July 1 marked the 70th anniversary of the founding of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This series explores the current status and challenges the SDF faces in an increasingly complex security environment.
To read the first part: 70 Years of the Self-Defense Forces: Present Challenges
Second part: 70 Years of the Self-Defense Forces: The Amphibious Brigade's Pledge
Third in a 5-part series
In late March, some 25 officers, primarily Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) captains, convened at the United States Navy's Yokosuka Base in Kanagawa Prefecture. They participated in practical training sessions led by the US Navy's 7th Fleet. This preparation was for the upcoming deployment of the US-manufactured Tomahawk cruise missiles, planned for fiscal year 2025.
The Tomahawk was first acknowledged in Japan's three security documents, including the National Security Strategy, at the end of 2022. This marked a significant shift, allowing Japan to execute counterstrikes against enemy bases located in foreign territories.
Expanding Capabilities
Since its establishment in 1954, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have never possessed long-range missiles that exceed 1,000 kilometers in range. Operating the Tomahawk missiles marks new and uncharted territory for the SDF.
The five-day training included classroom sessions on unit role division and establishing crucial communication networks. It also featured hands-on practical exercises. Participants boarded the USS McCampbell, an Aegis destroyer based at Yokosuka. Aboard the ship, they practiced key operations using the combat information center's controls and consoles.
"Let's work together moving forward," encouraged the US instructor, addressing the attentive JMSDF officers.
To swiftly enhance its counterattack capabilities, the Japanese government the introduction of the Tomahawk by a year in 2023. Lieutenant Commander Kotaro Kitahara (39) from the Maritime Staff Office's Defense Department expressed his commitment during the training. "We must stay alert and firmly focused on our preparations," he said.
Prime Minister Abe's Influence
In 2013, the Japanese government initially showed interest in developing enemy base strike capabilities, a move outlined in the National Defense Program Guidelines. This pivot was motivated by China's rapid military expansion and advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile technologies.
However, it wasn't until 2022 that a formal decision to acquire these capabilities was documented in security strategies.
In the interim, at the end of 2017, Japan decided to procure standoff missiles with ranges between 500 and 900 kilometers. These missiles, the government clarified, were intended for defending Japan's remote islands against landed enemies, rather than for strikes on enemy bases.
To effectively engage targets within enemy territory, the development of a Kill Chain is crucial. This strategic approach involves identifying, tracking, and assessing the impact on targets. Without a formal decision to acquire enemy base strike capabilities, Japan faced limitations in developing necessary satellites and disabling enemy radars. Additionally, Japan struggled with coordinating with the US military.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asserted to Defense Ministry officials, "Intercepting missiles with missiles is not feasible. We need offensive capabilities." In September 2020, shortly before his resignation, he announced plans to consider enemy base strike capabilities. This helped pave the way for the definitive decision in 2022.
Essential Modernization for Japan-US Alliance
Since the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, the US military has traditionally been viewed as the "spear" in the alliance. Meanwhile, the SDF has been perceived as the "shield." This dynamic is evolving as the SDF begins to develop its own offensive capabilities, a role previously exclusive to US forces.
Despite this progress, an SDF official noted, "Even with missiles, the SDF still lacks crucial 'eyes,' such as satellites, for effective targeting."
While the SDF can now make independent attack decisions, creating a self-reliant Kill Chain remains challenging. This underscores the need for continued collaboration with US forces. Coordinating attack targets between Japan and the US is becoming increasingly critical.
Such developments highlight the increasing importance of operational cooperation and command control strategies between Japan and the US.
To support these efforts, Japan plans to establish a unified joint operations command center by the end of fiscal year 2026. This center will coordinate land, sea, and air forces. Simultaneously, the US aims to enhance the capabilities of its forces in Japan, improving operational collaboration.
Chief of Staff of the SDF, Yoshihide Yoshida, emphasized his commitment to swiftly advancing the modernization of the Japan-US alliance. He stated, "We aim to prepare for any scenarios by drawing on the wisdom of our experienced ally."
Next in Part 4: 70 Years of the Self-Defense Forces: Joint Operations and New Fields Bring Change
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Read the article in Japanese.
Author: Keita Ozawa
