Japan Plans Foreign Intelligence Agency, Luttwak Warns Against CIA Model

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The Japanese government plans to establish a central intelligence command body, the "National Intelligence Bureau," as early as July this year. It also aims to launch a foreign intelligence agency by the end of fiscal 2027. The proposed agency has been described as Japan's equivalent of the CIA.

However, American historian and strategist Edward Luttwak, a former consultant to the US National Security Council, believes that modeling a new intelligence service on the CIA would be a serious mistake. In his view, the agency has a long record of failures, including in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, and is therefore not an organization Japan should seek to emulate.

Language as a Core Requirement

In an interview, Luttwak argued that a foreign intelligence service should not be established as an independent agency like the CIA.

He pointed to Britain's foreign intelligence service, MI6, which operates under the authority of the Foreign Office, as well as similar arrangements in Australia.

According to Luttwak, this model allows intelligence organizations to draw on Foreign Ministry personnel with extensive overseas experience and strong language skills while facilitating close coordination with diplomatic missions abroad. By contrast, he said, too many CIA officers lack proficiency in foreign languages.

Above all, he argued that intelligence officers involved in foreign intelligence work must be able to communicate effectively in foreign languages, interact comfortably with people from other cultures, and have firsthand experience living overseas.

"If you set up an intelligence organization with 500 people, let's say," Luttwak explained, "nobody in that building should be somebody who doesn't speak at least one foreign language well. Not the secretary—nobody."

He added, "Anybody who has a leadership role should have lived in at least two or three countries and be able to speak at least two languages."

Training Personnel

Luttwak also noted that Japan's foreign ministry alone would be unable to provide enough personnel for a new foreign intelligence service. Instead, he said, Japan should recruit people from across the country with strong language skills and substantial overseas experience.

"Takaichi has to understand that Japan from Hokkaido to Kyushu is full of people with foreign experience. And they are the ones who must be recruited."

Previous occupations should be of little concern, he said. Whether they are painters, fishermen, poets or singers, such individuals would make more effective intelligence officers than domestically oriented bureaucrats.

"You cannot get people who have been bureaucrats and teach them to be intelligence agents," he said.

Translation Is Not Enough

To illustrate the importance of language ability and overseas experience, Luttwak cited the example of John Brennan, who served as CIA director under President Barack Obama.

"When he was younger, they paid for him to spend one year in Cairo to learn Arabic," Luttwak recalled. "When I met him many years later, I tried to speak with him. He said, 'Sorry, I don't know Arabic.'" Brennan later explained that he had been too occupied with embassy duties during his postings in the Middle East to develop fluency in the language.

In Luttwak's view, this reflected a broader problem within the CIA, where officers often spend more time inside embassies than working directly in the field.

According to Luttwak, foreign-language translation and interpretation at the CIA are frequently handled by specialist linguists rather than intelligence officers themselves. He noted that even the first head of the unit established in 1996 to track al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden reportedly relied largely on English-language translations rather than reading Arabic-language sources directly.

While translated material can convey information, Luttwak argued, it often fails to capture important nuances, including tone, gestures and other subtle forms of communication.

He also recalled introducing British intelligence officers stationed in Beijing to Japanese specialists on China. Both groups spoke Chinese fluently. When he later asked the British officers how many CIA personnel in Beijing could speak Chinese, they could identify only one, he said.

Luttwak said that shortcomings in foreign-language proficiency and overseas experience can lead intelligence agencies to misunderstand local conditions and provide policymakers with flawed assessments, ultimately distorting foreign policy decisions.

Managing the CIA's Image

At the same time, Luttwak said, the CIA has been highly effective at managing its public image.

"Every Hollywood film, they present the CIA as very expert," he explained. "They pay a lot of money to persuade Hollywood to put out good stories."

According to Luttwak, the agency has also sought to cultivate sympathetic voices in the media. He pointed to foreign-affairs coverage in The Washington Post, which he said has often reflected the CIA's perspective.

"They do not carry stories about the mistakes the CIA makes every day. And they carry stories saying how great the CIA is, even when they are not. And they lie completely about it," he said.