Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein (©Japan Forward)
Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein is President Emeritus and Japan Chair at the Hudson Institute, one of Washington's most influential foreign policy think tanks.
Japan Forward spoke with him following his keynote address at the First Shinzo Abe International Forum in Tokyo, where he reflected on former Prime Minister Abe's legacy, the evolution of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework, and the challenges Japan faces in maintaining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
The Indo-Pacific Forum
A longtime confidant of Abe, Weinstein co-founded the Indo-Pacific Forum with Abe in 2022—an initiative designed as a platform for frank, strategic dialogue that Abe believed was missing from the region's security architecture.
"He had wanted to create a legacy forum to promote his idea of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific," Weinstein recalled. "The idea was to bring together business leaders and government officials working on critical security and economic security challenges in the Indo-Pacific—a closed-door, frank conversation with no press present about how to meet these challenges."
Following Abe's death, Prime Minister Kishida offered his full support to continue the initiative. The forum has since held events in Tokyo, Taipei, and Düsseldorf, with side events at Munich, Shangri-La, and Davos, focusing on defense dual-use technologies.
The Evolution of FOIP
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept traces its intellectual roots to Abe's "confluence of the two oceans" speech, delivered in the Indian Parliament in 2007. That speech drew on the worldview of his grandfather, former Prime Minister Kishi, who emphasized the strategic importance of India–Japan relations in shaping Asia's future.
Weinstein described FOIP as initially serving two purposes: reframing Asia's strategic geography from a China-centric map toward what he calls a "democratic diamond" of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India; and reinforcing principles of open trade, economic development, and freedom of navigation.
Over time, FOIP has been adopted by more than a dozen countries and integrated into their foreign and security policies. However, as a non-binding framework, its meaning has remained open to interpretation.
As Weinstein put it, "People sort of have this notion that Free and Open is a kind of Rashomon effect—that every nation sees what it wants in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific."
US Interpretation
Weinstein noted that the United States' adoption of FOIP marked a significant shift in how the concept evolved internationally.
"It was the first time in US history that a rather obscure doctrine by an ally became central to US defense, foreign policy, and development strategy," he said.
However, he noted that Washington's interpretation diverged from Tokyo's in important ways. In Japan's original framing, China was not explicitly positioned as the central focus, whereas in the US version, it became the primary strategic reference point.
He also pointed to FOIP's transformation from a largely economic and connectivity-oriented vision into a more explicitly security-driven framework. One symbolic reflection of this shift, he said, was the renaming of US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command.
FOIP Under Different Prime Ministers
Successive Japanese leaders have adapted FOIP to their own strategic priorities. Under Prime Minister Kishida, the framework placed greater emphasis on ASEAN engagement, disaster relief, and regional resilience.
Under Prime Minister Takaichi, FOIP has shifted decisively toward economic security. In a policy speech in Hanoi in May, she set out three priorities: stronger energy and critical-material supply chains, joint development of new economic fields through public-private cooperation, and expanded security linkages.
Weinstein argued that despite these shifts, a core element of Abe's original thinking has remained implicit throughout FOIP's evolution.
"For Abe, Taiwan was central but unstated. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific requires that the status quo remain in the Taiwan Strait," he explained. This implicit framing, he adds, reflected Abe's sensitivity to the economic and diplomatic constraints facing ASEAN states and the need to balance competing regional relationships.
Reflecting on the framework today, he said, "FOIP is gaining ground, and is gaining ground now primarily as a Japanese concept."
Deterring Xi
On the question of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, Weinstein was direct.
"We need to make sure that Xi Jinping comes to have a notion that taking over Taiwan is not going to be like suppressing freedom in Hong Kong."
He argued that deterrence now depends increasingly on integrated intelligence and technological capability. Historically, limited coordination between Japan, the United States, and Taiwan constrained real-time information sharing. "But now, with commercially available data from low-Earth-orbit satellites, it would be easier to act jointly if required," he explained.
Weinstein also raised a less-discussed risk: that Beijing's primary target may not be Taiwan itself. "Their real focus may be on Scarborough Shoal, which may be easier to take over than Taiwan. That gives Xi Jinping a victory—but not one that, at the end of the day, is worth having a world war over."
Ukraine's Lessons
The Ukraine war has emerged as a key reference point for how modern warfare is reshaping defense planning, particularly through the integration of new technologies.
Weinstein highlighted Ukraine's use of satellites, drones, and data-driven systems as an example of how "total domain awareness" has become increasingly central to battlefield effectiveness.
At the same time, he stressed the need for resilient supply chains that can operate under conditions of sustained military pressure. "If there is a Taiwan contingency—which would mean a Japan contingency—Japan will not be able to rely on the United States to come in with parts and aircraft, because our troops will be occupied in combat as well," he said.
Weinstein said Ukraine has also demonstrated the importance of allied support during a prolonged conflict. He described the country's partnerships with European nations as "transformative" and suggested that President Trump wants Europe to assume greater responsibility for Ukraine while the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific.
The Political Obstacle
Asked about the most significant constraint on Japan's ability to respond to a Taiwan contingency, Weinstein highlighted structural and institutional limitations.
The first is the lack of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which could complicate early-stage coordination during a crisis involving rapid information flows and potential cognitive or information warfare.
The second is Japan's defense industrial capacity gap. While he expects Japan to become a major producer of unmanned systems in the coming years, he argued that current capability still falls short of operational needs.
He suggested that addressing this gap will require not only budget increases but a shift in political mindset.
"Japan needs to act as if this is a national crisis right now," he said, pointing to fiscal conservatism and institutional caution as persistent constraints.
Despite these challenges, Weinstein expressed greater optimism about Japan's strategic outlook than earlier in his career.
"The naivety of post-war pacifism has passed," he said. "Japan's strategic culture is far more sophisticated than it was before Shinzo Abe."
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