China's Gray Zone Pressure Around Taiwan Is Becoming Permanent, Security Expert Warns

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Chinese military and paramilitary activity around Taiwan has shifted from periodic shows of force to a standing presence, a change with direct consequences for Japan given its geographic proximity to Taiwan and the southwest island chain, says Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, Associate Professor at the Institute for International Strategy and Emerging Technologies, Tokyo International University, and a specialist in Indo-Pacific security and defense operations.

Additionally, some of the world's busiest shipping lanes and Taiwan's own semiconductor production run through waters where Chinese activity is expanding, meaning disruption near Taiwan could hit Japan's economy and supply chains even without a single shot fired near Japanese territory.

In an interview with Japan Forward, Hinata-Yamaguchi discussed what this shift means for Japan's operations and why the country's defense readiness still has significant gaps to close despite recent policy momentum.

A Standing Presence, Not a One-Off

In May, Taiwan's National Security Council reported that over 100 Chinese vessels had been deployed around the first island chain. Hinata-Yamaguchi said the pattern is more significant than the scale: this is no longer occasional saber-rattling but a sustained posture.

"We are seeing China becoming more confident with their state of readiness," he said. "And that is allowing them to press harder, not just along the first island chain, but potentially on the second island chain as well."

He cautioned against reading this purely through the PLA. The People's Armed Police, which includes the China Coast Guard, and maritime militia are equally active, extending Chinese presence from the East China Sea into the South China Sea and the South Pacific. 

"They are changing the status quo," he said. "These things are going to become sort of day-to-day business. It's not something we should react to on a case-by-case basis, but rather more proactively."

That shift was visible in December's "Strait Thunder-2025" exercises, which extended into waters east and southeast of Taiwan rather than concentrating on the Strait itself. 

Disruption, Not Just Destruction

Hinata-Yamaguchi framed the significance in terms of disruption rather than direct assault: the priority for Beijing, in his reading, is less about landing forces than about degrading the ability of Japan, Taiwan, and their partners to operate and to move goods freely. 

Given Taiwan's role in semiconductor production and the volume of trade passing through the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea, he said a serious disruption there could exceed the economic shock of recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Asked to rank the risk of specific sea lane disruption scenarios, such as a blockade, boarding and inspection of vessels, or the declaration of danger zones for shipping, Hinata-Yamaguchi declined to single one out, noting that many specifics remain unpredictable at this stage. His broader point was that Japan should plan for economic and logistical disruption as a standing risk rather than waiting to see which specific scenario materializes.

Readiness Gaps Behind the Headlines

On Japan's defense capabilities in general, Hinata-Yamaguchi pointed to a vulnerability that gets less attention than hardware acquisitions: the opening phase of any contingency, when communications and logistics between US and Japanese forces in the southwest island chain would likely be the first target. Sustaining command links and supply lines to units in that region, he said, matters as much as the weapons systems themselves.

He was direct about Japan's dependence on the United States for capabilities it lacks, particularly strike assets. "It would be extremely challenging for Japan to deal with the situation without the presence of the United States," he said. 

At the same time, he described the alliance as complementary rather than one-directional, citing Japan's strengths in submarine, anti-submarine, and mine warfare near its own coastline as capabilities the US relies on in turn.

That complementary relationship, he argued, still needs institutional work to function under pressure. Japan established a Joint Operations Command in March 2025, but Hinata-Yamaguchi called it only a starting point in what he expects will be a 5- to 10-year effort to make joint operations, logistics, and intelligence sharing sufficiently effective.

The Weakest Link

Civil resilience, he said, remains the weakest link. Public unfamiliarity with basic contingency procedures, uneven coordination between national and local governments, and an assumption that Japan's disaster-response experience will transfer directly to an armed contingency were his three biggest concerns. 

"We don't want Japan's confidence in dealing with natural disasters to be applied to these kinds of situations," he said, arguing that the scale and nature of an armed contingency would differ fundamentally from an earthquake or typhoon response.

Asked whether recent efforts to improve coordination among prefectures, municipalities, emergency services, and police gave him confidence, he was measured in his response. "I would still say the glass is half empty," he said, noting that many local governments still treat defense matters as either too politically sensitive to engage with or someone else's responsibility.

For Hinata-Yamaguchi, the throughline connecting Beijing's expanding presence around Taiwan and Japan's own preparations is the same: both are matters of sustained readiness rather than a single decisive moment. 

"A lot of people talk about hardware and platforms," he said. "But we also need the ability for the defense force to effectively use the assets it has." That, he said, will count as much toward Japan's deterrence and crisis management as any new weapons system.

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Author: Daniel Manning

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