Chinese President Xi Jinping (©Kyodo)
In a development with profound implications for global security, it is believed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s People's Liberation Army (PLA) had already completed its full combat preparations and internal assessments for a forcible takeover of Taiwan by the end of 2025.
As Beijing accelerates its military expansion and sharpens its focus on "unification," the central question confronting policymakers and analysts alike is this: under what specific conditions might a real cross-strait war erupt, and what final triggers could set it in motion?
PLA Completes Taiwan War Preparations
Recently, Bloomberg reported that the US Asia Command submitted a 121-page report to Congress stating that the PLA is undergoing a "historic expansion across all domains."
The Chinese military is training intensively around two primary missions: forcing the unification of Taiwan and countering US and allied defense capabilities, with a target of achieving military readiness by 2027.
In response to Beijing's aggressive expansion and invasion preparations, the US military is seeking additional funding to strengthen deterrence and warfighting capacity.
In fact, five months earlier, former Director of the Legal Advisory Office of the Inner Mongolia Government Du Wen had already disclosed on his program, based on internal sources, that Xi Jinping had demanded the PLA complete operational training and readiness assessments for a forcible attack on Taiwan. Du Wen's revelations covered six key areas.
First, since taking power, Xi Jinping has gradually pushed the entire military toward Taiwan-focused preparations. Per his orders, all PLA units must develop Taiwan combat plans.
Training encompasses two major components: joint land, sea, air, and space operations against Taiwan—including amphibious assaults and urban warfare—and "anti-intervention" or denial operations against potential US, Japanese, Australian, and other allied forces. Every unit must conduct targeted training according to its assigned role and pass rigorous assessments.
Originally, the CCP's Central Military Commission set the deadline for passing these assessments at the end of 2026. However, in September 2024, Xi ordered the deadline be moved up to the end of 2025. Thus, according to Wen's sources, all PLA services and theater commands had completed their Taiwan war preparations by late 2025.
Psychological Warfare, Political Mobilization, and Xi's Fury
Second, the PLA has completed the integration of its new combat readiness and duty system—one of the key outcomes of Xi's military reforms. Units now operate on a rotational basis: one-third on active duty, one-third on standby, and one-third resting. Internal evaluations confirm the PLA can transition from peacetime to wartime footing instantly, enabling it to fight at any moment.
Third, the PLA has completed full-spectrum political mobilization and psychological conditioning. Assessments for Air Force pilots and Rocket Force personnel focused on overcoming fear of US forces and building an unshakeable "fight and win" mindset.
Du Wen cited the widely circulated but dubious story from February 2025—claiming Pakistani Chinese-made J-10 fighters downed Indian Rafale jets—as a deliberate element of this psychological campaign. Though unreliable, the narrative helped PLA pilots confront their awe of Western equipment.
PLA pilots remain far below the real-combat proficiency of US, NATO, Ukrainian, or even Russian forces. Chinese training often emphasizes merely taking off and landing safely while maintaining straight flight paths. To address this gap, realistic combat training has become paramount.
Additionally, officers' phones now carry an app called "Strong Enemy Atlas," detailing US military insignia, deployments, equipment, organization, capabilities, and even personal data on key officers—including photos, ranks, birthdays, family members, and even home addresses. The goal is to humanize and demystify the enemy, eroding "fear of America."
Internal Dissent Over Taiwan Timing
Fourth, unconfirmed rumors suggest that purged senior officers like former CCP Central Military Commission vice chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, along with others such as Liu Zhenli, privately argued that the timing for military action against Taiwan was premature. They cited unstable equipment performance, Taiwan's credible defense capabilities, and the likelihood of a costly "pyrrhic victory."
Xi reportedly reacted with fury, declaring that the PLA is called the "Liberation Army" precisely because Taiwan remains unliberated. Unifying Taiwan is both the historic mission of Chinese soldiers and Xi's personal destiny—one that must be fulfilled. He pointed to 2027, the PLA's centenary, as the deadline for success.
Xi's Personal Obsession and the Russia-Ukraine Precedent
Fifth, according to Wang Bo, former deputy secretary of the Standing Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress, a Politburo Standing Committee member revealed that Xi addressed succession at a Politburo meeting during the 19th CCP Congress.
Xi said that some comrades within the Party hoped he would follow the political rules that had continued since the reform and opening-up era, step down when his time came, and even hoped he would retire earlier.
