Launcher for the long-range Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile (upgraded version) on display at the GSDF's Camp Kengun in Kumamoto City, morning of March 17. (©Sankei)
Amidst the complex and severe security environment, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) announced on March 31 the first operational deployment of domestically developed long-range missile systems.
This move marks one of the most consequential shifts in Japan's postwar defense posture and is expected to bolster the archipelago's deterrence capabilities.
The JGSDF deployed an upgraded ground-launched Type 12 surface-to-ship missile at Kengun camp in Kumamoto prefecture and a Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) at Fuji camp in Shizuoka prefecture.
Both weapons have been given new names: the upgraded Type-12 is renamed the Type-25 surface-to-ship missile (SSM), and the HVGP is renamed the Type-25 HVGP. The implementation of counter-strike capabilities to deter enemies and strike distant targets marks a shift in the country's defence policy under the pacifist constitution.
Beyond the Defensive Line
Japan's aim of acquiring counter-strike capabilities to strike enemy missile bases was also explicitly mentioned in Japan's revised National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2022.
Under the revised NSS, counterstrike capabilities have been deemed constitutional under the three conditions. One, an armed attack is imminent or has occurred. Two, there is no other way to halt an attack. And three, that the use of force should be kept to a minimum.
Counterstrike capability is the ability to target and hit missile-related sites within an attacking country. So far, Japan's lack of such capability has been compensated for by its reliance on the US protection and missile defenses.
In recent years, however, Japan has been steadily building its defense capabilities as China, North Korea, and Russia have increased their military activities in the region.
Extending Range, Sharing the Burden
The Type-25 SSM has been enhanced with its range extended to around 1,000 kilometers, allowing ground-based units to engage targets beyond Japan's coastline. Moreover, the Type 25 HVGP has introduced hypersonic weapons into the JGSDF service, which travel at high speeds and are fundamentally used for doctrine development and training.
The deployments come as the Chinese military has ramped up its training around Japan's islands near Taiwan, and North Korea continues its missile programs with an enhanced nuclear weapons program.
The newly formed Type-25 missile systems form a key pillar of Tokyo's efforts to build a strong defense architecture. Japan's Ministry of Defence aims to deploy the Type 25 HVGP to Camp Kamifurano in Hokkaido and Camp Ebino in Miyazaki in the 2026 fiscal year.
Japan also plans to deploy ship- and air-launched versions of the Type 25 SSM on Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers and Air Self-Defence Force fighter jets in fiscal year 2027.
This evolution in defense posture is tied to its alliance commitments with the US. Japan's development of counterstrike capabilities helps address the challenge of prioritizing the missile defence targets. Under its alliance commitments, the US is obligated to intercept missiles that are directed at Japan, but it must also prioritize defending its own territory if both are under threat.
By acquiring the ability to strike enemy missile launch sites, Japan can assume greater responsibility for its own defence, thereby reducing the burden on the US and further easing this strategic dilemma.
Navigating Risk and Restraint
Domestically, the policy shift is equally complex as Article 9 of Japan's constitution has constrained the use of force, and public opinion, too, remains cautious about expanding the military capabilities.
While it is widely accepted for the US to extend its security protection to Japan, some find it controversial for Japan to take actions that could effectively protect the United States, particularly if such actions risk escalating into broader conflict.
Furthermore, Japan's counterstrike capabilities can also be justified in light of the potential Taiwan contingency, since Japan should be prepared for a Chinese attack on Japan's Self-Defence Forces or the US forces stationed in Japan.
To that end, China and North Korea are likely to view Japan's acquisition of long-range missile systems with suspicion, as both countries have already criticised Tokyo's defence reforms as evidence of remilitarisation.
The Japanese government has justified the missile deployments as a necessary response to evolving threats, emphasising the use of force to be limited to self-defence.
Power, Price, and Integration
Another issue in this development is that of command and control. The effectiveness of counterstrike capabilities depends on hardware and timely surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance. Japan will need to deepen integration with US systems and enhance its independent capabilities.
Moreover, the financial costs of these developments are substantial. Japan has already committed to increasing its defence spending to 2% of its GDP, ahead of the original target of 2027, aiming to reach levels comparable to NATO standards.
Long-range missile programs, along with associated investments in targeting, cyber, and space capabilities, will require sustained funding over many years. Balancing these expenditures along with other domestic priorities will be an ongoing challenge for policymakers.
Japan's deployment of long-range missiles reflects a broader recalibration of its national security strategy. It is an attempt to adapt to a complex strategic environment while remaining anchored in longstanding norms of restraint. Whether this balance can be maintained will depend on how these capabilities are integrated, communicated, and governed in practice.
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Author: Simran Walia, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA in India
