Jennifer Zeng 
The Great Hall of the People, where China's National People's Congress was held, Beijing on the 5th (@Sankei by Shohei Mitsuka)(Photo by Mitsuzuka Seihei)
"This morning, it felt like the sky had fallen!" This is how many Chinese small and medium-sized business owners lamented after US President Donald Trump announced the "Liberation Day" tariffs. What do Trump's latest tariff policies truly mean for China's economy and the Chinese Communist regime?
What does the latest political turbulence in China imply for Xi Jinping? And why are Chinese citizens suddenly exclaiming, "Where have all the Chinese people gone?"
US Tariffs Strike a Heavy Blow
On April 2, US tariffs on Chinese goods surged to 54%. Some argue that if previously implemented tariffs of 20% are included, the actual tariff burden reaches as high as 74%.
This does not even include additional tariffs: 25% on steel and aluminum, 100% on automobiles, and docking fees at US ports.
In addition, a new 30% or $25 per item tariff on Chinese goods under $800 entering the US via the international postal system deals a major blow to China's cross-border e-commerce platforms like Temu and Shein.
China's economy is famously driven by the so-called "three carriages": infrastructure (government spending), domestic demand, and exports. The first two have long lost momentum. And now, with exports taking such a hit, the economic outlook appears increasingly grim.
The End of a Growth Model
Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has taken full advantage of American openness, along with unethical tactics such as technology theft. With those, it has built itself into the world's second-largest economy. Now, that model has reached a dead end.
Looking ahead, it is highly likely that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will turn further inward, closing off from the world and becoming a second North Korea. Whether the economy collapses or people's lives worsen is irrelevant to the CCP. Even if the economy deteriorates, it does not affect the consumption level of the CCP's top echelon.
How Long Can the Chinese People Endure?
The pressing question is: How long can the Chinese people endure? This remains to be seen.
Another concern is whether the CCP might attempt to divert internal crises by provoking war externally. One theory suggests that rather than launching a full-scale attack on Taiwan, the CCP may create small-scale military conflicts in offshore islands like Kinmen, then declare a wartime status to tighten its grip over China.
Former Chinese official Du Wen, now in exile, recently revealed that he has received information indicating the CCP has issued orders to its military units to prepare for operations against Taiwan before 2026. Previously, the deadline was to be ready before 2027.
Regardless of whether this information is credible, Taiwan has already begun ramping up its response. Back in September of 2024, President Lai Ching-te released a video urging citizens to stock up on supplies in case of emergencies.
Recently, the Japanese government also drafted a response plan for a possible CCP attack on Taiwan. It includes evacuating approximately 120,000 residents and tourists from the Sakishima Islands within six days.
As the Chinese saying goes, "Preparation averts disaster." Therefore, whether or not the CCP eventually launches an attack on Taiwan, the international community must be thoroughly prepared.
Turmoil Beneath a Calm Surface
As Trump's global tariffs usher in a new era in international affairs, significant changes are also brewing beneath the seemingly calm surface of China's political system.
On March 13, I was the first to report in English-language media that He Weidong, the third most senior figure in the Chinese military and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), had been detained. Since then, several English-language media outlets have followed up, and two American intelligence officials confirmed the news to The Washington Times.
Now, more than twenty days have passed, and the Chinese authorities have not denied the rumors. On the contrary, they have reinforced the credibility of these rumors in a subtle way.
Xinhua News Agency published a report on April 2 titled "Zhang Youxia and Yin Li Participate in Capital Voluntary Tree-Planting Activity." Zhang Youxia is the second-highest-ranking figure in China's military and the First Vice Chairman of the CMC. Yin Li is the Party Secretary of Beijing.
He Weidong's Silent Disappearance
This tree-planting event is an annual ritual organized by the CMC, and this year marked the 43rd consecutive occurrence. Typically, the event is attended by the Vice Chairmen of the CMC and several CMC members, making it a highly orchestrated political performance.
However, this year's report named only Zhang Youxia and two other CMC members, Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin. He Weidong's name was completely absent. If everything were normal with He Weidong, such an omission would be unimaginable.
Compared with previous years, this becomes even clearer. On April 1, 2024, the Xinhua report was titled "Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and Yin Li Participate in Capital Voluntary Tree-Planting Activity." The opening sentence stated that Zhang Youxia and He Weidong took part in the tree-planting activity in Beijing's Chaoyang District.
The same was true the year before in 2023 — identical headline, identical format. Only the date changed: April 7. Once again, Zhang and He were mentioned side by side.
In 2022, He Weidong had not yet been promoted to CMC Vice Chairman. The report that year was titled "Xu Qiliang, Zhang Youxia, and Cai Qi Participate in Capital Voluntary Tree-Planting Activity." At the time, Xu Qiliang was the First Vice Chairman, Zhang was the second, and Cai Qi was the Mayor of Beijing.
