Hiroyuki Kawase 
The Shikinen Sengu of Ise Jingu, in which the shrine buildings are rebuilt every 20 years. October 2013, Ise City, Mie Prefecture.
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What does "conservatism" mean today? Once a stable pillar of Japanese politics, the concept is now showing clear signs of fragmentation.
One recent example is the controversy surrounding the Tokyo chapter of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It considered endorsing Sayaka Watanabe Kankolongo — a former NPO director and someone hardly identifiable as conservative — as a candidate for this summer's House of Councillors election. Watanabe had previously lashed out at the Shinzo Abe administration on social media. The party ultimately dropped the plan after criticism.
Conservatism's erosion deepened following Shinzo Abe's assassination in 2022. With the traditional conservative-progressive divide breaking down, 2023 saw the enactment of LGBT legislation — something Abe likely would not have allowed.
This triggered disillusionment among core conservative voters, leading to a crushing defeat for the LDP in 2024's lower house election.
Today, however, the conflict is no longer between conservatives and progressives but among conservatives themselves. As Japan confronts growing internal and external pressures, this division risks leaving the nation unable to respond to crises. It also threatens the country's very identity in the process.
Flexibility as a Virtue
That sense of crisis forms the basis of a special feature in the May issue of Hanada, a conservative opinion magazine. The feature is titled "What Is Conservatism?" Among its contributors, writer Tsuneyasu Takeda opens the section with a particularly compelling essay.
According to Takeda, conservatism is "the willingness to adapt flexibly to protect what must be preserved." He cites the shikinen sengu, the ritual rebuilding of Ise Jingu shrine every 20 years, as a powerful example.
Western buildings, no matter how solid, eventually decay. But Ise Shrine has passed down ancient architecture to the present day by continuously rebuilding. Though it requires vast quantities of timber, Japan has preserved this construction style by adapting sourcing methods.
Takeda emphasizes the importance of "preserving essence through change." The problem, he argues, is that many Japanese no longer clearly understand what must be preserved. That, he suggests, is the root of conservatism's confusion.
Restoring the Imperial Line and Security Readiness
Back in the 1960s student movement era, author Yukio Mishima identified the Three Sacred Treasures of imperial regalia as the final line of defense for Japan's essence. Takeda references this and asserts that "protecting the imperial line is the core of Japanese conservatism."
The imperial succession has passed without exception through the male line, from Emperor Jimmu to the current 126th emperor. Upholding this principle and securing stable succession will be the foundation for conservative renewal.
In the same feature, Upper House lawmaker Shigeharu Aoyama defines conservatism as "the unyielding fight to ensure that Japan remains Japan." He highlights national security as a priority.
Aoyama argues that Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), lacking a military tribunal system, cannot function as a true national military. Bound by peacetime civil law, they are too constrained in emergencies. He insists conservatives must revise the Japan-United States Security Treaty and amend Article 9 of the Constitution to pave the way for a national military.
Former US President Donald Trump criticized the treaty's asymmetry and, during recent tariff negotiations, declared defense costs part of the "deal." This reality carries weight.
WiLL magazine has also published commentary on the instability of conservatism, suggesting it will become a key theme in future public discourse.
Progressives Remain Unchanged Amid Shifting Realities
But what of progressives? Unfortunately, they seem entirely unchanged.
A Sekai magazine feature, "Taking Back the Constitution," reflects this entrenched stance. In her essay, "The Return of the Commander-in-Chief Problem," Gakushuin University Professor Miho Aoi argues that postwar Japan viewed Article 9 not just as an ideal, but as a binding legal principle mandating the renunciation of military force.
However, in 2014, the Abe Cabinet passed a resolution reinterpreting Article 9 to allow collective self-defense as an "exception," overturning decades of precedent. The following year, new security laws were enacted. Over the last decade, Aoi notes, there has been a clear detachment of constitutional debate from security realities. She argues that this effectively nullifies the original force of Article 9.
Ignoring External Threats, Misreading the Constitution
Criticizing this "special treatment" of military affairs, Aoi likens it to the prewar notion of the independence of supreme command, which allowed the military to operate beyond constitutional control.
Yet, her argument has flaws. First, although Article 9 did constrain the SDF, interpreting it as a legal mandate to deny all military force is excessive. Second, Aoi makes no mention of the deteriorating regional security environment, which is why the security laws were revised in the first place. Not a single word is devoted to North Korea's missile launches or China's military buildup, which is astonishing.
If anything deserves critique in today's discourse, it's not Abe-style conservatism but the progressives' refusal to confront reality or adapt.
A Call to Confront China's Growing Military Power
To such progressives, one hopes they'll read researcher Maki Nakagawa's recent Seiron essay on the threat posed by China's Rocket Force.
China possesses a Rocket Force on par with its army, navy, and air force, with numerous missile launch platforms along its coastline. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the force is rapidly expanding.
Among the most serious threats to Japan is the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile with hypersonic glide capability confirmed in 2019. With speeds exceeding Mach 5, the DF-17 can penetrate Japan's ballistic missile defense system.
Meanwhile, the nuclear-capable DF-26, which can strike all of Japan, has also entered deployment with enhanced capabilities.
Nakagawa, a former senior officer in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, calls not only for strengthening Japan's defense capabilities but also for building counterstrike capacity and accelerating shelter development.
These are urgent national tasks — ones that transcend ideological lines.
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Author: Hiroyuki Kawase, The Sankei Shimbun
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