
North Korean President Kim Jong Un visited a key munitions factory January 8-9. (©KCNA via Korean News Agency)
North Korea's economy is rebounding. Just a few years ago, the reclusive regime was reeling from pandemic lockdowns and biting international sanctions.
But after three consecutive years of contraction, the tide turned in 2023. North Korea's real GDP grew by 3.1% that year, largely buoyed by border reopenings and a resurgence in trade with China.
Now, as Russia emerges as Pyongyang's newest patron, experts say the momentum is poised to accelerate. Drawing closer to Moscow while drifting from its traditional partners, the Kim Jong Un regime is charting a new path of strategic autonomy.
In an interview with JAPAN Forward, Koh Yuhwan, emeritus professor of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University, offered insight into the country's shifting geopolitical and economic trajectory.
Excerpts of the interview follow.
How has North Korea's economy changed since its alignment with Russia?
There has been a significant shift. Before its rapprochement with Russia, North Korea had intentionally been cut off from the outside world for years, and the impact of COVID-19 had left its economy in dire straits.
However, the war in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty with Moscow in June 2024 marked a turning point. By providing ammunition, artillery, and troops to back Russia's war aims in Ukraine, Pyongyang has secured major economic and military aid in return. This paves the way for a sustained economic recovery.

In the past, North Korea sought to ensure its survival by pursuing normalization with the United States. Now, it has entered a new era, one in which it looks to Russia instead. Since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2011, this may be the regime's most stable period to date in terms of political control and economic conditions.
Can you provide some examples of recent domestic initiatives?
To balance development between the central and local governments, North Korea has been implementing the 20x10 Policy over the past two years, aspiring to industrialize and revitalize 20 cities and counties annually.

Major construction projects have resumed as well. The long-delayed Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourist area has been completed, and so has the Pyongyang General Hospital. Other large-scale residential construction projects in Pyongyang are also picking up steam.
How do you assess Wonsan-Kalma Resort development and its potential impact?
When the Wonsan-Kalma resort opened in June 2025, the Russian ambassador and embassy staff were in attendance, but no Chinese officials were present. From Beijing's perspective, the region is geographically less accessible and, therefore, less appealing from a cost-effectiveness standpoint.
North Korea's deepening ties with Russia have opened the door for travel from Vladivostok to Wonsan by ship. As in the past, Russian tourists from colder regions may be drawn to North Korea's milder coastal areas for leisure and recreation.


At present, however, the resort primarily serves North Korean elites and Russian visitors. With prices out of reach for ordinary citizens and too few Russian tourists to fill a facility built for 20,000, the establishment's sustainability remains doubtful.
In the long run, reform and the regime's opening up would be necessary for the resort to become a fully functional and internationally viable destination. For now, its main purpose is symbolic, serving as a showcase of a supposed socialist utopia under Kim's reign.
Where does China fit into the current geopolitical landscape?
While the 1961 North Korea–China Treaty remains in effect and still includes a clause for automatic military intervention in the event of an invasion, China today is a global G2 power locked in strategic competition with the US. This makes it increasingly difficult for Beijing to advocate for or represent Pyongyang's interests unilaterally.
A telling example is the New Yalu River Bridge connecting Dandong and Sinuiju, which China completed in 2015. To this day, North Korea has yet to connect the bridge on its side. In contrast, North Korea and Russia have recently begun constructing their first road bridge, symbolizing the burgeoning of their bilateral ties and the relative cooling of the North's relationship with Beijing.

Historically, North Korea has oscillated between aligning more closely with either Moscow or Beijing, depending on the state of Sino–Soviet relations and the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, for instance, Pyongyang sought to balance the two powers to extract support from both.
As long as food security is maintained, North Korea, with a population of roughly 25 million, can continue to function at a basic level. Russia's vast wheat production and abundant natural resources, especially in the Far East, offer a crucial lifeline for North's survival and stability.
Does North Korea's economic stability impact its diplomatic posture?
Until recently, South Korea served as a de facto intermediary for the North. For example, in 2002, with backing from the Kim Dae-jung administration, North Korea and Japan held bilateral talks and issued a joint declaration aimed at normalizing relations — though the efforts collapsed over unresolved abduction issues.
During the Moon Jae In era, Seoul sought to mediate relations between Pyongyang and Washington, leading to three summits between Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump. However, these efforts also fell short.

Once the Ukraine war reaches a certain level of resolution, North Korea's negotiations with Washington and normalization with Tokyo could follow. The Kim regime understands that Japan is one of the few countries capable of providing the essential capital needed to fully revitalize its economy.
That said, Kim now appears determined to bypass Seoul in future negotiations, opting instead for direct engagement with major powers. In this shifting dynamic, Moscow may take on the mediator role that Seoul once played. Given North Korea's rising strategic value, the bar for future talks is likely to be set even higher.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida