China, as Seen Through the Lens of Four Middle Powers

United States President-elect Donald Trump is assembling an extraordinary administration. In its upper ranks at least, looks likely to resemble a convocation of China hawks. They would do well to take note of a recent analysis of differing opinions in middle-power countries about the challenges China poses to the US and its allies. 

Earlier this year the National Security Research Division at RAND Corporation published a research paper titled "Middle-Power Equities in a Cross-Strait Conflict." Coauthored by Rafiq Dossani, Cortez A. Cooper III, and Joan Cheng, the report looks at how four middle-power nations view a possible Taiwan crisis. Looking at Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, it considers how they might seek to shape events in pursuit of their own interests. 

The authors first reviewed open-source literature. Then they interviewed policymakers and policy analysts in the four countries. Forty-four of these were considered senior, meaning they had been working in their field for at least ten years. Of these, 14 were from Japan, tying with the UK for the most respondents. In the case of Japan, four were diplomats, three defense sector officials, five policy analysts, and two business executives. 

With the policymakers and policy analysts, the one-on-one discussions focused on the interests and strategies in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. Each interview covered several topics, including whether these nations would support Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict. The researchers also sought to understand their nation's perception of threats from China and whether they thought that China would initiate a conflict with Taiwan.

A Different View from the Middle-Powers 

There were some fascinating differences among the views expressed by the respondents in these four US allies. These were particularly evident in how they viewed the nature of the Chinese challenge as compared to the apparent prevailing narrative among influential analysts and policymakers in the US. 

An armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait would affect not only the rest of Asia but the entire world. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that China and the US alone will determine the course of events in the event of a crisis in the Strait. Such a war could draw not just the US but several middle powers into the conflict, the report indicates. Undoubtedly, it would impact the long-term political, economic, and security interests of these states. 

These middle powers are by no means small. Indeed, they might have the capacity and willingness to become involved to protect their own interests. At the same time, the middle powers may feel that they are losing influence and strategic autonomy, the report suggests. 

Would China Invade Taiwan?

Whether China can proceed with an invasion of Taiwan without significant global consequences could depend on the interests and strategies of these middle powers. Would they seek to deter or limit the scale of such a conflict? Or, might one or more even be willing to act as a mediator in a cross-strait conflict? 

The report also considers what support Taiwan could expect in the event China attacked it. That is likely not go beyond diplomatic support and endorsement of US sanctions, concludes the report. Any involvement in a US-led military response would likely be limited to logistics and material support. 

The report contends, "Middle powers' military support would be limited because of their own weak military capabilities to resist retaliation by China, uncertainty about domestic political support of Taiwan in a conflict with China, and prioritization of other regions in their foreign policies."

Perception of Beijing's Views 

There was a consensus among respondents that Beijing views the four middle powers as weak. Too weak militarily, at least, to take on China, either alone or in coalition. Beijing furthermore does not consider India a serious threat. Instead, China has India tied up in the Himalayan border dispute. 

The report goes on to state, "Our respondents contended that, in East Asia and Oceania, China is only concerned about Japan's military power but thought that Japan would not prevail in a conflict with China." 

Perspectives from Japan

A Japanese business executive opined that China anticipates that Japan would actively join a US-China fight over Taiwan and is prepared for it. Other respondents agreed that China is prepared for a breakdown in relations with Japan in a Taiwan conflict. 

However, a respondent from Japan's defense sector argued that a cross-strait conflict would inevitably lead to war between China and the US. This war, he suggested, would end "with China being completely destroyed." The respondent argued that China is aware of this outcome. For that reason, he views the prospect of a cross-Strait conflict as extremely low. 

In fact, several Japanese respondents shared that conclusion. A retired diplomat, though, also cautioned that it would be a mistake for US policymakers to assume the Chinese public would not support their government in the event of a war.

Japan's potential for survival in a war with China would be a key determinant in its stance. According to a business executive, the Japanese people are not ready to fight and die for the defense of Taiwan. A retired diplomat responded that a US-led coalition would form if China were to invade Taiwan. However, Japan would not send troops to such a conflict or even its navy to remove a blockade. 

Right of Collective Self-defense

Under the interpretation articulated by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2014, Japan can undertake collective self-defense if the survival of Japan is at stake. However, the Japanese respondents agreed that would only occur in truly exceptional circumstances. 

One respondent declared: "I think China will say to Japan that, if you try to do that, we will take military action against Japan as well. And I think will be very difficult for Japan, as we will be sandwiched between the United States and China."

A retired diplomat noted that China cares more about US power than Japanese power. He said China thinks there are limits to how much suffering Japan can endure in the event of a conflict. This respondent also noted that China does not invest much in its relationship with Japan. 

Deep-rooted Japanese pacifism, both popular and constitutional, and the fear of a retaliatory attack by China are likely to limit Japan's military support for Taiwan to logistics and supplies. 

Preserving the Legitimacy of the CCP 

Several respondents emphasized that the paramount goal of China's leadership is the continued legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. They do not believe China cares about multilateralism or other internationalist values. In their eyes, China must continue to be seen internally as a great power that is preeminent in Asia. It also means China must achieve high economic growth. 

Currently, the Chinese economy is experiencing malaise. Under the circumstances, an invasion of Taiwan could conceivably cause the Chinese people to doubt the CCP's legitimacy. Most responders thought Beijing would deem that an unacceptable risk relative to the status quo. 

In short, the thinking of the middle power respondents interviewed for the report tended to differ from those of US policymakers. Many on the US side, however, seem convinced China will continue to be aggressive and could well invade Taiwan. 

Advice from an Australian Expert

In this regard, those addressing the Xi Jinping regime in China would do well to read Kevin Rudd's new book On Xi Jinping: How Xi's Marxist Nationalism Is Shaping China and the World (November 2024). Currently Australia's ambassador to the US, Rudd formerly served as that nation's prime minister and foreign minister. He is an acknowledged China expert and former president of the Asia Society.

Rudd explains that when Xi took power he was convinced that he needed to rectify imbalances that had grown during the reform and opening era "from the time of Deng Xiaoping. Xi felt they were sapping the strength of the Party through corruption. He was also concerned about the growing power of entrepreneurs and international-oriented business people, and the first stirrings of democracy. He therefore decided to tighten the reins and strive for greater self-sufficiency, which incidentally would reduce China's vulnerability to sanctions. 

The result is "Marxist nationalism," which, according to Rudd, means "taking Chinese politics to the Leninist left, Chinese economics to the Marxist left, and Chinese foreign policy to the nationalist right." 

Washington DC today needs such cool-headed analysis of the Chinese regime, including what makes Xi Jinping and the CCP tick. 

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Author: John Carroll