US calls for direct support in the Iran conflict puts back Tokyo and Seoul in a familiar bind between energy dependence, alliance pressure, and domestic limitations.
Iran missiles hit Bahrain port on February 28 NA7YQBGI6FNPTMPZRJYGP6CKWA

Black smoke rises from Bahrain's capital, Manama. February 28 (©Reuters)

On March 14, President Donald Trump called on countries that depend on Gulf energy to contribute naval forces to secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In a Truth Social post, he said countries receiving oil through Hormuz "must take care of that passage," adding that the United States would help "A LOT." 

Entering the third week of the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, instability in the Middle East is rippling far beyond the region. 

Speaking to reporters on Monday, Trump singled out Japan, South Korea, and NATO, expressing dissatisfaction with what he characterized as their cautious responses to his calls for more direct military involvement.

The Iraq Precedent

With Washington increasingly seeking allied support, the pressure is reviving a familiar dilemma in both Japan and South Korea — one that came to a head during the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath. Then, as now, American allies in East Asia were asked whether political solidarity would have to be matched by military commitment.

In Japan, the precedent lies in then–Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's decision to back the US following its invasion of Iraq. The Japanese parliament enacted a special measures law in July of that year, allowing the Self-Defense Forces to deploy to Iraq for reconstruction missions in designated "non-combat areas." 

Tokyo sent about 550 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel to Samawah in southern Iraq in 2004 for reconstruction and humanitarian work, while also supporting American-led operations through refueling missions in the Indian Ocean. 

Junichiro Koizumi Yoon Suk-yeol
Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi does an Elvis Presley impression with Priscilla Presley and Lisa Marie Presley and George Bush watching. At Graceland, Memphis, Tennessee, 2006. (© REUTERS/Larry Downing)

The deployment was controversial, not only because of its size, but because it pushed Japan into a war zone. That despite the government's insistence that troops would operate only in "non-combat areas." The distinction never fully convinced the public. The mission became a defining case of how far Tokyo was willing to stretch the postwar limits on overseas military action to support its alliance with Washington. 

Public opinion reflected that unease, with a Kyodo News poll in January 2004 showing 51.6% opposed to the deployment, compared with 42.8% in favor.

In a now-famous Diet exchange in July 2003, Koizumi was pressed by an opposition lawmaker to identify non-combat areas in Iraq. He was unable to provide a clear answer.

Japan had sent minesweepers during the first Gulf War in 1991, but this came only after a ceasefire had been declared.

Alliance Pressure Returns

South Korea faced a similar reckoning. Despite domestic opposition, then-President Roh Moo-hyun's government ultimately deployed around 3,600 troops to Iraq, at one point giving it the third-largest foreign military presence there after the United States and Britain.

The National Assembly at the time passed a motion approving the deployment, with 179 lawmakers voting in favor of 256 members present.

That decision was especially striking because Roh came from the progressive camp and had campaigned on a more independent line toward Washington. Yet when the alliance was put to the test, his government still chose to contribute. 

President George W. Bush welcomes President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea to the Oval Office on Thursday, Sept. 14, 2006. (©White House)

The parallels with today are not exact, but once again, the United States is asking friends to move beyond statements of concern and provide tangible operational support. 

And once again, Tokyo and Seoul are being forced to weigh alliance obligations against legal constraints, public opinion, and the risk of entanglement in another Middle Eastern war.

Between Law and Strategy

About one-fifth of the world's oil normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy markets. And experts generally agree that the Strait is an international waterway where freedom of navigation must be preserved, irrespective of disputes over the legality of US and Israeli strikes. 

For Japan and South Korea, both heavily reliant on Persian Gulf oil, much of it transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the argument that a prolonged disruption could threaten their national security is not entirely hard to make.

But translating that logic into an actual deployment during ongoing hostilities is another matter, one that requires legal justification and ideally domestic political backing. 

The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and is one of the world's most critical maritime choke points.

So far, the South Korean side has not committed any concrete support and has said it will "closely coordinate and carefully review" the situation with the relevant parties.

Speaking in parliament on Tuesday, the Japanese prime minister said Japan has "not made any decisions whatsoever" about an escort mission, while adding that the government is "reviewing what can be done within the bounds of our legal framework."

Takaichi is due in Washington on Thursday for talks with Trump, where Iran is expected to feature prominently on the agenda. Seoul, for its part, will be watching closely.

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Author: Kenji Yoshida

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