Retired Lt. General Chun In-Bum addresses service members from the US and South Korea during Backbone University 2025 at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Feb. 7, 2025. (©US Army/Spc. Kelsey Kollar)
When Lord Palmerston observed that nations have "no eternal allies, and no perpetual enemies — only eternal and perpetual interests," he was describing a world defined by shifting balances rather than fixed loyalties.
South Korea today finds itself operating squarely within that logic, navigating deepening great-power rivalry while striving to preserve autonomy on an increasingly divided peninsula.
To this end, President Lee Jae-myung has pursued what is often described as pragmatic, interest-driven foreign and security policies since taking office in June 2025.
Yet with Seoul anchored to an alliance with the United States — subject to sharper political swings under a mercurial leader in Washington — and bordered by two nuclear-armed neighbors, China and North Korea, its room for maneuver may be steadily narrowing.
In an interview, retired South Korean Army Lt General Chun In-Bum said the Lee administration has made tangible progress in diplomatic coordination with Washington and Tokyo, but cautioned that its approach to military affairs risks undermining readiness at a critical moment.
Purges and the Price of Readiness
While foreign policy messaging has emphasized stability and pragmatism, Chun said the government's handling of the armed forces since the declaration of martial law under former President Yoon Suk-yeol has generated growing unease within the military.
On December 3, 2024, then-conservative leader Yoon declared brief martial law, vowing to "eradicate pro-North Korean anti-state forces" and "restore normalcy." He was subsequently ousted from office on charges of inciting insurrection and now faces a criminal trial.
Chun acknowledged the persistence of factionalism and favoritism within the ranks. But following Yoon's removal, investigations into alleged "insurrectionary elements" have expanded across the military, disproportionately affecting the army, military intelligence, and the Korea Military Academy.
"You remove the people who violate their oath," the former general said. "But you don't try to dismantle the institution that produces your military leadership."
Under efforts to prosecute collaborators, Chun said, "sweeping legal actions have targeted officers who were responding to routine command obligations rather than making political decisions." Some personnel were penalized for simply reporting to duty after being informed that martial law had been declared — an action he described as basic professional conduct.
The cumulative effect, he continued, has been a climate of fear and risk aversion, particularly among mid-level officers. "When officers stop taking risks in training, readiness inevitably declines," he said, calling the trend "extremely dangerous for any military."
These internal pressures coincide with structural manpower challenges. South Korea's armed forces are estimated to be tens of thousands of personnel below required levels, according to Chun, with recruitment shortfalls most acute among junior officers and non-commissioned officers — the ranks essential for day-to-day command and control.
No Sidelines in Asia
At the strategic level, the implications of domestic turbulence extend beyond the peninsula. Experts have continued to point out that the US cannot sustain simultaneous large-scale operations across multiple theaters, underscoring the importance of allied burden-sharing.
Chun observed that Seoul has long operated on the assumption that American forces would be able to respond decisively in a crisis. That assumption, however, is now being tested as Washington prioritizes domestic resilience while urging allies to shoulder greater responsibility for regional security.
Under President Donald Trump's "peace through strength" doctrine, he argued, Japan and South Korea are becoming more central to US strategy in Asia, especially amid China's accelerating military modernization.
In the event of a US–China conflict in East Asia, neither Seoul nor Tokyo would be able to remain on the sidelines, he added, noting that "there is no scenario in which we are unaffected."
Resistance among South Korean progressives and some in Japan to involvement in Taiwan contingencies, he said, reflects political preference rather than strategic reality.
To that end, the former general said signs of deepening South Korea–Japan security coordination are encouraging. Recent instances of South Korean Air Force aircraft refueling at a base in Okinawa were cited as practical indicators of improving interoperability between the two countries.
Reaching a Sealed North
Since assuming office, President Lee has also shown eagerness to re-engage with North Korea, a relationship that had deteriorated sharply under his predecessor. But achieving this is easier said than done.
In 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing objective of reunification with the South and shut down virtually all remaining channels of communication. Roads and rails linking the two Koreas were demolished, and guardrails collapsed in the disputed West Sea.
Complicating the strategic calculus further, Chun said, is Pyongyang's deepening alignment with Moscow.
"North Korea has gained operational experience and international exposure through cooperation with Russia during the war in Ukraine, while its conventional weapons programs continue to advance," he said.
That said, he noted that outward belligerence tells only part of the story. The ex-general described the still-reclusive state as "fragile," pointing to the Kim regime's growing efforts to block outside cultural influence, particularly South Korean popular culture.
On the prospects for renewed inter-Korean engagement, Chun said Pyongyang's insistence on recognition as a nuclear-weapon state and full sanctions relief as preconditions for talks leaves little room for meaningful dialogue.
Submarines and Sea Power
Looking ahead, the ex-general emphasized the strategic importance of maritime security and emerging Arctic trade routes, which could significantly shorten transit times between Europe and Asia.
Protecting those interests will require long-endurance naval capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, Chun said, linking the case to South Korea's decades-long research into small modular reactors (SMRs).
As of early 2026, Seoul is moving toward developing its first nuclear-powered submarines with Washington's backing to counter regional threats, though technical details remain unresolved.
Beyond propulsion, he added, SMRs could underpin a broader energy ecosystem at a time when artificial intelligence is driving unprecedented demand for reliable power.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
