A Stronger Japan-India Partnership for Indo-Pacific Security

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Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's foreign policy is based on an enhanced version of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Yet the Quad, the Japan-US-Australia-India partnership that serves as a cornerstone of FOIP, is showing signs of strain.

On May 26, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi attended a Quad foreign ministers' meeting in India and expressed concern that the Quad leaders' summit, which Japan considers critically important, has not been held since the start of the second Trump administration. According to Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney, the reasons include strained US-India relations stemming from President Donald Trump's tariff policies toward India, as well as shifts in his administration's approach to China.

US-China Relations

At the US-China summit in mid-May, the two countries agreed to pursue a "constructive relationship of strategic stability," signaling a shift in Washington's China policy toward greater accommodation.

Yet at the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference in Singapore on May 30, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth struck a different tone. Invoking former President Theodore Roosevelt's dictum, he said the United States would "speak and walk softly while carrying a big stick."

Hegseth emphasized that the United States is a Pacific nation and that potential adversaries will have no choice but to recognize its strength when they see its hard power, collective readiness, and unwavering resolve. He stated, "our approach in the Pacific centers on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain."

Even so, Hegseth stopped short of directly criticizing China.

Quad Under Strain

For Hegseth's determination to be translated into action, however, close cooperation among the Quad members is essential. At a time when China is steadily expanding its influence, the four countries must reaffirm not only their commitment to the grouping but also the strategic purpose it is meant to serve.

According to Chellaney, this is precisely where the Quad is falling short. He argues that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's participation in the Quad foreign ministers' meeting and his four-day visit to India reflected Washington's concern that the grouping was losing momentum, as well as its desire to repair strained relations with New Delhi.

One of the meeting's key objectives, Chellaney said, was to set a date for a Quad leaders' summit later this year. In the end, however, no agreement was reached. He also questioned the value of holding such a meeting if America's China strategy had changed.

A Changing Strategic Landscape

Motegi offered a similar assessment.

"Rubio wanted to hold a leaders' summit," he said. "But if President Trump himself is not committed to the idea, there is little that can be done."

As US-China relations continue to evolve, cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India has become increasingly important for Japan's efforts to deter China. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi's outreach to India has become a critical question.

Motegi also acknowledged the challenges of revitalizing the Quad.

"To begin with, Trump prefers bilateral negotiations to multilateral frameworks," he said. "Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping remains focused on expanding China's sphere of influence. India, for its part, is strengthening ties with Russia and China through its traditional policy of multi-alignment, partly because of its distrust of the United States, rather than concentrating on the Quad. Under these circumstances, our side should prioritize strengthening its own position over criticizing China."

Beyond the Shinkansen

When discussing Japan-India cooperation, attention in Japan often focuses on economic, technological, and industrial ties. One example is the Shinkansen (bullet train) project, Motegi noted.

"Prime Minister Narendra Modi hopes to introduce E10-series Shinkansen trains on the Mumbai-Gujarat route by 2030," he explained. "This is a remarkable next-generation technology, and deployment in Japan itself is scheduled for 2031. Modi's goal may not be realized, but cooperation need not be limited to high-speed rail. Cooperation in shipbuilding may, in fact, be the more important undertaking."

The proposal involves bringing Indian engineers to Japan and passing on shipbuilding expertise. Such cooperation would help sustain and deepen bilateral ties and should be pursued vigorously as part of Japan's economic security strategy.

Masanori Kondo, a planning committee member at the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals and an India specialist at International Christian University, argues that the foundations for stronger Japan-India relations are already well established.

He notes that the two countries have reached an enormous number of agreements and that the key is to put them into practice rather than leave them as words on paper. What is required, he says, is faster decision-making by Japan.

At the same time, Chellaney stresses that while advancing Japan-India cooperation, Japan should also share India's sense of security anxiety.

He further argued that the Quad receives little attention in the United States' National Security Strategy and that Washington's focus on Indo-Pacific security appears to be waning. As a result, he said, Japan and India will have to shoulder a greater share of the responsibility for maintaining regional stability. With the future of both nations at stake, this is the moment for Japan and India to commit to that responsibility and work together to safeguard their interests.

Confronting the Nuclear Threat

Yet as this strategic challenge unfolds, one cannot help but question the substance of the discussions taking place within the Liberal Democratic Party's Security Research Commission. At a time when Japan is surrounded by three nuclear-armed authoritarian states—China, Russia, and North Korea—and when US strategy itself may be in flux, the commission refuses even to discuss nuclear issues.

Does the party truly have the resolve to protect the Japanese people? Its unwillingness to confront the nuclear threat could be seen as a failure to address one of the country's most pressing security challenges.

(Read the article in Japanese.)

Author: Yoshiko Sakurai, President of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

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