As Xi's Military Purge Continues, Why Doesn't the PLA Rebel?

Messages from within the Chinese Communist Party's military indicate that Xi Jinping is employing big data and artificial intelligence to conduct a massive internal purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The primary target is anyone connected to former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, who was arrested in January. Many observers are asking a pointed question: under such brutal and sweeping purges, why do Chinese generals or soldiers not resist?

Xi's Relentless Purge Deepens in the PLA

According to former CCP official Du Wen, a PLA officer who had been out of contact for several months recently reached out to him, revealing that the large-scale cleansing within the military continues unabated.

This officer returned to his unit after spending the Chinese New Year at home in March, only to disappear suddenly. His family could not reach him and was terrified. When they inquired with the unit, they were told he was merely away on a mission.

In reality, upon returning, he was immediately isolated for investigation. He endured months of harrowing interrogation that felt like a brush with death. Only after nothing incriminating was found was he released.

He reported that many officers around him had vanished in the same manner. The entire military system is now conducting a retrograde investigation spanning 14 years, targeting all individuals associated with Zhang Youxia.

The reason for going back 14 years is clear: Zhang assumed the post of Minister of the PLA General Armament Department in 2012 and entered the Central Military Commission. From then on, he wielded enormous power within the Chinese military and promoted a vast number of officers.

The current purge extends beyond direct or indirect subordinates to their subordinates' subordinates, and so on—reaching from full generals down through lieutenant generals, major generals, senior colonels, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, and second lieutenants, all the way to ordinary battalion-level cadres.

In effect, every officer promoted after 2012 is being subjected to a universal screening. This dragnet-style investigation is unprecedented anywhere in the world.

Big Data, AI, and the Expanding Web of Suspicion

Previous investigations typically focused only on military commanders and political officers. This time, even technical specialists and professional soldiers in specialized branches fall within the scope of scrutiny.

Because the number of people to investigate is overwhelming, manual screening is impossible. The military discipline inspection commission lacks the capacity, so authorities have turned to big data and AI. Even contacts in mobile phones and WeChat friend circles are now under examination.

For example, if someone's phone contains Zhang Youxia's number and Zhang's phone contains theirs, that person is immediately flagged. Once flagged, their subordinates, drivers, drivers' families, relatives, and comrades-in-arms all come under investigation.

In the five months since Zhang Youxia's arrest in January, at least several thousand personnel across the PLA's five theater commands have been investigated, possibly reaching into the tens of thousands.

The PLA, from top to bottom, has fallen into an unprecedented state of panic and paralysis. Its outward displays of military might are little more than deliberate posturing to create tension and deter potential adversaries from acting rashly.

Statistics show that since Xi Jinping assumed the post of Central Military Commission Chairman in 2012, he has promoted 80 PLA full generals. Today, only four of them remain in position, two of whom were promoted very recently.

On July 3, Xi promoted two more: Zhang Shuguang, secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and director of the CMC Supervision Commission, and Air Force Commander Wang Gang.

The promotion ceremony was strikingly austere, with only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin seated on the dais. The cold, empty atmosphere led many to wonder how long these newly promoted officers would last in their roles.

The Structural Barriers Preventing Military Resistance

Another pressing question arises: Xi is purging the military with such ruthless breadth. Of the seven-member Central Military Commission, only Zhang Shengmin remains besides Xi himself. Why does the military not resist such cruelty?

Answering this requires understanding the CCP's military system. Besides military commanders such as army commanders, there are political commissars and military discipline inspection commissions. Political commissars oversee political work and ideological indoctrination to ensure loyalty to the Party while functioning like secret police, constantly monitoring the troops.

The Chinese military also enforces a "gun-bullet separation system." Firearms and ammunition are stored and guarded separately by different personnel, with regular inspections and registration.

Sentries stand guard in pairs: one carries an unloaded rifle, the other the ammunition. Weapons are never kept loaded. Ammunition is managed exclusively by designated personnel and only issued when both parties deem the situation urgent.

Units normally operate with "guns without bullets" or "bullets without guns" to prevent any single individual or small group from controlling complete weaponry.

Moving Troops

Authority to mobilize troops is highly centralized at the Central Military Commission; only the Chairman can approve major movements. A PLA army commander can directly command only his guard company of roughly one hundred men with very limited weapons and ammunition.

To rebel or launch an uprising, he would need to rely on a long chain of subordinate officers—division, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, and squad leaders. Any link in that chain who disagrees could report him, exposing the plot instantly.

