Figurines with computers and smartphones are seen in front of the words "Artificial Intelligence AI." This illustration was taken on February 19, 2024. (©REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration)
The United States appropriately treats advanced artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductors as strategic assets. Cutting-edge AI chips are not merely commercial goods. They power next-generation military systems, surveillance platforms, and national innovation ecosystems.
In an era of intensifying strategic competition with China, export controls on advanced chips have become a central instrument of national security policy.
That logic underpins the AI Overwatch Act (HR 6875), which would grant the US Congress veto authority over certain AI chip export licenses and suspend approvals until a revised national security export strategy is submitted.
The concern driving the legislation is understandable. However, its mechanism risks complicating the alliance coordination that has made recent export controls effective, particularly cooperation between the United States and Japan.
Congress Risks Export Chaos
In 2023, Tokyo revised its controls under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA), restricting 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The decision, implemented through the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), was not cost-free.
Japanese firms such as Tokyo Electron and Screen Holdings play indispensable roles in the global semiconductor supply chain, and the new controls caused commercial losses.
Yet Japan aligned with the US and the Netherlands in limiting China's access to advanced fabrication tools. And that alignment required Japan's trust that Washington's policy would remain coherent, technically grounded, and strategically consistent.
The AI Overwatch Act introduces a new variable: Congressional veto politics inserted directly into individual export licensing decisions.
Historically, export controls have been administered by executive agencies with access to classified intelligence, technical expertise, and diplomatic context.
In my experience working on Indo-Pacific trade and security policy, procedural reliability often matters as much as strategic intent. Case-by-case licensing decisions require speed, discretion, and quiet coordination with allies.
If the licensing authority becomes subject to legislative veto and partisan pressure, approvals could slow, and unpredictability could increase.
Threatening Allied Coordination
For allies such as Japan, uncertainty about the reliability of US licensing complicates coordination. Export controls are most effective when partners move together, but weakened when governments hedge against policy instability.
Japan's previous willingness to absorb commercial risk in pursuit of strategic alignment with the United States on restrictions on advanced chips and chipmaking tools bound for China may waver if Washington adopts the AI Overwatch Act and the US system of export controls becomes politicized or erratic.
Recent controversies surrounding AI chip export approvals highlight a deeper vulnerability. The central risk has not been insufficient Congressional involvement but opacity and potential influence within executive decision-making.
A Congressional veto mechanism does not necessarily address that problem. Transparency requirements, conflict-of-interest safeguards, stronger end-use verification, and post-export monitoring would more directly mitigate the risk that advanced chips are diverted or misused.
Technology Policy is Security Policy
For Japan, the stakes are not abstract, as semiconductor cooperation has become a pillar of US–Japan security ties. Supply chain resilience initiatives, joint research partnerships, and new fabrication investments increasingly underpin deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan's support for Rapidus, a new initiative aimed at restoring advanced domestic chip fabrication capability, reflects a broader national strategy to strengthen technological sovereignty while remaining deeply integrated with allied systems. Technology policy has become security policy.
Fragmented export governance in Washington would complicate that coordination at precisely the moment when strategic alignment is most necessary. Semiconductor capital expenditure decisions operate on long time horizons. Volatility in American licensing decisions could ripple across the broader allied ecosystem, affecting planning assumptions in both the private sector and government.
More predictable US export frameworks would, on the other hand, allow Japanese firms to plan investments with confidence.
Unity Determines Effectiveness
None of this argues against robust export controls. On the contrary, such controls are most effective when they are technically precise, coordinated among allies, and insulated from domestic politics. Strategic competition with China demands discipline and coherence, not additional friction inside the policymaking process.
Congress plays an essential role in oversight, funding enforcement, and setting strategic direction. But inserting lawmakers directly into operational export licensing risks slowing decisions at a time when speed itself is strategic.
China continues to accelerate its push for indigenous semiconductor capabilities and seeks to exploit gaps in allied restrictions. Any internal inconsistency among democratic partners creates opportunities for Beijing to maneuver. The strength of export controls lies not only in their severity but in their coordination and predictability.
For Japan, the lesson is not to oppose US controls, but to pay close attention to how they may be changed or implemented. Alliance strength depends not only on shared threat perception but also on policy coherence and institutional reliability.
In the competition over advanced technology, coordination among democratic allies remains a decisive advantage. That advantage should not be weakened by mechanisms such as the AI Overwatch Act, which would introduce uncertainty into the system at precisely the moment unity is strategically indispensable.
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Author: Daniel Bob
Daniel Bob worked on Indo-Pacific trade, security, and economic policy in the US Senate Finance Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as an International Affairs Fellow in Japan at the Council on Foreign Relations.
