As the New Year Begins, Stay Attentive to the Dangers of a Taiwan Emergency

The New Year of the Horse has begun. In 2026, apart from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the gravest concern confronting the international community today is the prospect of a Taiwan contingency. Up to the last hours of 2025, the Chinese military conducted large-scale exercises encircling the island.

Meanwhile, the United States Department of Defense released its annual report on China's military power in December. It concluded that "China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027." Japan would do well to treat this assessment with the utmost seriousness.

China's Aim

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was right to state that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency, and a contingency for the Japan–US alliance." Japan and Taiwan are in extremely close proximity.

China treats the Senkaku Is l ands as if they were affiliated islets of what it calls "Taiwan Province." From this perspective, Beijing's unification with Taiwan cannot be completed without first seizing the Senkaku Islands from Japan. This is one of the fundamental reasons Japan cannot afford to remain a bystander in a Taiwan emergency.

This must be a year in which both the government and the public redouble their efforts to prevent ー for the first time since the war ー a situation in which Japan comes under armed attack. We cannot allow future generations to say that Japan stood idly by in the year, "before the Taiwan emergency."

If we complacently assume that war will not happen, it will be far too late to begin worrying about when it does. We live in a perilous world. Unless we adopt a clear-eyed understanding of the times and commit ourselves, we will be unable to deter contingencies. Japan must implement the necessary measures to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities, even if they appear hasty.

*Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi holds a press conference following the close of an extraordinary Diet session. December 17, at the Prime Minister's Office. (©Sankei by by Ataru Haruna)*

For example, in 2026, the ruling parties plan to strengthen Japan's intelligence capabilities. Some insist this should be done carefully, over time. However, those arguments betray an alarmingly weak sense of urgency.

The Cost of Misjudging Authoritarian Intent

This recalls events from four years ago, when the United States and the United Kingdom shared intelligence warning that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was imminent.

Governments and militaries in major countries, including Japan, were monitoring Russian troop movements through satellite imagery and other means. Yet, with the exception of the US and the UK, many remained skeptical that a full-scale invasion would occur. From a conventional military standpoint, the scale of Russia's mobilization appeared insufficient to conquer Ukraine. Even the Ukrainian government, up until the eve of the invasion, dismissed such warnings as needlessly alarmist.

Nevertheless, Russia's dictator, President Vladimir Putin, chose to invade, and Ukraine's territory was laid waste. To this day, Ukrainian civilians continue to be targeted by missiles and drones.

Two lessons emerge from this experience.

First, even the leaders of authoritarian states possessing extensive military and intelligence apparatuses can underestimate their adversaries. Or, like Russia, overestimate their own strength, misjudge that they can "win," and ultimately choose aggression.

Second, although the US has made grave misjudgments in the past, most notably regarding weapons of mass destruction in the Iraq War, its intelligence capabilities and strategic assessments nonetheless merit serious respect. The Pentagon's annual report, released at the end of 2025, reflects the application of a broad and sophisticated intelligence apparatus.

Diplomatic efforts are, of course, indispensable. At the same time, it is imperative to ensure that China's dictator never concludes that invasion is a viable option.

Facing the Security Reality

Japanese public opinion underwent a significant shift on security issues in 2025, increasingly lending support to proactive pacifism. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's entirely reasonable remarks regarding the prospect of a Taiwan contingency sparked fierce backlash from China, along with domestic left-wing forces such as the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and certain media outlets. Yet the Cabinet's high approval ratings remained unmoved.

*Mount Fuji on January 24, 2025, watches over rough waters. (©Sankei by Masahiro Sakai)*

Then, some media outlets criticized off-the-record remarks by officials close to the Prime Minister's Office regarding nuclear deterrence. However, the public largely ignored them. It is deeply encouraging that a majority of the public is no longer swayed by the left's fanciful pacifism or by dangerous rhetoric that serves to please authoritarian China. This historic shift is likely a source of profound confusion for China, as well as for left-wing parties and media in Japan.

It is symbolic that pandas will disappear from Japan later in this month of January. Such gestures may have been understandable during the era of the Soviet threat. However, the inertia-driven model of Japan–China friendship that followed is now coming to an end.

What is required is a sweeping reassessment of the frameworks governing Japan–China relations across all fields. This should be the year when Japan confronts its threats squarely and implements concrete measures to safeguard the nation's peace and security.

(Read the article in Japanese.)

Author: Satoshi Sakakibara, Chief Editorial Writer, The Sankei Shimbun