Senior Associate Professor Junjiro Shida at his office, Meio University, Nago, Okinawa. (©JAPAN Forward=Kenji Yoshida)
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since the outbreak of war in Iran has exposed a familiar weakness: the global community still heavily depends on narrow maritime chokepoints to keep trade and energy flowing.
For Japan, the risks are not distant. As a resource-scarce nation, it faces similar vulnerabilities much closer to home. The South China Sea and the sea lanes along its southwestern archipelago, for instance, serve as critical arteries for trade.
Even as China's military presence in these waters grows, some 40% of Japan's trade passes through the South China Sea each year. If disruption can happen in Hormuz, it can happen here as well.
Is Tokyo prepared for a contingency in its own front yard? And what might Beijing learn from the Middle East crisis? In Part II of JAPAN Forward's ongoing series, we speak with Junjiro Shida, Senior Associate Professor at Meio University in Okinawa and an expert in international security.
Excerpts of the interview follow.
With China's maritime presence expanding, how significant are Japan's missile deployments in the Southwest?
At its core, deterrence rests on how an adversary perceives our intent and capability.
Japan must clearly signal its intent to defend its territory and sovereignty and reject any unilateral change to the status quo by force or coercion, and back that intent with credible capabilities.
If both are reliably demonstrated, they can make Beijing think twice before testing the limits of the status quo.
What lessons might China draw from the Hormuz disruption and the global response?
China is likely watching the US actions in Iran with quiet intensity. On one level, America's continued use of force, especially alongside visible friction with NATO allies, suggests a widening gap between Washington and its partners.
Yet another lesson cuts in the opposite direction. When the US decides to act, it does so decisively with overwhelming force. And even when allies disagree, they rarely drift far. If anything, they regroup — often coordinating more closely among themselves.
That dynamic matters for the Taiwan Strait. In the event of a blockade, US allies and like-minded states would unlikely sit idle. They would likely tighten cooperation on economic security, raising the cost of escalation and narrowing Beijing's room to maneuver.
Wars are steered by overwhelming firepower and won by the capacity to endure, including economic strength.
How will Japan's push for stand-off weapons and integrated operations reshape deterrence?
It is important for the public to understand that these efforts are not meant to fuel a regional arms race. They are designed to strengthen Japan's deterrence and response capabilities and, in doing so, contribute to regional stability.
Because these initiatives require closer integration among the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces and deeper coordination with the US military, they will enhance joint operational capacity.
This, in turn, will reinforce the Japan–US alliance and strengthen overall deterrence in the region.
In a Taiwan or Senkaku contingency, how would operations be divided between the SDF and US forces?
Much depends on the nature of the contingency, but the Self-Defense Forces' core mission is clear. In coordination with local governments and relevant ministries, they must ensure the safe evacuation of residents from remote islands while responding to any infringement on Japan's territory and sovereignty.
Operations to retake remote islands [should they be occupied by an adversary] are therefore a central consideration. In the Nansei Islands in particular, mobility and rapid response will be critical.
In preparation for potential contingencies involving Taiwan and the Nansei Islands, joint training with US forces in Okinawa is already underway. While the precise division of roles remains unclear, such exercises likely reflect careful and detailed planning between the two allies.
At the same time, any crisis is likely to extend beyond the physical domain. Cognitive warfare, including disinformation and other forms of information manipulation, is expected to play a major role. In response, the SDF has recently established dedicated units to counter information warfare across all three branches. These units are expected to play a key role in ensuring effective operations.
Do shifting US priorities risk a defense vacuum in East Asia, and how should Tokyo respond?
A close reading of the recent US National Security and Defense Strategies suggests a gradual scaling back of alliance commitments in Europe and South Korea. By contrast, the defense of the First Island Chain is framed as directly tied to core American national interests, including economic ones. This distinction cautions against viewing the Japan-US alliance in the same terms as NATO or the US-South Korea alliance.
These documents likewise make clear that Washington expects its allies to take greater responsibility for their own defense and regional stability. For Japan, this means that strengthening its defense capabilities is not only a matter of national security but also a way to reinforce the stability of the bilateral alliance.
As China expands its maritime reach beyond the First Island Chain toward the Second Island Chain, the Takaichi administration's push to discuss "Pacific defense" can be seen as an effort to close the emerging defense vacuum across this wider theater.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
