Expert: After Iran, North Korea's Nuclear Conviction Hardens

As the conflict in the Middle East shows no sign of abating, a newly confident North Korea is staging a show of force thousands of miles away, testing missiles on land and at sea.

On April 19, Pyongyang carried out its fourth missile test of the month. State-run media said the weapons carried cluster-bomb warheads, a type of munition banned under a treaty joined by more than 120 countries. Days earlier, the regime's new destroyer, Choe Hyon, fired several strategic cruise and anti-ship missiles, underscoring its push to extend strike options past the Peninsula.

The launches come as US President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing in mid-May and has reiterated interest in meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions. Such a meeting would mark their first face-to-face encounter since June 2019 and could revive stalled denuclearization talks.

For Japan, the stakes go beyond a nuclear-free Korea. Tokyo has yet to resolve the abduction issue, with 12 of the 17 officially recognized Japanese abductees still unaccounted for after five returned home in 2002. Whether talks with Pyongyang can be reopened may depend heavily on the trajectory of Trump-Kim ties.

To assess what lies ahead, Japan Forward spoke with Dr. Ri Sotetsu, a Korean Peninsula expert at Ryukoku University in Kyoto.

What strategic lessons might North Korea be drawing from the current crisis in the Middle East?

US military operations in Iran and earlier in Venezuela have likely hardened North Korea's long-held conviction that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Pyongyang is also likely drawing another lesson that even weaker states can impose costs on stronger military powers through asymmetric weapons, including drones and cluster munitions.

North Korea will try to show that killing Kim would not kill its ability to retaliate. That means building a system in which nuclear weapons could be launched automatically if Washington were to target Kim Jong Un the way it targeted Khamenei.

There is growing speculation about another summit between Trump and Kim. How realistic is it?

It would be difficult. From Trump's perspective, any meeting with Kim would need to produce some level of nuclear agreement. At present, there is little prospect of that. A US-North Korea summit without substance would bring Trump few political rewards. It might briefly command global attention, but with less than three years left in his term, he has little reason to spend time on a showpiece event that yields no visible result.

Kim, for his part, would likely set two conditions for a US-North Korea summit. First, Washington would have to abandon what Pyongyang calls its "hostile policy" toward North Korea. In practice, that means sanctions relief. Second, Washington would have to recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, which would amount to accepting the Kim regime on its own terms. There is little reason to believe the US would accept either demand, especially after demonstrating its resolve to dismantle Iran's nuclear capabilities.

That said, one cannot rule out the possibility that Trump, during a mid-May visit to Beijing, might call on Kim to meet without preconditions. But accepting such an offer would force Kim into a hard choice. He would either have to reject Trump's demand for denuclearization outright or signal some willingness to discuss it.

If Kim chooses the former, he could invite the same fate as [former] Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro or Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. If he chooses the latter, he risks undermining the very foundation of his regime.

If a summit takes place, what would each side seek?

If a summit were held, Washington would likely press for a phased deal: first a freeze on North Korea's nuclear and missile development and testing, then reductions in nuclear materials and warheads, and finally verifiable inspections. Kim would probably reject everything beyond the first step. Even if talks somehow reached the second stage, any agreement would mean little without independent inspections.

Pyongyang, for its part, would likely frame the talks in three stages. First, an end to what it calls America's hostile policy. Second, sanctions relief. Only then would it move to arms-control talks. The problem is that North Korea can redefine what it means by hostile policy on a whim. Pyongyang could cite something as minor as a US official or media outlet getting Kim's title wrong as a pretext to walk away from the talks.

Sanctions relief would also take time. And even if those hurdles were cleared and the two sides moved to arms-control talks, Pyongyang would define arms control as proportional reductions. In other words, if North Korea promises to cut its nuclear warheads by 10%, it would likely argue that the US reduce its arsenal by the same share.

For Japan, reopening dialogue with North Korea and securing the return of abductees remains an important diplomatic priority. How do you see the outlook?

Japan-North Korea talks are conceivable under two scenarios. Either US-North Korea talks succeed, or they collapse.

If talks with Washington go well, Pyongyang would likely turn quickly to Tokyo. The US can offer North Korea diplomatic normalization and sanctions relief, but not hard cash. Japan can. Under the Pyongyang Declaration [in 2002], Tokyo pledged postwar economic cooperation.

Should talks fail, Japan could become useful to Pyongyang for a different reason. If the US hints at a decapitation strike, considers a preemptive attack, or sharply intensifies pressure, North Korea may try to open dialogue with Tokyo, including movement on the abduction issue, to soften the atmosphere and restrain Washington.

South Korea's intelligence agency recently assessed that Kim Ju Ae is a likely successor to Kim Jong Un. What is your take? 

There is no real prospect of a succession struggle in North Korea. The idea that Kim Yo Jong [younger sister of Kim Jong Un] is dissatisfied or that her power is rising independently is baseless. Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong should not be seen simply as political allies. They function as a single political organism.

Kim Yo Jong appears powerful because Kim Jong Un is powerful. The elevation of his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, should be read in that context. Kim Yo Jong is actively helping put Kim Ju Ae forward to keep the succession question away from herself.

RELATED:

• North Korea's Latest Missile Tests Sharpen Focus on Regional Strike Capability 
• North Korea's Military Rise and New Cold War on the Peninsula 

Author: Kenji Yoshida