Additional insurmountable obstacles exist. Logistics support and communications command belong to separate branches. Large ammunition depots are often located far from units, sometimes across provinces or theater commands. Existing stocks and supplies are barely sufficient for a single exercise, let alone a military operation.

Even if someone risked an uprising, they would likely face immediate large-scale encirclement. Reaching Beijing would be extraordinarily difficult. Zhongnanhai is connected by extensive underground tunnels; any disturbance above ground would allow leaders to escape. The compound also has its own air defense systems.

Communication between different military units is also very difficult. It is hard for forces from different regions and different departments to secretly coordinate with one another and launch an uprising together.

Two Possible Paths to a Successful Uprising

A general told Du Wen that a successful rebellion has only two realistic paths.

First, an internal uprising within the Central Guard Bureau, which could succeed with near 100% certainty if they acted directly, supported by outside forces.

Second, if Xi dared to inspect troops in person, soldiers might risk everything to act. Since arresting Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli in January, Xi has avoided military inspections.

Unlike past years when he visited troops during the Lunar New Year, this year he sat alone in the CMC building in Beijing and greeted the troops by video.

According to information Du Wen obtained from within the PLA, 60% of soldiers and over 80% of generals sympathize with or support Zhang Youxia, while only a small minority staunchly back Xi Jinping. Yet the systemic barriers make rebellion extremely difficult.

The CITIC Tower Incident and the Limits of Control

Still, even the strictest surveillance and institutional arrangements may contain loopholes.

A recent incident in which a small plane crashed into the highest building in Beijing, exposed glaring weaknesses in the CCP's air defense. The aircraft deviated from its route, lost contact for 20 minutes, flew over central Beijing, came within four miles of Zhongnanhai, and nearly collided with a civilian airliner—yet triggered no alarms or interceptions.

One Chinese writer told a joke: Beijing's air defense system had detected the plane, but no one dared decide what action to take. The information was passed up the chain to Cai Qi, Xi Jinping's close confidant and the de facto No. 2 figure in the CCP. But Cai also did not dare make the call, so he reported it to Xi. By the time Xi issued the order not to shoot the plane down, the aircraft had already crashed into the building more than an hour earlier.

Although this was only a joke, the story vividly illustrates the paralysis caused by extreme concentration of power: everyone avoids responsibility, and when something happens, no one acts.

Rumors of Resistance Among Red Families

There are also rumors that Xi's perverse policies have enraged other major CCP families.

Families such as those of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin once shared the spoils of ruling China. Under Xi's dictatorship, they receive nothing.

The arrest of Zhang Youxia was reportedly the final straw, prompting them to unite in opposition. Deng Xiaoping's eldest son Deng Pufang has allegedly been chosen as the representative, negotiating through Xi's brother Xi Yuanping to force Xi's resignation.

Some pressure has reportedly worked, leading to the gradual release of certain officers arrested alongside Zhang.

Strange Personnel Changes at the Top

In the opaque black box of CCP politics, the truth remains hidden. Yet recent personnel shifts are telling.

For example, Ma Xingrui, a former member of the CCP Central Political Bureau and former Party secretary of Xinjiang, who had close ties to Xi Jinping's wife Peng Liyuan, was officially announced in April this year to have fallen from power. This announcement came later than the announcements about Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.

However, at the meeting of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress on June 25, Ma Xingrui was stripped of his status as an NPC deputy before Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.

By contrast, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, who reportedly fell in January, have still not had their NPC deputy status revoked. Nor has there been any announcement removing them from any other posts.

CCP Party School

Another example is Chen Xi, who had a very close relationship with Xi Jinping. At university, he was Xi's classmate and roommate. They were even said to have slept in bunk beds.

Chen was the former president of the CCP Central Party School and had long served as head of the CCP Central Organization Department, where he controlled personnel power.

Not long ago, he was inexplicably removed from office. But there was no public announcement. People only learned that the important position of the school's president had changed hands from an obscure news report that referred to Cai Qi as the president of the Party School.

Online reports say Chen Xi's status has suffered a "cliff-like fall," dropping from the deputy state level to the deputy department level, equivalent to returning to the rank he held 26 years ago.

At the recent CCP celebration of the 105th anniversary of the Party's founding, Chen Xi also did not attend. This was highly abnormal.

There have also been many other unusual personnel changes.

Therefore, the internal struggle at the highest levels of the CCP may now be proceeding intensely. But on the surface, in order to preserve the CCP system and its face, everyone is jointly maintaining the illusion that "all under heaven is at peace."

In this fierce internal struggle, who will fall first? We can only wait for time to give us the answer. Perhaps we will not have to wait too long before seeing the result.