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Ruling party's break with Komeito may speed Japan's defense overhaul, but experts say fiscal limits and personnel shortages loom large.
USS George Washington

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and US President Donald Trump walk aboard USS George Washington on October 28 in Yokosuka. (©AP via Kyodo)

Japan is moving to revamp its defense posture under new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi amid a rapidly deteriorating regional security landscape. 

Top priorities include revising defense-related documents and boosting combat readiness, all while pushing to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP ahead of schedule.

Masashi Murano, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, says that while the overall direction is sound, more work is needed to ensure an effective response to potential regional contingencies.

He recently spoke with JAPAN Forward to share his insights.

Excerpts from the interview follow.

What improvements does Japan need to strengthen its defense readiness?

The accelerated efforts to acquire Tomahawk missiles and fast-track the mass production of upgraded surface-to-ship missiles demonstrate a clear sense of urgency. Yet Japan must move even quickly to deploy them to operational theaters.

Likewise, the number and scale of hardened infrastructure at bases remain scarce. For instance, aircraft shelters — designed to protect fighter jets — exist at about three Air Self-Defense Force bases, with none in Okinawa. 

Ground-launched test of the enhanced Type-12 surface-to-ship missile, Niijima Islands, October 2024. (courtesy of ATLA)

Given China's missile capabilities and the rapid pace at which it is enhancing its operational strike forces, the sheer scale of the threat means even dispersed targets in Japan are at risk. Quick scrambling and evasive maneuvers alone are not sufficient. 

Reinforcing the resilience of bases, strengthening aircraft shelters, ammunition depots, and fuel storage facilities is essential. At the same time, systems for transporting fuel to civilian airfields for refueling must be improved to ensure operational continuity.

Are there additional areas that need refining?

Another area is strengthening missile defense. For instance, Japan's defense budget request for fiscal year 2026 does not include the procurement of new Patriot missiles. 

The five-year plan formulated in December 2022 did not anticipate such a significant weakening of the Japanese yen, meaning the budget for missile defense has already been largely consumed. 

Procuring additional systems next year would leave little room for other priorities, such as fighter jets or missiles for enemy base strike capabilities, showing the difficult trade-offs.

Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles (PAC-3) are deployed at the Air Self-Defense Force Miyakojima Base. Photo of November 22 (© Kyodo)

Mass deployment of diverse unmanned systems is also critical to contingency planning against regional threats. The drones Japan needs are small, missile-like munitions, which are required in large quantities. 

In a typical deployment, dozens are launched simultaneously and expended en masse to attract enemy fire, jam hostile radar, or improve the strike precision of cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk.

A Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel closely shadows a China Coast Guard ship (right), maintaining tight surveillance and protecting the Japanese research vessel off the Senkaku Islands, Ishigaki City in Okinawa. April 27, 2024, at 8:29 AM (© Sankei by Naoki Otake)

With Tokyo increasingly mulling nuclear-powered submarines, what key obstacles stand in the way?

Specifically, there are three obstacles: financial cost, human resource requirements, and the timeline for their implementation. In terms of funding, it could be achievable with sufficient determination and effort. 

The United Kingdom, for example, operates strategic nuclear submarines, dedicating roughly 6% of its defense budget to maintaining them. While demanding, a similar approach might theoretically be feasible by reallocating funds from other programs, such as air defense systems.

That said, neither the shortage of personnel nor time constraints can be overcome solely through sheer willpower. The personnel shortage, in particular, represents the most pressing challenge. Maintaining current staffing levels indefinitely is unrealistic given Japan's demographic trends.

Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi at a Ministry of Defense press conference, October 22. The new minister has been emphasizing the need for nuclear-powered submarines, citing the increasingly severe security environment. (©Pool Photo)

Under the current defense posture, Japan aims to maintain a fleet of 22 conventional submarines. But whether that target can actually be sustained is highly uncertain. 

A full-scale nuclear submarine requires roughly twice the crew of the submarines currently in service. Simply halving the fleet might appear feasible on paper, yet even with longer endurance or expanded operational range, such a drastic reduction would undermine operational readiness and defeat the very purpose.

What alternatives could help maintain effective maritime defense?

Integrating unmanned systems with the current submarine fleet could provide a more practical way forward. The objective is not to replace conventional submarines with nuclear-powered ones but to create a balanced mix of capabilities tailored to each mission. Be it anti-submarine warfare, long-range strike operations, or area denial.

Extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles like XLUUVs or autonomous AUVs carry substantial battery capacity, making them ideal for pre‑deployment to strategic locations for ambush missions.

As underwater platforms, they are much less vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes and can operate at significant distances from their home bases. 

Combining them with the existing fleets is highly effective at threatening surface vessels and allows them to assume many of the choke‑point control functions carried out by Japan's patrol submarines

How will the US Forces Japan upgrade, once complete, enhance operational coordination with Japan's military?

As Indo-Pacific Command is presently headquartered in Hawaii, conducting operational command and consultations from such a distance is cumbersome due to both the time difference and physical separation. 

In the event of a contingency — whether involving Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula — the core concept is to bolster the command functions of US Forces Japan. The upgrade, when complete, will enable more seamless operational-level coordination with Japan's new command structure.

Donald Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi aboard the US aircraft carrier George Washington, Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, October 28 (Pool photo).

The specific timeline and scope for transferring functions from Hawaii to US Forces Japan is a complex administrative issue, however. 

One key question would be the commander's rank, as in whether it should be a four-star or a three-star general overseeing the command. The number of such positions is legally fixed for each branch, which also intersects with questions of authority and command prerogatives.

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Author: Kenji Yoshida

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