Robert Eldridge: How China Seeks to Win Without Firing a Shot

When Dr Robert Eldridge visited Taiwan in late December last year, the self-governing island was bracing for the Justice Mission 2025 — a two-day Chinese military drill that, on paper, seemed almost routine. 

In practice, though, it was anything but. Amid choppy seas and winter winds, China demonstrated its ability to operate in and around the Taiwan Strait and its contiguous zones with increasing speed and precision.

Eldridge, a longtime observer of East Asian security and a former associate political advisor for the US Marine Corps, argues that each iteration reflects a steady expansion of the Chinese military's capabilities. Preventing a Taiwan contingency from cascading into a broader regional crisis, he says, will require more than military readiness, but diplomatic finesse.

In a wide-ranging interview, he shared his insights on Beijing's evolving strategies and the high-stakes calculations confronting Tokyo, Washington, and other key regional players.

Excerpts follow. 

What were the key features of the People's Liberation Army's recent military exercises around Taiwan?

The December 29-30 Justice Mission 2025 exercises were significant for at least three reasons. Many experts argue that this time of year is ill-suited for a cross-strait invasion due to harsh seas and unfavorable weather. China's actions, however, demonstrated that it is capable of operating in the Taiwan Strait even under these conditions.

Second, the US and Japanese militaries are largely on holiday during this period, when overall awareness and readiness naturally decline. China follows the lunar New Year calendar, making it a regular work period for the PLA. This would have allowed Beijing to observe how its adversaries respond when taken off guard.

Third, China's military capabilities continue to advance. The exercises were conducted rapidly and concluded just as quickly, underscoring improved operational efficiency. With each drill, the PLA appears to emphasize a different capability — whether a specific skill set, weapon system, or the introduction of a new operational element.

How did the people of Taiwan respond to the unfolding military situation during your visit?

Tensions among observers are undeniably high, yet public sentiment in Taiwan is generally upbeat and easygoing, as it is in Japan. And that may be precisely Beijing's objective. To normalize military exercises and drills so thoroughly that they fade into the background of everyday life.

But these drills should be taken seriously. The lesson from Russia's war against Ukraine is that military exercises can serve as cover for an actual invasion, as Moscow demonstrated along Ukraine's border.

What are the regional implications of China's military maneuvers near and around Taiwan?

Until recently, planning for a Taiwan contingency focused primarily on the Taiwan Strait and tended to involve China, Taiwan, and the US. That is no longer the case. Today, such a scenario would likely draw in North Korea, Russia, and other regional players.

And it would extend to the South China Sea. What was once a single-front scenario has expanded into a potential four-front conflict. Compounding this shift is the fact that, unlike in the past, tens of millions of Chinese nationals now reside overseas, including roughly one million in Japan and large populations in South Korea, the US, and the Philippines.

Since 2010, under China's National Defense Mobilization Law, Chinese nationals abroad are legally obligated to cooperate with the Chinese government. In a conflict scenario, they need to be seen as essentially enemy combatants for the unrest they can cause.  

What specifically is at stake for Japan?

Chinese nationals could generate significant chaos and disruption, particularly in Japan. Their numbers there are four to five times larger than those of the Self-Defense Forces. In Tokyo alone, their number is seven times that of the police forces there.

The Chinese are also reported to have weapons stored in Japan near key infrastructure. If the roughly one million Chinese nationals in Japan are legally obligated to cooperate with the Chinese government — and many of them have received military training — they could pose a serious security threat.

In a worst-case scenario, if China resumed tourism to Japan, ten Japanese ports, from Hakodate and Otaru to Ishigaki, could each receive cruise ships carrying four to five thousand passengers, with weapons and operational plans listing targets to be seized or destroyed, stored onboard.

Consider ports and airports that are often located near each other. Naha Airport in Okinawa, for instance, sits in proximity to a major cruise terminal and could be easily damaged or seized. 

Even without military action, these gray-zone operations could create massive chaos. So this isn't an "unthinkable or soteigai" scenario, as some Japanese people like to put it. 

