Senkaku Islands at the Brink: Is China's Landing Next?

Tensions around the Senkaku Islands are flaring up again.

On May 3, a small Japanese civilian aircraft approached the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki City, Okinawa. In a move intended to show aggression, Chinese Coast Guard vessel Haijing 2303, which had been operating in the contiguous zone, encroached on Japanese territorial waters. Moments later, it launched its onboard helicopter, breaching Japanese airspace.

The civilian aircraft turned back after receiving instructions from the Japan Coast Guard. But the Chinese helicopter pressed on inside Japanese airspace, ignoring repeated warnings. 

While this was the third time Chinese aircraft violated Japanese airspace near the Senkakus, it stood apart. "The May 3 violation was a clear assertion of China's claimed sovereignty," said Kiyofumi Iwata, former Chief of Staff of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force.

In an interview with JAPAN Forward, Iwata discussed Beijing's growing territorial ambitions as well as Tokyo's tepid response.

A New Phase of Provocation

How is the May 3 provocation different from past incidents?

In response to the presence of a Japanese civilian aircraft, China attempted to intercept it, framing the move as an exercise in proclaiming its sovereignty.

Until now, China had unilaterally violated Japanese airspace without any clearly stated purpose. This time, however, Beijing presented its actions as a response to what it argued was a Japanese incursion. By portraying the move as reactive, they are attempting to establish a precedent for their territorial claim.

Is an attempted Chinese takeover their next move?

After repeated incursions into Japanese territorial waters and airspace, the next logical step would be a [attempted] landing and absorption. Wouldn't you agree? 

The China Coast Guard is already preparing for such operations. They have been steadily upgrading their equipment and capabilities, including ship deployments, helicopter operations, and specialized training for personnel tasked with disembarking and carrying out missions on the ground. 

On the legal front, Xi Jinping amended regulations in 2024 that authorize the detention of foreign vessels and individuals that enter what China claims as its territorial waters. Meanwhile, their coast guard continues to conduct drills that resemble naval military exercises.

Can Japan respond effectively?

Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership, preparations advanced steadily, including the deployment of a task force in Okinawa to address potential contingencies around the Senkakus. 

Japan's coast guard has also stepped up its vigilance. For instance, around 11 AM on May 3, just before the Chinese helicopter violated Japanese airspace, satellite images showed a Japanese coast guard patrol boat stationed within two kilometers of the southern tip of Uotsuri Island. These vessels are anchored there daily, closely monitoring for any unusual or suspicious activity.

Assuming a small contingent of Chinese forces attempts to land on the Senkakus, Japan is ready to handle them with arrests and other countermeasures. 

That said, China employs what's known as a "maritime militia (minpei)." These are fishing vessels that operate routinely as civilian boats but come under China's military command during crises. If 100 to 200 of these vessels were to converge around the Senkakus, perhaps under the pretext of rescuing Chinese fishermen, Japan would find itself outnumbered.

Muted Response, Mounting Risk

Are you confident in Ishiba Shigeru's administration?

The Chinese violation of Japan's airspace and territorial waters occurred on May 3. Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya's press conference was held fully 10 days later, on May 13, and his tone was notably restrained. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has not even addressed the incident once. Given that our sovereignty was clearly challenged, such a muted response is incomprehensible.

If Chinese forces or maritime militias were to land on the Senkakus, a decisive response would be mandatory. Failure to act would spark massive public outrage, which has remained relatively subdued until now.

Where do the Senkakus fit within the Japan-US alliance?

All United States presidents since Barack Obama have affirmed that the Senkakus fall under the protection of Article Five of our bilateral security pact. But this affirmation only acknowledges Japan's administrative control over the islands. Washington hasn't explicitly acknowledged our territorial sovereignty. 

To that end, if China were to gain effective control, the islands might no longer fall under the security treaty commitments. Especially under Donald Trump's tenure, it's highly questionable that Washington would risk military confrontation with Beijing over what they presumably see as some faraway islands.

How do you evaluate Japan's military-industrial base?

When a bilateral or multilateral weapons pact is signed, it is tantamount to a defense marriage. You're essentially locked in for the duration of the contract. Japan has long depended heavily on American weapons and defense systems within the framework of these agreements.

Of course, we still rely heavily on the US. But we are increasingly developing and exporting our own weapons and equipment. The next-generation GCAP fighter jet, for example, is being developed jointly with the United Kingdom and Italy. Unlike past projects, such as the F-2 fighter jet, which faced Washington's objections, there has been no official pushback this time.

Are domestic weapons competitive in the global market?

Mitsubishi Electric, for example, manufactures radar systems that are exported to the Philippines. This marks the first Japanese company to transfer such apparatus abroad. The company secured this achievement by winning a competitive bidding process against other countries.

In 2023, the law on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases was enacted. Under this law, the Japanese government offers financial support when selling defense equipment, including funding for minor design modifications to meet the specific needs of buyers. 

I expect our weapons and equipment sales to extend across Southeast Asia and Australia. Under normal circumstances, Taiwan would also be a key market. Japan's political constraints — rooted in appeasing Beijing — make that virtually impossible.

RELATED: 

• JINF Report: Is China's Senkaku Takeover Ever Closer?
• Unusual China Coast Guard Presence Reported Near Senkaku Islands 

Author: Kenji Yoshida