Cracks in the CCP: What the 4th Plenum Really Reveals

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s long-anticipated Fourth Plenum concluded on October 23. In the weeks leading up to it, speculation had swirled that Xi Jinping might relinquish one or even all of his three supreme positions — Party General Secretary, State President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. None of that happened.

At first glance, this outcome should have settled the question of whether Xi has lost power. Yet, strikingly, it has not. Those who believe that Xi remains firmly in control and those who believe his authority has eroded are still reading the same facts in opposite ways.

Why? To answer that, let us look at several key facts — and what they really suggest beneath the surface.

Fact 1: The Sudden Fall of Generals

Three days before the plenum, it was the People's Liberation Army — not Xinhua, as would normally be the case — that announced the dismissal of nine senior generals. Among them was General He Weidong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and effectively the PLA's No 2 officer.

For context: back on March 13 of 2025, I was the first to report in English on He Weidong's downfall. That was more than seven months ago, and ahead of any mainstream outlet.

After He's removal, the seven-member CMC was reduced to only four. Ahead of the meeting, former Chinese Navy headquarters staff officer Yao Cheng revealed what he said was a new CMC roster. According to his information, Xi Jinping was preparing to resign as CMC chairman, and four new members — including the current defense minister, Admiral Dong Jun — would be added to fill the vacancies.

In reality, none of that happened. Xi Jinping remained as chairman. The only change was the promotion of Zhang Shengmin, previously head of the CMC's Discipline Inspection Commission, to vice chairman. No one else was added.

That means the CMC now has only four members in total. Even more unusual, Zhang Shengmin, though promoted, was not elevated to the Politburo as is customary. The Politburo seat vacated by He Weidong remains empty.

Fact 2: Record-Low Attendance

This Fourth Plenum recorded the lowest attendance rate since the Cultural Revolution.

Out of 205 Central Committee members, only 168 were present — just 82% attendance. To grasp the meaning of this number, one must look at history. The 11th Central Committee, elected in 1977 right after the Cultural Revolution, achieved 84% attendance at its 3rd Plenum. In 1982, the 12th Committee reached 89.5% at its 4th Plenum. Every other plenum since 1977 has exceeded 90%, and six have reached full 100% attendance.

This year's 82% — lower even than the chaotic years after Mao's death — is startling. Why did so many fail to appear?

Fact 3: Military Absences and the Silent Purge

The answer may lie partly in the military.

Among the 163 civilian members of the Central Committee, only 10 were absent — about 6%. But among the 42 military representatives, 27 were absent — a staggering 63%.

Of those 42, 33 hold the rank of full general, and 9 are lieutenant generals. Twenty-two of the 33 full generals did not attend. Eight have been publicly expelled and stripped of Party membership. The remaining 14 are just "missing."

Five of the nine lieutenant generals were also absent.

On top of that, commanders and political commissars from every branch of the military — except the air force — are all wiped out. Within the CMC's functional departments, everyone except one general from the Joint Staff Department has effectively vanished from view.

This pattern suggests not mere coincidence but a massive paralysis in the Party-army relationship.

Fact 4: Skipping the Line of Succession

At the plenum, 11 new Central Committee members were added. Normally, replacements are drawn from the alternate members in order of ranking. Yet this time, eight higher-ranking alternates were skipped entirely.

Five of those eight were from the military: the deputy political commissar and deputy commander of the Rocket Force, the commander of the Joint Logistics Support Force, the commander of the Army under the Beijing Military Region, and Fang Yongxiang, director of the CMC General Office — Xi Jinping's personal gatekeeper and de facto chief of staff.

Special Attention: Fang Yongxiang

Particular attention should be paid to Fang Yongxiang. In essence, he serves as Xi Jinping's chief of staff — his closest aide and gatekeeper.

Fang accompanies Xi daily, is privy to all his secrets, and manages every document that passes through the Chairman's hands. Within Zhongnanhai, few are more trusted or more intimately involved in Xi's personal and political affairs.

The fact that even someone of Fang's stature was bypassed in the replacement list speaks volumes. It can only mean one thing: Fang himself is in serious trouble — either already purged or under investigation. That alone explains why he was deemed unqualified to enter the Central Committee.

And that raises a critical question: what does it say about Xi Jinping's true grip on power when even his most trusted aide is sidelined?

Cracks Between Party and Army

From these facts, a clear picture emerges: the upper echelon of the CCP, especially between the Party apparatus and the military, has fractured deeply.

They could not agree on new CMC appointments. Too many Central Committee members have either fallen or refused to attend. And participation has sunk below even post-Cultural Revolution levels. This points to an unprecedented, uncontainable internal crisis.

The CCP has long proclaimed that "the Party commands the gun." In reality, the CCP regime's history often shows the opposite — the gun commands the Party. Power lies with whoever controls the military.

Today, the gun and the Party appear divorced. The Party cannot command the gun, and the gun can no longer command the Party.

Rumors of a Rebellion Within

According to Yao Cheng, during the plenum, the military delegates collectively proposed removing Xi Jinping from his post as chairman of the CMC. But because their numbers were too few, the motion failed.

In effect, the meeting ended in a stalemate between Xi and the military: neither side achieved total victory. The power struggle will therefore continue.

Just a day before the plenum closed, my friend — Chinese YouTuber Tang Jingyuan — cited inside sources from the CCP elite. He said the anti-Xi faction, sometimes called the "Elder Faction," has so far refrained from toppling Xi outright for four reasons.

*Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on September 3 during the Victory Day parade. (© Xinhua/Kyodo)*

Four Reasons Xi Still Stands

First, these elders remain Communists themselves. They fear that removing Xi too abruptly could trigger a chain reaction endangering the Party's survival. To "save the Party," they hold their fire.

Second, most anti-Xi figures — such as Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao — are cautious technocrats, not bold power-brokers. They dread the unpredictable consequences and the personal liability of overthrowing Xi. Their consensus is to "struggle without breaking," hoping Xi will eventually step down voluntarily.

Third, surprisingly, Donald Trump is a factor. The United States president has repeatedly spoken of meeting Xi at the APEC summit and calls him "my friend." This has muddied the elders' sense of Washington's stance. Conflicting signals from US channels have made them hesitate. Some, therefore, prefer to let Xi keep at least the state presidency, allowing him to meet Trump and preserve a façade of continuity — avoiding international shock or instability that could shake the Party's foundations.

Fourth, they are wary of questions of procedural legitimacy. They do not want to bear the stigma of staging a coup. Ideally, they would prefer to compel Xi to resign of his own accord — but if he refuses, their hands are tied.

A Regime at an Impasse

Taken together, these reports — whether fully accurate or not — reinforce one conclusion: the CCP's internal struggle is fierce, and its crisis runs deep. The economy is stagnant, and social despair is spreading. Random acts of violence — "revenge against society" — are increasingly common.

If the Party manages to keep power under such conditions, it may have only two paths left:

Move toward a North Korean-style totalitarian model, even at the cost of mass starvation, or
Launch a war, creating an external crisis to rally the nation and preserve its rule.

Expecting a Chinese [Mikael] Gorbachev or [Boris] Yeltsin to emerge is unrealistic, and chances of a popular uprising remain slim.

Still, I believe that perhaps Heaven has its own plan — one beyond our imagination — to end the world's largest totalitarian regime. Until then, every one of us must do our part to expose and oppose such evil. Otherwise, why would Heaven help us at all?

Author: Jennifer Zeng