Yasuhiro Matsuda is Professor of international politics at Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia and expert on the Cross-Strait relations. (©Sankei by Tomo Kuwamura)
Weeks after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's remarks that a Taiwan contingency could pose a "survival-threatening" situation for Japan, Beijing's fury shows no sign of abating.
Chinese officials insist — as always and almost reflexively — that the Taiwan question remains strictly an internal affair. Yet a glance at the region's strategic map tells a different story. Japan's economic lifeline runs directly through the waters that encircle Taiwan.
Consider the sea lanes of the East China Sea. Through narrow corridors runs a substantial share of Japan's energy imports and trade, meaning even minor interference can have outsized effects. Any push by China to assert control over the waters south of Taiwan or the approaches to the Miyako Strait could put those routes at immediate and serious risk.
Yasuhiro Matsuda, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo's Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, says, "A naval blockade would almost certainly precede any full-scale invasion, and Tokyo is unlikely to stand apart."
In an interview with JAPAN Forward, he discussed the strategic realities of a Taiwan crisis, why Japan cannot be a bystander, and the future of Tokyo–Beijing relations.
Excerpts follow.
How do you assess PM Takaichi's recent comments on Taiwan?
Prime Minister Takaichi's comments in the Diet do not represent a shift in Japan's fundamental policy toward a Taiwan contingency. The notion that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency" is nothing new, and has previously been articulated by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and senior figures like Taro Aso.
What is new in this instance is that a sitting prime minister offered a more detailed explanation during a budget session in the Diet. Even so, this was less a calculated comment from Takaichi than a response shaped by persistent questioning from an opposition lawmaker, which prompted a more expansive answer.
What do you make of Beijing's furious response and punitive actions against Japan?
Beijing's objective is to respond with maximum force, signaling a warning not only to Japan but also to Taiwan, South Korea, and the United States. From China's perspective, Taiwan constitutes a core interest — one that is fundamentally non-negotiable. Its heavy-handed reaction is fully consistent with that posture.
But this isn't their first time. There is ample precedent. During both the Yasukuni Shrine controversy and the "nationalization" of the Senkaku Islands, for example, Beijing employed a similar playbook.
When the Japanese government purchased some of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, Beijing deliberately escalated tensions through repeated acts of coercion. Chinese military aircraft conducted unusually close approaches, maritime vessels engaged in high-speed chases in the surrounding waters, and deliberate airspace incursions became routine.
A more recent example is China's response to the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi [nuclear power] plant. Beijing imposed a comprehensive ban on Japanese seafood imports in August 2023, which still remains in place. Once implemented, administrative measures of this type are typically difficult to unwind.
Could a Taiwan contingency escalate into a 'survival-threatening' scenario for Japan?
The nature of a Taiwan contingency inherently allows for wide variability. It could take the form of a prolonged, deliberately planned campaign, or it could unfold and conclude within a single day. The trajectory would also hinge heavily on how the US military responds.
Imagine a naval blockade scenario. Freedom of navigation through international straits is a principle that must be upheld, and Japan would have clear grounds to contest any attempt to restrict it.
If the Chinese navy were to declare a blockade of the Bashi Channel, for instance, the situation would lead to a major crisis. The bulk of Japan's trade would halt, and in practical terms, such an action would be tantamount to a state of war. Under those circumstances, it's hard to imagine Tokyo simply remaining on the sidelines.
A blockade would almost certainly precede a full-scale invasion. Therefore, it's entirely reasonable for the Japanese government to interpret it as a build-up toward such an outcome.
What could be the ramifications if military intervention were delayed or absent?
At its core, Japan is reluctant to shoulder the burden alone. Were it to retreat in tandem with the US, however, the probability of major conflict over a Taiwan contingency would rise significantly.
If China were to use force against Taiwan in the region and neither the US nor Japan responded, the only plausible explanation would be a reluctance to confront a nuclear-armed major power. But such inaction would effectively herald the end of the post-war international order.
Once Taiwan falls, China would be able to project power far more easily into the Western Pacific, forcing the line of defense to retreat as far back as the Second Island Chain. Control over the Senkaku Islands could extend China's dominance across the East and South China Seas.
Just look at Europe today. A failure by like-minded allies and partners to act promptly and appropriately can have far-reaching consequences.
How do you foresee Tokyo-Beijing relations evolving from here?
Given the sharp slowdown in China's domestic economy, it's entirely plausible they have an incentive to preserve relatively stable relations with Japan. Yet if Beijing's ties with Washington improve and tariff negotiations are settled favorably for the former, pressure on Japan will likely continue.
At the October G20 summit, Prime Minister Takaichi did not even seek to engage with her Chinese counterpart. This pattern of mutual avoidance at international forums is expected to persist for the foreseeable future.
China's APEC summit next autumn is an event to watch closely. Tokyo may pursue various avenues in the interim, but Beijing will probably continue to decline bilateral meetings. That said, it would be diplomatically awkward for the host nation to avoid interacting with a foreign leader entirely.
Should a meeting still fail to materialize at APEC 2026, the situation would become markedly serious, raising the possibility that Beijing might refuse engagement until the end of the Takaichi administration.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
