Chinese Land Buys Raise Security Alarms, AFPI Warns

Chinese land acquisitions across the United States are drawing growing scrutiny from security officials. When a Chinese-backed firm tried to build a "corn mill" just 12 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, the US Air Force called it a "significant threat."

Another Chinese billionaire's plan for a wind farm near Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas was similarly blocked by state law. These incidents are part of a growing pattern that has alarmed US policymakers, and the risks extend far beyond farmland.

According to Adam Savit, director of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) China Policy Initiative, the problem lies in China's National Intelligence Law of 2017, which obliges all Chinese organizations and citizens to cooperate with the country's intelligence services. "CCP-owned land plots near military installations are by definition a national security threat," Savit said.

Chinese entities hold less than 350,000 acres of US agricultural land. That is just under 1% of all foreign-held acreage. While the footprint may seem small, Savit explained that "any parcel of land, however big or small, can be used as a platform for surveillance or sabotage by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)."

Beyond Food Security: The Evolution of a Threat

Public concern over Chinese land ownership first reached critical mass in 2022. At that time, the focus was largely on food security. Skeptics argued that China's holdings were too small to matter. However, by 2024, legislative debates in many US states had shifted focus. The proximity to military bases and critical infrastructure had become the dominant concern.

Savit explained that even tiny plots of land could serve as vectors for "agroterrorism," the deliberate targeting of agriculture to disrupt food supplies, or as launch points for small-scale drone attacks. "Ukraine used this method to destroy billions of dollars' worth of Russian bombers," and "Israel used pre-positioned drones to attack Iranian missile assets," he said.

Farmland, Food Chains, and Data

Concerns also extend to major agribusiness acquisitions. When China's WH Group bought Smithfield Foods in 2013, the largest pork producer in the United States, it gained control of 146,000 acres of farmland. Similarly, ChemChina's purchase of Syngenta gave a Chinese state-owned enterprise access to advanced American agricultural technologies and data.

These deals don't just shift ownership, but may also transfer agricultural know-how and proprietary data that could be leveraged to Beijing's advantage. AFPI is preparing a report on this issue, which will outline the national security implications of such acquisitions.

The Hidden Infrastructure Risks

Beyond agriculture, Chinese land ownership near critical infrastructure — energy, water, and telecommunications — presents subtler but potentially graver risks.

In May 2024, then-President Joe Biden barred a Chinese-backed cryptocurrency mining firm from operating near Francis E Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. The base oversees America's land-based nuclear missiles. Located just one mile from the base, the firm's land acquisition had gone unnoticed by regulators since 2022. "The violation was discovered only after CFIUS [the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] received a tip from a member of the public," Savit said.

*Former US President Joe Biden (©Reuters)*

Crypto mines, he noted, consume enormous amounts of power. He cautioned that such facilities "use massive amounts of electricity and could be used to purposely overwhelm electrical grids and cause blackouts at the base."

Data Centers: The Next Frontier

While farmland and power grids have received the most attention, data infrastructure is emerging as another critical front. Chinese-owned or operated data centers could provide convenient access points for espionage, cyber intrusions, or data siphoning.

Digital assets and data centers may be considered the modern equivalents of ports and airfields. Should the CCP control the hardware or software behind a country's networks, it may not need to own the land to control the flow of information.

State and Federal Countermeasures

In response, over two-thirds of US states have enacted or proposed laws restricting land ownership by entities tied to adversarial nations. Congress has also debated similar federal measures, though progress has been uneven.

A more coherent national policy is needed. Some states have passed strong laws, but others remain loopholes. AFPI has published model legislation to help states close these gaps, along with a fact sheet outlining best practices.

Lessons from Japan and Allied Coordination

Tokyo has already identified hundreds of "monitored areas" within one kilometer of military bases, nuclear facilities, and other critical sites. A government survey found that Chinese buyers accounted for over half of all foreign land transactions near such areas in a single year.

Japan's stricter monitoring and data collection efforts are something the US may learn from. And conversely, Washington's evolving use of CFIUS could serve as a model for Japan. Coordination between allies is crucial, since the CCP's global strategy doesn't stop at national borders.

Security vs Economic Openness

China often defends its acquisitions as purely commercial ventures that boost local economies. America has historically welcomed foreign investment, but economic openness must not come at the expense of national security.

"The short answer is that most of our critical infrastructure is vulnerable," Savit revealed. The challenge is distinguishing legitimate investments from those designed to serve Beijing's strategic objectives. A nation can protect its sovereignty without blanket bans or discrimination, but only with transparency, accountability, and a unified policy.

Author: Daniel Manning