Hidden Hands and Spies: The Job Offer You Should Definitely Refuse

Learning about a prospective employer is more important than ever when you're on the hunt for a new job. Is the company what it claims, and if not, could there be a hidden hand at play?

In a May 16 report, Max Lesser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focuses on a network of five companies. Notably, they all rely on the same dedicated, Chinese-owned server to host their websites. Four of the five sites also share a single SSL certificate ー the digital identity card for a website that enables secure, encrypted communication with visitors.

Lesser found that only one company, Smiao Intelligence, actually exists. The others are mere digital facades with cloned websites, fake customers, and artificial intelligence-generated text. He concludes that "one or more individuals associated with Smiao likely created the network for intelligence purposes."

Lesser told Reuters, "What makes this activity significant is that the network seeks to exploit the financial vulnerabilities of former federal workers affected by recent mass layoffs." That is right out of the Chinese spy playbook.

Last Part
Read Part One: Need a Job? Who's a Target for Chinese Spies

Following the Chinese Intelligence Playbook

Among the positions advertised on these sites are "geopolitical consulting advisor," "investigative reporter in the United States," and "human rights conditions investigative research analyst," whose job is to monitor, document, and report human rights abuses.

Lesser notes that the tactics employed by this network closely resemble previous Chinese intelligence operations targeting US government officials and other high-value targets in the US, Europe, and other countries.

A Phantom Company in Japan

Tsubasa Insight, LLC is an especially interesting company within this network. It characterizes itself as a "boutique policy consulting firm based in Japan, dedicated to helping businesses and organizations navigate the complexities of the regulatory and policy environment."

The company claimed to have a team of experienced consultants. Indeed, it promised strategic insights and practical solutions "tailored to the unique needs of our clients" to help them succeed both in Japan and the US. Tsubasa Insight also offered to build and maintain relationships with key stakeholders, including government bodies. These were intended to advance the client's business objectives.

There was all the usual language you would expect to find on such a website, including discussion of "Our Mission," "Our Expertise," and "Our Values."

There was even the obligatory use of the phrase "we are passionate about."

However, with a little sleuthing, I discovered some odd things about Tsubasa Insight.

First, its contact link is job@tsubasainsight.com. Companies registered in Japan would normally use a .co.jp domain. That domain name assures visitors that the website is operated by a genuine and credible Japanese business.

Also, the company gave its ground address as 5-15-1 Shibuya, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, Japan 150-0002. It turned out, however, that such an address is fictitious. In Shibuya, there is no "5 [chome]," and the address as written cannot be Googled.

Furthermore, the bottom of the homepage of Tsubasa Insight's website had this notice: "Copyright © 2025 Tsubasa Insight, LLC - All Rights Reserved." A check of Copyright.gov, the copyright public records portal, reveals that no such copyright exists. Finally, the company currently has no presence on LinkedIn. [The website appears to have been taken offline in early June but still appears as an option in a Google search.]

*Glenn Duffie Schriver (Screenshot, FBI film)*

Recruiting From China

icconsulting information consulting Co, Ltd, is one Chinese company overtly recruiting foreigners online. It claims to be an entrepreneurial think tank that is "the pioneer of crowdsourcing consulting in China and the Asia-Pacific area." The address given for its offices is in the hi-tech Zhongguancun quarter of Beijing. Commonly referred to as the "Silicon Valley" of China, the area is near Beijing University and Qinghua University.

These are all within the sprawling Haidian urban district in northwestern Beijing. Incidentally, the same area is also home to several facilities belonging to the Ministry of State Security (MSS).

The company's homepage says it has both Chinese and English versions. However, the English is rather mangled and not written by a native English speaker. Furthermore, clicking into the Chinese version on the drop-down tab brings up only a blank page.

The company's address and email contact are provided, but a phone number is not listed. I was unable to confirm with Google Maps whether the address actually exists, although it appears to be incomplete.

What icconsulting Claims to Offer

icconsulting claims that it is involved in:

Analysis of Geopolitical Trends for major countries and
the degree to which they cooperate with China;
Risk Assessment of Regional Hot Spots "focusing on the protection of overseas interests" (presumably China's); and
Consultation on Overseas Investment Policy involving "detailed interpretation of [the] macroeconomic situation, regional investment environment, industrial policy and law of countries of the Western hemisphere and along The Belt and Road."

Going further, icconsulting says it is looking for "talented people from different countries."

Its pitch goes like this: "If you have made achievements in international relations, international economy and trade, politics, security and other fields, or you have wide and in-depth connections in related fields, then you can spend your spare time as our part time policy analyst or consultants to obtain abundant economic returns."

The website lists open positions for a "part-time policy analyst for Sino-US relations project." That position's duties are to write reports on topics of interest to the managers for remuneration ranging from $300 to $1,000 USD, depending on the "quality of the report."

The company was also looking for a human resources assistant to work in Beijing. It would involve posting "recruitment information on major recruitment websites or media outlets in the United States and give feedback to recruiters." The assistant would also conduct phone interviews with relevant candidates.

Just Like the Glenn Duffie Shriver Case

Reading all this immediately reminded me of the case of Glenn Duffie Shriver. He was an American student who took money from Chinese intelligence officers while living in Shanghai during the early 2000s and was convicted of conspiring to commit espionage for them.

Shriver started by writing reports on China-US relations for mysterious Chinese handlers. Those handlers paid him large sums in cash for his efforts simply because they wanted "to be his friend."

The young man was nursed along until he reached the point he felt unable to break his ties with Chinese intelligence, even after returning to the US. China's MSS encouraged Shriver to seek employment with the US State Department or CIA so he could serve them as a mole.

Later, the FBI produced a slick 28-minute reenactment of exactly how Shriver was lured into working for the MSS. Eventually, he received $70,000 from the MSS. Called Game of Pawns, the video is available on YouTube. Shriver himself appears at the end, describing how he got into the pay of the Chinese. He was in prison at the time, serving four years for espionage.

In an extended version of the prison cell interview, Don't Be a Pawn: A Warning to Students Abroad — FBI, Shriver warns, "The recruitment is going on. Don't fool yourself."

And he makes this chilling observation, "Once they've got you on videotape taking their money, they've got you. There's no going back from that."

MSS Targets New Prospects

Consider that the MSS was willing to invest that much time and money on a foreign student in China with no government experience or contacts. Just imagine what they would offer a retired or terminated government official in a Western country. Especially one with a Top Secret clearance (or its equivalent) who formerly held a sensitive position in the intel community, the military, or a scientific or technical agency.

But remember, too, there is no going back. That's the one offer you should definitely refuse.

Author: John Carroll