Veteran journalist and commentator Jeong Kyu-jae, the founder and former head of the conservative news outlet Pen & Mike, in an interview with JAPAN Forward. (©Kenji Yoshida for JAPAN Forward)
The conservative political wing in South Korea is in disarray. President Yoon Suk-yeol, reeling from his shock martial law gambit, was impeached by parliament last Saturday, December 14. The leader of the ruling People Power Party has since resigned, bearing the fallout from this latest crisis. Should Yoon be officially removed from office, a liberal takeover of the government appears all but inevitable.
Can they weather the storm? What does this mean for the nation's trajectory and its ties with neighboring Japan? In an exclusive interview, JAPAN Forward spoke with veteran journalist and commentator Jeong Kyu-jae. As the founder and former head of the conservative news outlet Pen & Mike, Jeong has decades of experience observing South Korea's political landscape. He was the sole journalist to conduct a one-on-one interview with former President Park Geun-hye during her impeachment proceedings in January 2017.
Excerpts of the interview follow.
In a Matter of Days, Martial Law and Impeachment
Was Yoon's martial law decree justified?
Absolutely not. President Yoon claims that his martial law was short-lived and that he rescinded it immediately after the National Assembly overturned it.
What's being overlooked in South Korea is that most soldiers dispatched to the National Assembly were unaware of their mission. They were instructed to block lawmakers from entering the National Assembly and to suppress citizens protesting outside. However, the intense public resistance forced most of the troops to back down.
It was a failed martial law attempt, plain and simple. No justification can excuse it.
Why do you think Yoon took such a risky gambit?
President Yoon appears to harbor the misguided belief that he can deploy the military to resolve political issues. It is a mindset that is entirely irrational. Martial law is reserved for extreme circumstances, such as wartime or severe domestic unrest. These conditions were entirely absent in this instance.
The president was undoubtedly facing political pressures, particularly from opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and his Democratic Party. But this pressure reflects a subjective fear, not an objective one. Ultimately, this is a political matter, not grounds for military intervention. I believe the Constitutional Court would likely concur with my assessment.
Did Yoon fail to engage effectively with the opposition?
First, President Yoon lacks proper political acumen and experience. When the budget bill was sent to the National Assembly, for instance, he made no attempt to address lawmakers or persuade them. He seldom engages with politicians, whether from the opposition or his own party. Yoon appears to believe that simply issuing instructions and setting directions is enough to ensure lawmakers will fall in line.
In a democratic society, a president should actively lobby parliamentarians, working to garner their support for key legislation. Yoon has done little in this regard, opting for a passive approach to governance. When things don't go as planned, he becomes frustrated.
If he had the time for drinks, he should have invited the opposition to discuss critical issues over a drinking session. Remarkably, he has met with opposition leader Lee only once since taking office in May 2022.
Parliament voted to impeach Yoon. What are your thoughts?
The ruling People Power Party was deeply concerned that Yoon's impeachment could spark a major crisis similar to the fallout from former President Park Geun-hye's impeachment. Therefore, the number of "defection" votes was lower than anticipated. It appeared 12 lawmakers "broke rank" to support Yoon's ouster. Some pre-impeachment predictions said 20 to 30 defection votes were possible.
South Korea's conservative camp has already faced two presidential impeachments and is in complete chaos. With only 85 votes against impeachment ー presumably all from pro-Yoon lawmakers ー the party will significantly lose its grip on the national stage from now. It may eventually devolve into a regional party, catering to voters in the conservative stronghold of Gyeongsang Province.
What went wrong for the conservatives?
Inviting Yoon as a conservative presidential candidate was a critical misjudgment from the start. Originally a prosecutor aligned with the Democratic camp, he played a key role in imprisoning numerous conservatives during Moon Jae In's administration. His aggressive investigation into then-Justice Minister Cho Kuk, a close ally of Moon, unexpectedly mobilized conservative voters and elevated Yoon as a viable contender.
In its desperation, the PPP introduced a candidate without a clear political or ideological foundation. As I've long argued, this was an endeavor destined to fail.
The PPP also lacks the will and the ability to cultivate leaders from within. It functions more like an aristocratic clique, prioritizing internal power dynamics and the protection of its own interests. In that, it is much like Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. When selecting candidates for district races, they often choose local celebrities, bypassing robust debates or competitive selection processes. These candidates may have local recognition but struggle to gain broader national appeal.
Who Could Succeed Yoon?
Should we be concerned about Lee Jae-myung's rise to power?
Anxieties seem to be growing in Japan and the United States that Lee's potential presidency could lead to major shifts in South Korea's diplomacy and security. However, I do not view Lee as a "pro-North [Korea]" figure, despite the external narrative.
During his tenure as mayor of Seongnam, Lee, lacking political connections, sought support from the pro-North faction and other controversial figures. But in April's general election, Lee refrained from nominating candidates with pro-North affiliations. Instead, he worked to forge a new political platform.
It's true that Lee has a complex and troubled past. As a child, he spent time in a juvenile detention center. He later worked tirelessly to pass the bar exam and gradually crawled up the social ladder, so to speak. Many elites within the ruling party and South Korea's high society, therefore, do not regard him as a legitimate politician.
What would a Lee presidency look like?
When Lee served as mayor of Seongnam and governor of Gyeonggi Province, he performed relatively well. He gained strong support from local constituents. For instance, he demonstrated a good understanding of market dynamics and implemented various pro-business policies. Rather than focusing on tightening regulations, he created a surprisingly trustworthy environment.
Despite his outward appearance, Lee may have adopted a populist approach merely to secure support within the Democratic Party and appeal to voters in Jeolla Province, a liberal stronghold. But beneath this populist façade, he could be quite pragmatic. To that end, I don't believe Lee would pursue the same aggressive anti-Japan policies that were championed by Moon Jae In.
There are indeed concerns regarding Lee's pro-North and pro-China leanings, as well as his association with radical leftist ideologies. If Lee chooses a socially revolutionary path, he could drift toward socialism like Hugo Chávez in South America. If he veers toward the center-left, he could emerge as a more pragmatic leader. Like many, I hope he follows the latter path.
How can the conservatives stage a revival?
In April, several promising politicians were elected within the PPP. The ruling party should allow them to prove themselves to the public and rise as national figures. A robust internal debate structure is essential to enable potential leaders with the right qualities to emerge.
Assuming that the Constitutional Court will uphold President Yoon's impeachment, a window of about four to five months will open from now until the next presidential election. The ruling party must use this period to demonstrate fundamental transformation and recalibrate its political direction.
What will the next presidential election look like?
South Korea's political landscape can be viewed as a division between conservatives and liberals, each controlling roughly 40% of the electorate. The remaining 20% comprises swing voters, whose decisions ultimately determine election outcomes. In the upcoming presidential race, proposals like relocating the capital to Sejong City may be put forward to win over voters in [swing state] Chungcheong Province.
RELATED:
- South Korean President Impeached: What Happened and What Comes Next
- Martial Law and Impeachment in South Korea: Diverging Conservative Reactions
- South Korea's Democracy is Being Tested — Again
Interview by: Kenji Yoshida
