Professor Nishioka analyzes why a Takaichi–Kim meeting is plausible and urges Tokyo to seize every opportunity to bring the abductees home.
National Rally to bring home the abductees November 2024

Families of abduction victims and participants cheer at a national rally calling for the immediate return of all abduction victims. In Tokyo on November 23, 2024. (©Sankei by Kanata Iwasaki)

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At the Japan–US summit on March 19, the issue of North Korea's abductions was reportedly raised as a key agenda item. 

Speaking to reporters afterward, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said, "President Donald Trump expressed his full support for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue. I also conveyed my strong determination to meet Kim Jong Un directly." 

She added that the "United States indicated its willingness to cooperate in various ways."

A Momentum Interrupted

Looking back, in January, Takaichi had framed the abductions issue as one of the chief reasons for dissolving the House of Representatives. She concluded that she needed a public mandate for her determination to engage Kim directly and produce tangible results.

The subsequent election delivered a historic victory for the ruling party. Takaichi's political strength also appears to have caught Trump's attention, as he tends to favor strong leaders.

At the latest summit, Trump likely listened to Takaichi's resolve more attentively than ever. Up to this point, events have unfolded largely according to her script.

Takuya Yokota, representative of the Family Association, answers media questions on the afternoon of March 4, 2024. Tetsuya Yokota, Sakie Yokota, and Tsutomu Nishioka also stand by at the Prime Minister's Office. (©Sankei by Hideyuki Matsui)

The remaining piece was expected to fall into place if Trump, leveraging a US–China summit, had proceeded with a meeting with Kim Jong Un and secured at least a measure of agreement on North Korea's denuclearization. 

That, in turn, would have brought a Japan–North Korea summit into clearer view, with Tokyo positioned to provide the economic assistance tied to such a deal.

Yet as is well known, the escalation of tensions in the Middle East has brought any visible movement to a halt.

Fear and Signals

As I wrote in my previous column, Kim Jong Un has been gripped by fears that he could be targeted in light of the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran that began on February 28. 

The North Korean leader suspended preparations for a US–North Korea summit and placed his sister, Kim Yo Jong, the Workers' Party official who is effectively the regime's second in line, in charge of gathering intelligence thoroughly on whether there are any signs that the US may attack North Korea.

At a session of the Supreme People's Assembly held on March 22–23, the State Security Ministry — the political police tasked with suppressing internal dissent — was rebranded into a State Information Bureau.

Kim Yo Jong, director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers' Party, issued a statement via the Korean Central News Agency on March 23, saying that "if Japan's prime minister seeks to resolve a unilaterally defined issue that North Korea does not recognize, our country's leadership has no intention of meeting." (©KCNA/Kyodo)

The new body will place greater emphasis on collecting and analyzing information from abroad to protect the leadership, while domestically, it will work to eliminate collaborators with foreign intelligence agencies.

Despite North Korea's heightened vigilance toward the US, on March 13, just ahead of the assembly, Trump reportedly told South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, who was visiting Washington, that "it would be a good thing" to meet Kim Jong Un. 

He added that such a meeting might happen when he goes to China, or afterwards. 

US President Donald Trump Meets with Chairman Kim Jong Un in 2019 (©Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

Timing the Summit

If Trump truly regarded Kim as a target for military action, he would hardly express a desire to meet him. In other words, even after the strikes on Iran, Trump has not abandoned the idea of meeting Kim during a future visit to Beijing.

That remark would almost certainly have been relayed to Kim. If a meeting fails to materialize while the US side is still expressing interest, it risks souring the atmosphere and potentially placing Pyongyang in a more precarious position.

Trump's planned visit to China, originally slated for late March before the Iran strikes, has now been rescheduled to May 14–15. Kim is said to be seriously considering holding a US–North Korea summit around that timing. 

Initially, there had even been a proposal to invite Trump to Pyongyang for a round of golf together. At present, however, multiple sources indicate that Kim is instead exploring the possibility of traveling to China to meet Trump following the US–China summit.

Abductions Still on the Table

So what lies ahead for possible talks with Japan?

On March 23, Kim Yo Jong issued a statement expressing a negative view of a Japan–North Korea summit. However, this should not be seen as a rejection of dialogue with Japan, but rather as part of a negotiating tactic.

The statement laid out conditions for a possible summit, including that Japan should not demand resolution of "unilateral issues we have never acknowledged," and that the country must be prepared to "break with outdated practices and habits." 

The reference to "unilateral issues" can be read as pointing to the abductions issue.

At the same time, it said that "Japan today is moving in the opposite direction," concluding, "Speaking entirely from a personal standpoint, I have no desire to see the Japanese prime minister visit Pyongyang."

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on April 6, in the afternoon, at the National Diet. (©Sankei by Ataru Haruna)

Seizing the Opportunity

In a statement issued in March 2024, Kim Yo Jong had flatly declared that negotiations would be "completely rejected" as long as the then–Kishida administration maintained that "the abductions issue remains unresolved." 

This time, however, such language was absent. In fact, the word "abductions" itself did not appear. The qualifier "entirely from a personal standpoint" also suggests that room remains for negotiation with Kim Jong Un at the top.

According to recent information I obtained, the original draft of the statement contained much harsher language, which was later removed. 

Taken as a whole, the message suggests that the Kim regime is probing Tokyo while keeping the door open to engagement. 

The opportunity will likely come. And when it does, the Japanese government must seize it and ensure it leads to the rescue of all abductees.

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Author: Tsutomu Nishioka

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