Printed Chinese and Japanese flags are seen in this illustration, July 21, 2022. (©REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo)
The shocking incident in which a young Japanese schoolchild was fatally stabbed on his way to school in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen at the end of September has received considerable attention. Not just in Japan, but attention in China as well. A month later, the research center Carnegie China published an online commentary titled The Commercialization of Cyber Nationalism in China. Its content helps explain why China is becoming a more difficult place for foreigners to live, especially Japanese.
The Shenzhen attack was the second on Japanese children in two months following an earlier incident in Suzhou. There have been multiple attacks on Chinese schoolchildren as well in recent years.
Chinese authorities have downplayed the attacks on Japanese schoolchildren as isolated incidents. They have also not revealed the attackers' motives or whether they singled out the children because of anti-Japan sentiment.
Some observers attribute this to the deteriorating Chinese economy and a general mood of angst among the Chinese public. However, there is no denying that anti-foreigner sentiment has been rising. At least partly, it is attributed to the Chinese government's campaign targeting "foreign spies" and "hostile elements."
The attacks on the schoolchildren have caused fear and concern among the roughly 100,000 Japanese residents in China. Many businesses are reportedly considering leaving China or downsizing their operations there. The refusal of the Chinese authorities to provide more information on the attackers has exacerbated the situation.
Commercialization of Cyber Nationalism
Wang Qiyue coauthored the report on cyber nationalism in China. He is a PhD candidate at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Li Mingjiang, a nonresident scholar with Carnegie China, is the other coauthor.
Their report describes how self-media and social media platforms are seeking to generate profit by driving traffic that relies on extreme xenophobic rhetoric. This in turn creates an "echo chamber" in which only nationalistic opinions are tolerated. Intellectuals who oppose China's drift into ultranationalism remain silent to avoid being attacked as "unpatriotic" by hardline nationalists.
Meanwhile, social media has usurped traditional media's role as the main source of information for many Chinese. Too often, the result is that normal patriotic and nationalist sentiments are distorted and intensified. This creates hate directed at the "enemy."
China's Prideful Progress
Chinese take justifiable pride in China's accomplishments in recent decades. And "patriotic education" constantly harps on past foreign invasions. Lashing out online at nations that dare criticize China has become acceptable within Chinese society. Japan in particular is criticized for its invasion in the 1930s and the general perception among Chinese of all ages that it has never sincerely admitted to past mistakes.
However, the new cyber nationalism is on a different scale entirely. As Wang and Li explain, these sentiments have been co-opted by self-media and social media to generate profit. Thus has arisen a traffic-driven business of cyber nationalism (aiguo liuliang shengyi).
As the report notes, "Generating rumors about tensions between China and Japan is a surefire way to drive traffic."
A Plethora of Conspiracy Theories
Whether or not the individuals or business entities positing the inflammatory content, often sensationalistic videos, actually believe what is in the content themselves is secondary to the pursuit of user traffic and profits.
One of the more outrageous conspiracy theories peddled online is that Japanese schools in China are the equivalent of "foreign concessions." Another is that Hu Youping, the woman who bravely sought to stop the assailant's attack on Japanese schoolchildren in Suzhou, was actually a "Japanese secret agent."
"Stoking nationalist sentiment has become a powerful tool for attracting attention amid rising domestic political shifts and increased international tensions," the authors write. "As a result, a wave of nationalist self-media has emerged, benefiting from the business of cyber nationalism."
It should be emphasized that the cyber nationalism described here is separate from the Chinese government's propaganda efforts. There is a veritable army of workers constantly scouring online content in China. They report incidents of unrest in the country or criticism of the Chinese Communist Party.
Nevertheless, except in rare instances, they let the cyber nationalists ply their trade in peace. The authorities apparently believe that such content serves as a useful safety valve, diverting domestic discontent to foreign targets.
Channeling Social Unrest
As Wang and Li write, "It's important to note that this business model has flourished with the state's tolerance and even tacit approval."
That means as long as those creating the content do not cause social unrest or seek to mobilize social movements. Regulating self-media and social media platforms has appeared more strict in recent years. The report notes, "Following the attacks on Japanese children in Suzhou and Shenzhen, regulatory pressure has increased on online platforms."
The Chinese economy is in the doldrums and Beijing is eager to attract new foreign investment. Therefore, the government may finally be ready to eliminate the worst cyber nationalist excesses.
"However," Wang and Li conclude, "given the size and profitability of the cyber nationalism industry and the state's continued partial tolerance, fully eradicating its harmful effects may not be realistic."
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Author: John Carroll
John Carroll is a Kyoto-based freelance writer and JAPAN Forward contributor. He is currently writing a book on the religious traditions and superstitions of Japan's ancient capital.
