Former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba during an interview with Japan Forward in Nagatacho, Chiyoda Ward, on April 15. (©Japan Forward/Kenji Yoshida)
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With the fragile Iran ceasefire still holding, former Japanese prime minister Shigeru Ishiba said Japan should "play a central role" in shaping a UN-backed coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz once a full truce is reached.
Still, in a recent interview with Japan Forward, he said the Japanese government cannot fully back Washington without clearly understanding "what imminent threat the US believed it faced" before launching strikes on Iran.
Ishiba, a former defense minister, also argued that his country needs a basic national security law to spell out what is and is not permitted under its Constitution to more effectively exercise collective self-defense.
Excerpts of the interview follow.
You have said Japan must clarify whether the US strikes on Iran were lawful. Can you elaborate?
Though ultimately proven wrong, in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, [then–US Secretary of State] Colin Powell appeared before the UN and justified American military action on the grounds that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
This time, the Trump administration has chosen to explain its rationale for striking Iran on social media.
Of course, pre-emptive self-defense is recognized under international law where there is an immediate threat. But if Japan were to fully back the US, we must understand what imminent threat the US believed it faced from Iran.
Recent reports suggest NATO is drafting a postwar plan to help secure the Strait of Hormuz. Should Japan join?
If a complete ceasefire is reached, I believe the UN should adopt an appropriate resolution. Japan should play a central role here and help secure safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz, ideally through a coalition of the willing, operating pursuant to such a resolution.
Are there other ways Tokyo can contribute?
Another plausible post-ceasefire response would be to order a maritime security operation for investigative and surveillance purposes and, to protect Japanese shipping, undertake measures such as neutralizing abandoned mines.
If that proves difficult under prevailing interpretations of police authority, Japan is well accustomed to enacting special measures laws of the sort adopted for the Iraq and Afghan wars. Doing so would not be particularly difficult.
At the recent Asan Plenum, you warned about the risk of simultaneous contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. Why?
If carried out, China will likely conduct any military operation against Taiwan in a way that avoids turning it into a contingency for Japan. That is to say, it may use force against Taiwan while stopping short of attacking the Senkaku Islands or Japan's southwestern islands.
If China were to strike those [latter] areas, the Japan-US Security Treaty would certainly be triggered. The result would be the full engagement of the alliance in direct conflict with China in the Taiwan theater. From Beijing's standpoint, that would yield little strategic benefit. A Taiwan contingency, then, need not immediately be a Japan contingency.
But a contingency on the Korean Peninsula is different. US forces in Japan would operate under the United Nations Command (UNC), and the relevant UNC status-of-forces arrangements would come into effect. Because prior consultation is not required, US forces stationed in Japan could technically move to and from the Korean Peninsula in their capacity as UNC forces.
In that sense, a Korean Peninsula contingency would almost certainly take on the character of a Japan contingency. Imagine if two contingencies [including the Taiwan Strait] unfolded simultaneously. This is precisely why South Korea, Japan, and the US must cultivate a common understanding in advance.
When would a Taiwan contingency become a Japan contingency?
First of all, China probably won't see much advantage in attacking Taiwan unless a major threshold is crossed, such as a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan, US recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, or an explicit nuclear-sharing arrangement between Washington and Taipei.
Short of such developments, the strategic merit of a full-scale Chinese invasion seems limited.
But if China were to launch a military assault on Taiwan, and the US were to invoke collective self-defense and request ally support, then Japan, too, would likely exercise that same right.
Is a constitutional amendment needed for Japan to fully exercise its collective self-defense?
I don't think an amendment is necessary. Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly prohibit the right to exercise collective self-defense.
Japan has long maintained that the exercise of collective self-defense would exceed the "minimum necessary" level permitted under its Constitution. Yet this is entirely a matter of interpretation. That is why the Peace and Security legislation was established [in 2015], allowing a limited form of collective self-defense in exceptional situations deemed to threaten national survival.
The priority should be to enact a basic national security law. Such a law should spell out, for instance, the conditions and limits of exercising collective self-defense, the standards governing arms exports, and the interpretation of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
Has US unpredictability made tighter coordination among middle powers more vital?
Countries like Spain, Italy, and Canada can speak more frankly to the US largely because they are embedded in NATO's collective-security framework. Collective defense is not a right but an obligation. The kind of thinking reflected in [Canadian] Prime Minister Carney's Davos speech remains inevitably Eurocentric.
In the Indo-Pacific, the US maintains a web of alliances and security ties—with ANZUS, with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. I don't see any great difficulty in weaving these relationships together into a more organic whole.
If Japan alone remains unable or unwilling to exercise collective self-defense, such an arrangement would be utterly untenable.
RELATED:
- Japan Fundamentally Different From NATO in Iran Crisis, Trump Ally Says
- From Iraq to Hormuz, US Allies in East Asia Face a Familiar Test
Author: Kenji Yoshida
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