Bhutan: A Frontier Against China's Expansion in the Himalayan Region
Beijing's policy toward Bhutan is limited for now, but history shows why the latter remains wary of China's ultimate strategic aims in the Himalayan region.
China's geostrategic bid to exert influence in South Asia finds Bhutan as its last standing border barrier apart from India. Clasped between India and China, this landlocked mountain kingdom was long isolated by frosty Himalayan peaks. It is known for its geographical, cultural, and religious proximity to Tibet.
China has held no relations with Bhutan since 1947. Historians and analysts attributing this to the 1910 treaty between British India and Bhutan and the 1949 treaty between India and Bhutan.
'Five Fingers of Tibet'
Two successive political developments, namely the communist revolution in China in 1949 and its annexation of Tibet in 1950, further underlined Bhutan's political and strategic vitality.
Following its victory in the 1949 communist revolution, China, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), described Bhutan as one of the "five fingers" of its "Tibetan palm." The treaty that the Republic of India signed with Bhutan in 1949 is largely said to be a continuation of the treaty of 1910.
Following the 1949 treaty, China tacitly recognized the special treaty relationship between India and Bhutan. However, it held grave reservations, particularly regarding Article 2, which empowered the government of India to guide Bhutan's external affairs upon the latter's request.
Bhutan's border with India remains clearly identified and demarcated. While signing the 1949 treaty, India returned about 32 square miles (about 83 sq km) of land territory in the area known as Dewangiri to Bhutan to accommodate its claims.
Particularly after 1959, China began reasserting its supposed claims over Bhutan. Maps were published in Beijing in which Bhutan was shown inside the domain of China.
There have been instances where the Bhutanese elite softened their attitude towards China. Nevertheless, the latter's policy in Tibet continues to arouse hostility in traditional Bhutanese society, which remains culturally woven to Tibet. Meanwhile, Bhutan's policy towards China is circumscribed by numerous political and economic considerations. Moreover, Bhutan's apprehensions over the ultimate politico-strategic objectives of Chinese policy in the Himalayan region have not disappeared.
When activity in Tibet gained momentum in 1958-1959, Chinese maps began showing almost the entire eastern district of Tashigong and pockets of northeastern and northwestern Bhutan as parts of China. All normal travel and trade between Bhutan and Tibet came to an end in 1959 when China suppressed the Tibetan uprising. At that time, the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers fled Lhasa and sought refuge in India.
The following year, 1960, Bhutan sealed its borders with Tibet. This closed the traditional trade routes northward to Shigatse and Lhasa from Paro, Punakha, and Tashigong as well as the brisk trade route via Yatung in the Chumbi Valley to the west. The Royal Government of Bhutan adopted a cautious policy towards Tibet and offered asylum to hundreds of Tibetan refugees in 1959-1960. However, it later asked them to accept Bhutanese citizenship or leave the country.
Historically, Bhutan maintained checkposts all along its boundary with Tibet and exercised effective administrative jurisdiction up to this boundary. The Bhutanese officials conducted official tours and collected taxes from the land areas extending up to it. Moreover, Bhutanese citizens regularly utilized the lands up to their border. And local Tibetan officials in areas adjacent to the border respected this boundary.
The discrepancy existing in this area was confirmed when the Chinese side handed over the coordinates of the most strategic southeast corner of Bhutan to India. The latter viewed that the coordinates were being incorrectly shown in Chinese unofficial and official maps.
China's Strategic Objectives
Surveying the political history and geographic location of Bhutan provides a strong rationale for studying the consequences of its relationship with Beijing. The forward element of China's foreign and defense policy has remained visible in its policy of extending its sway and influence over the peoples and territories of peripheral regions. These include Mongolia, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, parts of India's northern and northeast frontiers, and to an extent, even Burma.
Beijing's strategy of prolonging border-related negotiations to extract maximum strategic concessions is a well-demonstrated tactic across Asia. As for Bhutan, its China policy has limited objectives, at least in the short term. Securing a comprehensive agreement on the boundary question will remain Bhutan's priority. However, its bilateral and regional initiatives have been driven by fear and apprehension regarding its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.
Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the Bhutanese have nursed anxieties of a Chinese military intervention in the region. The long-feared communist threat still looms large in Himalayan Asia.
Learn more about Dr Chansoria and follow her column "All Politics is Global" on JAPAN Forward, and on X (formerly Twitter). The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which she is affiliated.
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