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Hope for a Japan–North Korea summit over abductees is rising, but progress depends on Trump and Pyongyang's readiness to part with its ICBMs.
nishioka tsutomu

Tsutomu Nishioka, chairman of Sukuu-Kai and regional expert, speaks with JAPAN Forward at his Tokyo office. (©JAPAN Forward by Kenji Yoshida)

"Japan's meeting with North Korea is highly plausible, but will depend on President Trump's actions," says Tsutomu Nishioka, chairman of Sukuu-Kai, the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea.

An expert on Korean Peninsula affairs, Nishioka told JAPAN Forward that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi appears ready to open direct dialogue with Pyongyang, setting aside the regime's nuclear issue. 

Since taking office in October, the new Japanese leader has stressed her resolve to mobilize every possible diplomatic channel to bring home Japanese citizens abducted by the North.

In 2002, five of the 17 Japanese nationals officially recognized by Tokyo as abductees were repatriated. The remaining twelve — and possibly hundreds of others — remain unaccounted for.

As hopes for progress cautiously rise, Nishioka shared his insights.

What direction is the new government likely to take on the abduction issue?

At a national rally on November 3, Prime Minister Takaichi revealed that Japan had reached out to North Korea to propose a summit meeting — notably, without mentioning Pyongyang's nuclear programs. That omission is significant.

Traditionally, successive Japanese leaders, including the late Shinzo Abe, have held that diplomatic normalization with North Korea must follow comprehensive progress not only on the abduction issue but also on the regime's nuclear and missile programs.

The new prime minister is likely willing to engage directly with Kim Jong Un without those preconditions, vowing to spare no effort in seeking a resolution.

President Donald Trump speaks to Sakie Yokota, mother of North Korean abduction victim Megumi Yokota, at the State Guest House on October 28 in Tokyo. (©PM's Office of Japan)

Is a summit with North Korea plausible?

The Kim regime has honored its commitments to Trump by refraining from full-scale nuclear tests, though it has continued limited ICBM launches. This is despite tighter sanctions from Washington. Kim likely anticipated a second Trump term.

If a Trump–Kim meeting produces tangible results, a Japan–North Korea summit would be highly plausible and follow soon after. The two are inseparable. Washington maintains that even if a deal is reached, the United States will not provide economic aid to Pyongyang. Trump anticipates Japan will assume that role.

South Korea's intelligence agency has indicated that a Trump–Kim summit is likely to take place sometime in or after March of 2026 — a timeline that my own sources have independently confirmed.

Pyongyang's renewed ties with Moscow could complicate efforts to bring Kim to the negotiating table. What's your take on this?

It is true that North Korea currently receives payments from Russia in exchange for military support. Still, those funds are being used solely to sustain the country's military forces, not to aid ordinary citizens.

North Korea has also felt the strain on its energy supplies. Gasoline prices that remained low nearly doubled in October, largely due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil facilities. Putin's relationship with Kim, at heart, is strictly transactional.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walk together in front of Tiananmen Square on September 3. (©Reuters)

The situation with China is no different. Although North Korea's trade with Beijing rose about 30% year-over-year in September, the increase comes largely from processed goods and crafts, while imports of essentials like rice and fertilizer have, in fact, fallen.

Even when Kim visited Beijing on September 3 to meet Xi Jinping, he received little to no substantive support from China. Beijing's aim is to keep the regime in a state of controlled limbo.

What might the actual negotiations look like?

In the past, Tokyo has indicated that if Pyongyang were to relinquish its nuclear weapons, it would provide massive funds comparable to the economic aid given to South Korea in 1965. It's an incentive that Pyongyang desperately seeks.

But with UN sanctions still in place, Japan cannot extend official development assistance to the North. Kim's strategy therefore is to secure a nuclear deal with Washington first and then use it to push for sanctions relief.

Sources inside North Korea indicate that the regime is willing to halt further nuclear development without producing additional weapons. Existing plutonium reactors, reprocessing facilities, and test sites would also be dismantled. This much was already discussed at the 2019 Hanoi summit.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un views a Hwasong-18 ICBM missile launch during what North Korea says is a drill on December 18, 2023. (©KCNA via Reuters)

Additional proposals may include dismantling all uranium‑enrichment facilities — including the Kangson complex — and eliminating the country's intercontinental ballistic missiles. But Kim would seek to retain existing nuclear weapons and materials to produce roughly 100 additional bombs for regime survival.

For Trump, securing North Korea's commitment to abandon intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US mainland would represent a major strategic victory.

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump interact during the extended bilateral meeting in the Metropole hotel during the second US-North Korea summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, February 28, 2019. (©Reuters)

Would the Kim regime agree to abolish its ICBMs?

Why has North Korea pursued ICBM development? As Kim Il Sung once explained, owning nuclear missiles capable of reaching the US is viewed as a tool to achieve Korean reunification.

During the Korean War in 1950, North Korea initially launched a successful surprise attack but ultimately failed to capture the entirety of the South because American forces intervened. The regime, at the time, viewed long-range missiles as a means to deter similar US intervention in the future.

Under Kim Jong Un's leadership, North Korea has officially abandoned the goal of reunification, rendering the strategy of a surprise attack obsolete.

Kim doesn't believe he could win a nuclear war with the US. While short-range missiles remain essential to target the South, giving up ICBMs is plausible given their reduced strategic value.

Has the war in Ukraine also influenced North's strategy?

When Russian forces launched their initial attacks in February 2022, the superior capabilities of Western weaponry prevented them from capturing Kyiv, the capital.

South Korea's conventional forces today far exceed those of the North. NATO is now actively acquiring South Korea's high-quality weapons. Even without US backing for the South, the Kim regime knows the odds of a successful surprise attack are slim.

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Author: Kenji Yoshida

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