After Ukraine, Will the US Stand Strong Against China?

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On February 28, a historic summit between the United States and Ukraine at the White House shocked the world. For Japan, understanding this event is vital in the context of its own challenges.

During the summit, US Vice President JD Vance criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for not expressing gratitude towards President Donald Trump. Trump himself excoriated Zelenskyy, accusing him of engaging in a gamble that could trigger World War III.

Zelenskyy's visit was intended to finalize an agreement with the US on developing Ukraine's vast mineral resources, with a major goal nearly within reach. However, the unexpected breakdown of negotiations raises a critical question: Is Trump's unpredictability a deliberate strategy to achieve these objectives or a volatile trait that even he struggles to control?

Not an Isolated Case

Zelenskyy's concerns go beyond the military pullback of the US from Europe. He believes the US has not fully recognized the reality of the war between Ukraine and Russia. At the summit, Zelenskyy repeatedly referred to Russia's invasion as an act of aggression by President Vladimir Putin. However, the key point is that the Ukraine war should not be viewed as an isolated case.

If the US ignores ongoing invasions, history teaches that further aggression from Russia and China will inevitably follow. Japan, too, has watched with deep regret as China's unchecked expansion in the South China Sea has set a dangerous precedent.

*Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with defense ministry officials in Moscow on November 22. (©Tass via Kyodo)*

It has long been recognized that America faces growing challenges in simultaneously containing both Russia and China militarily. Masashi Murano is a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute and the author of Preventing a US-China War: The Hidden Power Struggles Among Trump's Strategists (PHP Shinsho, 2025). In it, he argues that if the US prioritizes countering China, risks will unavoidably emerge elsewhere. Trump's recent actions toward a ceasefire suggest those risks are now being felt in Ukraine.

A Near-Term Major War

Trump may have visions of securing a Nobel Peace Prize and establishing himself as a peacemaker through a ceasefire. However, this is a secondary concern for Japan.

In Asia, the key issue is whether Trump has the long-term resolve to implement strategies addressing the Chinese threat. This has been highlighted by the US Commission on the National Defense Strategy and other experts. Simultaneously, Japan must confront China's threat directly and take concrete steps to work alongside America as a counterbalance.

In its July 2024 report, the Commission stated, "The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war." At the same time, the Commission criticized the Biden administration's 2022 National Defense Strategy. It claimed the strategy did "not sufficiently account for global competition or the very real threat of simultaneous conflict in more than one theater."

Breaking China's Monopoly

Both Republican and Democratic experts share this sense of urgency. Moreover, the Trump administration is addressing this crisis proactively, as evidenced by the composition of his national security team. Even within the first month and a half of his tenure, actions have demonstrated Trump's commitment to a tough stance on China.

One example is the agreement with Ukraine on the development of mineral resources, including rare earth elements. Trump sees artificial intelligence (AI) as the driving force of future industries. Semiconductors will support AI. Mineral resources, including rare earths, are essential for their production. He is attempting to break China's monopolistic control over these resources.

Additionally, The Sankei Shimbun special correspondent Hideo Tamura emphasizes that Trump's proposal to purchase Greenland is closely tied to its vast mineral reserves. He argues that placing Greenland under US influence carries clear military, economic, and strategic significance in countering China.

*Computer chips are composed of semiconductors. (© ankei by Tetsuji Goto)*

A Second Ukraine?

The White House summit with Ukraine was meant to be the first step in a global strategy to counter China. However, the talks broke down. Trump's diplomacy, which has seemingly abandoned Ukraine, will ultimately unify Europe and strengthen its deterrence against Russia.

Countering the threat from China also requires a strong deterrence against Russia. That is the harsh reality of international politics.

Japan must continue providing maximum support to Ukraine. At the same time, it should work with the Trump administration, even if it's difficult to predict, toward the implementation of concrete policies in line with the US grand strategy, which sees China as the greatest threat.

Above all, strengthening national defense — Japan's most powerful tool in diplomacy — is an urgent priority. There are many measures that Japan should consider. However, if we were to prioritize one, it would be the reassessment of the three non-nuclear principles.

Murano points out that the United States' military capabilities are insufficient compared to China. Given this reality, there is a growing bipartisan consensus in the US that maintaining deterrence against multiple adversaries may require a partial increase in reliance on nuclear weapons.

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the discussion must go beyond merely considering how nuclear weapons might be used. It must also address the critical question of when and where we would need to use them.

Rather than turning away from nuclear issues, a shift in mindset toward directly confronting them is crucial. Japan must face Trump's administration with resolve, not simply relying on America but as equal allies, or risk becoming a second Ukraine.

(Read the article in Japanese.)

Author: Yoshiko Sakurai, The Japan Institute for National Fundamentals

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