From a deterrence perspective, what do you think is currently missing in preparing for a Taiwan contingency?

Deterrence against China is weaker than it should be. There is the military preparedness side, but also the diplomatic side. Tokyo talks tough about its relationship with Taiwan, but it has yet to establish a Taiwan Relations Act, for instance. 

Only twelve countries maintain formal diplomatic ties with the island. The most effective way to defend Taiwan is for that number to grow dramatically.

The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, before his assassination, wrote an article on Project Syndicate in April 2022 calling on Washington to end its ambiguous policy toward Taiwan. 

In the article, he observed that, from an international law perspective, Taiwan is still considered part of China, making international defense efforts more difficult.

What I believe he was arguing is that Taiwan's weak international status — its absence from the United Nations and lack of formal diplomatic recognition — limits the ability of other countries to respond if China were to attack.

In preparing for a potential confrontation with China, in what areas should Japan focus its military and policy planning?

One concern I have is that China understands Japan better than Japan understands itself. And it knows exactly which buttons to push.

I could envision a scenario in which, if Tokyo has a weak government, China might avoid striking Japanese or US bases in a potential Taiwan contingency, since doing so could immediately trigger Japan's right to self-defense.

China could avoid targeting a Japanese base at first, paralyzing Tokyo's response mechanism. It might instead strike a Japanese aircraft or ship in a limited way, but such actions would probably be insufficient to meaningfully shift public opinion in Japan.

Many Japanese, including the media — especially Asahi in its editorials — might ask, "Is it worth going to war with China over a frigate or a single ship?"

China may be studying precisely that: keeping Japan out of a Taiwan contingency by avoiding direct attacks on Japanese territory early on.

As the US pivots attention to the Western Hemisphere, do you see any risk of reduced American engagement in East Asia?

There are two theories regarding alliance relationships, which in Japanese are called Maki Komareru, meaning "getting entangled," and Misterareru, meaning "getting abandoned."

This constantly fluctuates between periods and administrations. Generally, US Republican administrations — Eisenhower, Nixon, Trump, and perhaps even the two Bushes — tend to expect allies to take greater responsibility for their own security.

Trump's approach aligns with that pattern and reflects his personal views as well. If countries in the region sense that America is pulling back or focusing elsewhere, it would serve as a clear example of a Republican approach to foreign policy.

In the case of the Trump administration in particular, my concern is the lack of Asian specialists and the absence of hawks on China. I believe this has led to a misjudgment of Beijing, with the administration seeming to assume it can strike a deal with China. For instance, they seem to be more focused on tariffs than on security.

South Korea, one of Japan's closest regional partners and home to several key US bases, is rarely mentioned in talks of a Taiwan contingency. How do you interpret this omission?

South Korea is rarely mentioned in discussions or war games about a Taiwan contingency, yet it stands to lose a great deal. Of course, Taiwan has the most at stake. But if the self-governing island were taken, South Korea would essentially lose access to the Pacific entirely.

Even if it tried to bypass Japan from the north, the fall of Taiwan could effectively neutralize Japan's strategic position. This means South Korea also has a significant stake in ensuring a free and sovereign Taiwan.

South Korea's role, however, would depend largely on how North Korea reacts to a Taiwan contingency. And that's where Trump's diplomacy would be crucial. 

First, Trump would need to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Second, if he pursues peace treaty talks with North Korea, he must make it clear that Pyongyang cannot intervene in a Taiwan contingency. If Russia remains separate from China and North Korea stays out, the situation would once again be primarily confined to the Taiwan Strait.

There is still the South China Sea to worry about, but the Philippines is putting up an admirable fight against China's bullying. The world needs to learn from the Philippines and support it.

RELATED:

• Miles Yu: Ending 'Strategic Ambiguity' Over Taiwan Should Start with Japan
• Authoritarian Temptations and the International Defense of Democratic Taiwan
• Caught in the Crosshairs, Okinawa Faces the Taiwan Test

Author: Kenji Yoshida