Former Trump Adviser: US Expects More From Japan Than Just Iran Policy

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Iran and the Strait of Hormuz have injected uncertainty into the Japan-US alliance. Just weeks after United States President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi used their March 19 summit to showcase a broader agenda of missile co-production, stronger deterrence, and closer economic-security ties, Trump publicly complained that Japan had not "helped" the US in operations related to Iran.

That has left an uncomfortable but increasingly important question hanging over the relationship: what, exactly, does Washington want from Tokyo in the current crisis, and what can Japan realistically do within its constitutional, legal, and political limits?

Deterrence and Direction in the Alliance

In an interview with JAPAN Forward, former Trump National Security Council chief of staff Alexander Gray argued that the confusion created by Iran should not obscure the larger strategic picture.

"The challenge facing the two countries is China and Chinese malign activity," he said. "Japan's our most important alliance in the 21st century. And it's because we're jointly dealing as the most capable military and economic powers in the Indo-Pacific." Gray said that, for Washington, the importance of the relationship lies above all in the shared challenge posed by China, and added that the Takaichi government is "uniquely situated to be a governing partner for the US."

His view largely matches the official tone of the Trump-Takaichi summit. According to the White House, the two leaders agreed to expand missile cooperation, continue coordination following the 2025 deployment of the US Typhon missile system to mainland Japan, explore Tokyo's role in increasing AMRAAM production, and rapidly quadruple Standard Missile-3 Block IIA production in Japan.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, said the two sides agreed to advance "a broad range of security cooperation, including co-development and co-production of missiles" to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities.

Domestic Form Is the Real Test

Still, Gray suggested that the real issue is not whether the alliance sounds strong on paper, but whether Japan can continue making itself a more capable strategic partner in practice. He pointed repeatedly to domestic reform as the key test.

*Alexander B Gray at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan on February 28, 2024. (© JAPAN Forward)*

"The biggest thing that the Takaichi government can do is […] to continue to make Japan the principal American military and strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific vis-a-vis China," he said, citing steps such as creating a more traditional intelligence agency and pressing ahead with defense exports.

He added that if "nice rhetoric and language" were stripped away, what matters is "pure military capability and enhancing the capacity to use it for deterrence purposes." That, he explained, is where Japan can add the most value.

Delivering on Investment

That emphasis is striking because the March summit also highlighted a much broader agenda. The White House and Japan both described the meeting as covering critical minerals, deep-sea resources, AI, energy security, and strategic investment, including a second batch of projects under the Japan-US Strategic Investment initiative and support for small modular reactor development.

Gray acknowledged the importance of critical minerals and Japanese investment in the US. But he suggested the more immediate political issue was follow-through on the investment package while Trump is in office.

"It's incredibly important to him. It's incredibly important to his base of voter groups in the US," Gray said. Japan, he added, should be seen as "a serious and trusted friend that's willing to make those kinds of monetary investments," as it would give Trump "a great deal of domestic support to continue keeping the alliance moving in the right direction."

Focus on the Indo-Pacific, Not Mediation

On Iran, Gray was cautious about assigning Japan a major diplomatic role. Japan's own readout of the March summit said Takaichi told Trump that Iran must never be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and condemned Iranian actions, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and threats to navigation. It also stressed the importance of early de-escalation and energy stability. The two leaders also agreed to remain in close communication on peace and stability in the Middle East, including the Strait.

But Gray suggested Japan's more useful role would be elsewhere. "I'm not sure where Japan would fit in at this point," he said, arguing that Washington already had multiple channels for facilitation. Instead, he said, Japan should "double and triple down on its capacity to act as a force multiplier and deterrent vis-a-vis China and the Indo-Pacific."

That logic also shaped his answer on what Japan can do immediately, even within current constraints. Gray pointed less to dramatic military moves in the Gulf than to a stronger use of Japan's existing tools closer to home. "Using the Japanese Coast Guard, using the Japanese National Police Agency, using all the elements of national power that Japan has at its disposal to increase what Japan is doing to help us counter China's gray zone activity," he said. "The gray zone is where the hybrid war space is, where you're likely to see something happen."

How Trump Judges the Alliance

Gray also offered a way to understand Trump's mixed messaging. Trump may publicly complain that Japan did not do what he asked, but that does not necessarily mean the administration sees the alliance as failing.

Gray said the real measure is whether Japan is making medium-term progress: raising defense spending, advancing procurement, loosening restrictions on defense exports, and advancing reforms that make it a more capable partner. "It's budgets, it's policy statements, it's white papers, it's how things are actually progressing on the ground," he said. By that standard, he argued, Tokyo is making "real tangible progress."

Looking ahead, Gray said he remains bullish on the alliance. His biggest warning was not over Iran, but over complacency — particularly if Japan assumes that signing investment deals is enough without following through. If Tokyo and industry fail to deliver the promised capital deployment, he suggested, the political costs could be significant. Otherwise, he said, the relationship is on track for "a very successful couple of years."

Author: Daniel Manning

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