President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan delivers an address with the Taiwanese flag in the background — July 1, at the Presidential Office in Taipei. (©Sankei by Yoshiaki Nishimi)
As China intensifies its military maneuvers around Taiwan, the self-governing island of 24 million is bracing for a conflict many no longer see as distant.
In its biennial National Defense Report released on October 9, Taiwan's defense ministry warned that China has been honing its abilities and continuously training for a possible invasion of the island.
The numbers tell their own story. Chinese military sorties crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait jumped from 953 in 2021 to more than 3,000 in 2024.
In response, Taipei is moving quickly to strengthen its deterrence. The government plans to build a "T-Dome," a multi-layer anti-missile defense system in the coming years, while seeking to raise its defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030.
In July, the island staged its largest-ever Han Kuang exercise — a nationwide drill held annually since 1987 — simulating a full-scale attack by its neighbor.
JAPAN Forward spoke with Maki Nakagawa, a researcher at the Japan Institute of National Fundamentals and a former commander of an intelligence unit in the Ground Self-defense Force, for deeper insights.
Excerpts follow.
What role does gray-zone activity play in China's strategy toward Taiwan?
Taiwan is acutely vigilant against a spectrum of non-kinetic threats. Its operatives blend into civilian life, severing undersea cables, engaging in widespread cyber intrusions, and proliferating disinformation.
Beijing's most advantageous outcome would be a peaceful unification that avoids open warfare — though "peaceful" can be a misnomer. A more insidious pathway combines sustained gray-zone activity designed to erode public will. These will include fomenting chaos, seeding doubts about the need for resistance, and exploiting political fissures to destabilize the government.
The endgame, from that perspective, is to manufacture conditions in which Taiwan's unification with the People's Republic of China appears to the population as the least costly option. Elements of that playbook are already in motion.
A leaked document suggests Moscow may be helping China prepare for an attack on Taiwan. How do Sino-Russian relations shape the potential for such cooperation?
Article 9 of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship states that if either party perceives "peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression," both sides shall "immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats."
Unlike the Sino–North Korean treaty signed in June, which explicitly calls for "military and other assistance," China and Russia's agreement is non-aligned and likely envisions indirect forms of cooperation.
However, support could embody intelligence sharing or the diversion of Japan's surveillance assets. In particular, if Chinese bombers were to forward-deploy to bases in Russia and enter the East China Sea directly — as seen in past Sino-Russian joint air patrols — they could force Japan and the US to respond on two fronts simultaneously.
In a potential Taiwan contingency, what role could US allies in the region play?
The emerging defense framework among Japan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines may play a limited but meaningful role.
In May 2025, defense ministers of the four countries met and issued a joint statement expressing concern over China's destabilizing activities in the East and South China Seas, as well as any unilateral attempts to alter the status quo through force or coercion. In February, they conducted joint training exercises in the South China Sea.
This framework carries particular significance given the geographic dispositions of Japan and the Philippines, which anchor the northern and southern ends of the First Island Chain surrounding Taiwan.
Japan has been reinforcing its defenses by expanding surface-to-ship and surface-to-air missile deployments across the Southwest Islands. Meanwhile, the US military has deployed the NMESIS anti-ship missile system and the Typhon intermediate-range missile system to the Philippines since 2024.
How would deploying missile systems along the First Island Chain enhance deterrence?
China's strategy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) is designed to block US and allied forces from operating freely within the First Island Chain.
Yet if the US deploys missile systems along this arc, China's ability to secure battlefield dominance or air superiority would be significantly constrained, limiting its capacity to project forces toward Taiwan.
Beijing is therefore actively seeking to weaken the US-Philippine cooperation, continuing its campaign of coercion and intimidation against the Philippines in the South China Sea.
The Quad should also play a constructive role, but its effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether India can be fully brought on board.
What steps is Japan specifically taking?
Militarily, Japan is advancing its Self-Defense Forces' southwest deployment and expanding long-range strike capabilities, including the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile.
Preparations are also underway to field American-made cruise missiles, like the Tomahawk, along with efforts to establish the legal frameworks for their use.
Whether these systems can be deployed effectively in the event of an actual crisis remains uncertain, however.
Could there be a role for South Korea beyond information gathering?
The THAAD missile defense system deployed in South Korea's Seonju provides a critical capability. In the event of a missile attack targeting American forces in Japan, the system could add a layer of interception.
Additionally, while landing craft would play a central role in an initial invasion of Taiwan, reinforcements from the Northern Theater Command will likely arrive in subsequent waves. If US forces in South Korea were able to strike those units as they moved toward the Yellow Sea, the impact on Beijing's operational tempo and logistics would be significant.
President Lee Jae-myung has stated that the strategic flexibility of American Forces is "an issue that cannot be easily agreed upon," but acknowledged that from South Korea's perspective, there needs to be a strategic transformation of US Forces Korea.
His remarks suggest a recognition of the need to adapt the force's posture. This could include the deployment of Multi-Domain Effects Battalions (MDEBs), which are designed to operate seamlessly across land, sea, air, space, cyber, electronic warfare, and intelligence domains.
President Trump's murky approach to Taiwan has deepened uncertainty over US intentions. What are your thoughts?
Close attention should be paid to any deal struck between Xi Jinping and Trump. Washington, wary of a unilateral declaration of independence that could trigger a Chinese invasion, has been pressuring Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party to act with restraint.
The concern, however, is that the US could misread Beijing's intentions. Rather than reaching a balanced agreement, Washington may inadvertently fall into a strategic trap.
[author's note: The Trump administration reportedly paused more than $400 million USD in military aid to Taiwan this summer.]
With conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East drawing much of the West's attention, could this affect the security situation in Taiwan?
The current strategic environment largely favors China. Western nations are unable to concentrate their military assets in East Asia, constrained by ongoing commitments in Ukraine and the Middle East.
That said, Western capitals well understand that it is China and North Korea supplying critical support to Russia and Iran, and their engagement with the Asia-Pacific therefore remains ongoing.
This year, for instance, both British and French naval vessels visited Japan to conduct joint exercises with the Self-Defense Forces. In February, Japan's destroyer Kaga joined the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and France's Charles de Gaulle for their first-ever trilateral training in waters east of the Philippines.
Still, their primary theaters of operation remain closer to home. In the Indo-Pacific, Japan must become a central hub for coordination and deterrence.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