Mixed and Subtle Signals
The point is, this event and its reports are highly formulaic. Every year, the two CMC Vice Chairmen and all CMC members join the Beijing mayor for the occasion.
This year, not only did Miao Hua — who has already been officially removed — not appear, but He Weidong, whose name and photo are still listed on official websites, was also absent. The only conclusion is that He Weidong is indeed in trouble, though the news has not been formally announced.
Yet the Xinhua report is already sending a signal by omitting his presence — suggesting he might have been purged. It may even be that anti-Xi factions within the CCP are subtly signaling that Xi's military control has been compromised.
Unprecedented Ministerial Shuffle
Another unprecedented development within the CCP is the unexplained mutual transfer of roles between former Organization Minister Li Ganjie and former United Front Minister Shi Taifeng.
This news was first reported by Hong Kong-based Sing Tao Daily and the South China Morning Post, which is viewed as having ties to the Jiang Zemin faction. Subsequently, Xinhua quietly updated Li Ganjie's title to United Front Minister, while Shi Taifeng's new title was Organization Minister.
Observers speculate the switch occurred during the March 31 Politburo meeting. The official summary of that meeting stated only that two resolutions and "other matters" were discussed — without specifying what those other matters were.
Why such an extraordinary reshuffle?
Power Struggles Behind the Swap
Public information reveals that both Li Ganjie and Shi Taifeng became Politburo members at the CCP's 20th National Congress in 2022. The Politburo has 25 members, ranking them among the top elite in the Party.
Li Ganjie was appointed Organization Minister in April 2023. Shi Taifeng became the United Front Minister in October 2022. Typically, these roles last five years. So why were they suddenly swapped midway?
This appears to reflect an internal power struggle, expanding from the military into civilian and Party organs.
Among the CCP's three major departments — Organization, Propaganda, and United Front — the Organization Department holds the most real power, overseeing official appointments. Mao Zedong was the first to hold this post. Both Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang also served as Organization Ministers.
The United Front Department, by contrast, focuses on external influence operations and carries less weight internally. So, Li Ganjie's move from Organization to United Front represents a demotion, while Shi Taifeng's move amounts to a promotion.
From Xi Loyalist to the Sidelines
Li Ganjie has long been seen as a close protégé of Xi Jinping. His predecessor, Chen Xi, was Xi's university roommate and lived in the same dormitory at Tsinghua University — an exceptionally close relationship.
Even after stepping down as Organization Minister at age 70, Chen Xi did not retire but became president of the Central Party School, which trains top CCP officials.
That Li Ganjie succeeded Chen Xi suggests a deliberate succession approved by both Chen and Xi.
Shi Taifeng, on the other hand, may not belong to Xi's inner circle. During Xi's tenure as Party School President (2007–2012), Shi served as Vice President for three years.
Shi was also a classmate of former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in the Peking University Law Department. Over his nine years at the Party School, Shi worked under former CCP head Hu Jintao and former Vice President Zeng Qinghong, maintaining good relationships with both.
Notably, in March 2016, when former leader Hu Jintao returned to his ancestral home in Jiangsu's Taizhou, then-Governor Shi made a special visit and held a tea session with Hu and his wife, indicating a close personal bond.
Thus, some analysts believe this extraordinary swap reflects a shift in power: the weakening of Xi's faction and a resurgence of the so-called "Tuanpai" (Youth League faction). After removing Xi loyalists from the military, anti-Xi forces may now be extending their purge to government and Party institutions. Seizing the Organization Ministry early enables them to prepare for a broader cleanup of Xi's loyalists across the board.
Where Have All the People Gone?
A glaring issue recently highlighted by Chinese netizens is the visibly shrinking presence of people in public spaces. Videos from cities, rural areas, shopping malls, subways, and bus stops all show significantly decreased foot traffic.
Even online livestreams are drawing fewer viewers. In some places, malls now require no rent — just a nominal management fee of a few dozen yuan per month. One netizen filmed himself inquiring about the price.
Consequently, a recurring question has emerged online: "Where have all the Chinese people gone?"
In January 2023, Falun Gong founder Mr Li Hongzhi claimed that as many as 400 million people died during the pandemic in China. Based on the number of crematorium furnaces, I previously estimated that around 140 million people may have died over the three years.
Few believed such high death tolls.
Yet, the eerie scenes of empty streets and malls are deeply unsettling and have reignited debates about the true death toll during the pandemic.
The Boiling Point of Perception
Besides mortality, other factors may be contributing to the decline in public activity. A shrinking economy, plummeting births, rising emigration, new virus strains, and deaths potentially linked to vaccines.
Ultimately, perception is shaped by cumulative change. When population decline reaches a certain tipping point, people suddenly take notice — just as cold water gradually heats without alarm until it suddenly boils.
The question remains: Has China reached that boiling point?
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Author: Jennifer Zeng