Xi reportedly said, "I tell you, liberating Taiwan is the historical mission entrusted to me by the Party and the people. If I can liberate Taiwan today, I will retire tomorrow and hand over the position of general secretary to younger people."
Judging from these remarks, Xi Jinping has a very strong political determination to so-called "recover" Taiwan. This is also a huge reason he uses to justify not stepping down.
Other sources corroborate that resolving the Taiwan issue is a condition for Xi's continued rule.
Sixth, the Russia-Ukraine war has emboldened Xi. He believes China is dozens of times stronger than Russia. If Russia can withstand international sanctions, then China certainly can as well.
Xi believes that with nuclear weapons in hand, no matter what happens, regime security will not be a problem. In his view, this will be a war that cannot be lost. If victory cannot be achieved, then negotiations can follow. Whatever can be seized will count as a gain.
China's reserves are strong enough to withstand a long war, and China would be far more composed than Russia. This is Xi Jinping's judgment, according to Wen's sources.
2027: A Symbolic and Political Watershed
The recent US report submitted to Congress highlights three reasons why 2027 matters profoundly. First, it marks the PLA's 100th anniversary. Second, Xi has explicitly set the goal of achieving military modernization by the centenary.
Third, 2027 falls in the latter part of Xi's third term, as he enters the "deep water" of long-term rule. He must demonstrate that he is the leader capable of completing the so-called "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." In CCP mythology, resolving the Taiwan issue is the final and most potent symbol of that rejuvenation.
Domestically, the Taiwan question has transcended diplomacy to become a core issue of regime legitimacy. The CCP lacks genuine elections, constitutional constraints, or judicial independence. For decades, it has relied on three narratives: economic growth, nationalism, and regime security.
The first is now collapsing amid slowing growth, local government debt crises, youth unemployment, real estate meltdown, foreign capital flight, and private sector despair.
As economic legitimacy erodes, the Party increasingly leans on aggressive nationalism. Taiwan has been cast as the ultimate, non-negotiable nationalist cause—one that cannot be failed, abandoned, or indefinitely postponed.
If Xi continues preaching unification without tangible progress, his authority within the Party, military, and nationalist circles will crumble. Therefore, the Taiwan Strait risk does not arise because the CCP is rationally calculating that war is worthwhile. Rather, it comes from the fact that within the CCP's political structure, the Taiwan issue is changing from a strategic choice into a political debt.
Miscalculation Risks and the Dictator's Logic
Du Wen concludes that the CCP is genuinely preparing for military action against Taiwan. Whether war erupts depends on Xi's comprehensive assessment of domestic crises, US resolve, Taiwan's resistance, and the international environment—including the PLA's internal command integrity.
For Taiwan, the greatest danger is miscalculation. Cross-strait risks arise primarily from mutual misunderstandings. Xi may underestimate Taiwanese resolve, believing they will surrender quickly. He may also misjudge US intervention, overlook Japanese involvement, overestimate PLA capabilities based on sycophantic reports, or ignore China's societal tolerance for war costs.
Taiwan may assume Beijing is merely posturing. Washington may believe deterrence statements suffice without clearer readiness statements. The international community may view it as a regional issue rather than a global order challenge. When misjudgments compound, war can erupt—not from masterful planning, but from failed deterrence and uncontrollable escalation.
Beijing's Internal Logic
At its core, the Taiwan issue is not an internal "Chinese vs. Chinese" dispute but a test of whether free societies can resist communist totalitarian expansion. The CCP's "unification" means subjecting 23 million Taiwanese to its authoritarian control system—enslavement, not liberation.
Observers should not focus solely on warships and missiles but on the internal logic of the CCP regime. A system that has lost economic legitimacy, rejected political reform, and weaponized extreme nationalism inevitably turns to external conflict to sustain domestic rule.
This structural pressure, combined with China's rapid population aging, shrinking workforce, and technological containment by the West, creates a "peaking power" dynamic. Xi likely believes that if he does not strike soon, the window will close forever—this anxiety may prove the ultimate trigger.
The year 2027 may not guarantee war, but it represents a critical threshold for full-scale crisis escalation. Taiwan and the free world must never underestimate Xi Jinping's aggressive ambitions, born of the CCP's systemic imperatives and deepening internal crises.
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Author: Jennifer Zeng
