INTERVIEW | Prepare For Conflict in Asia, Says Kimberly Kagan

The Institute for the Study of War is one of the most quoted sources when it comes to analyzing conflict as it occurs around the world. Kimberly Kagan is its founder as well as its president, having started the organization in 2007. She and the institute have covered a variety of portfolios, including Afghanistan, Syria, and now Uk raine.

The Sankei Shimbun and JAPAN Forward sat down with Dr Kagan to discuss the current situation in Ukraine, as well as its crucial lessons for Asia and Japan. In this second article in a two-part series, she focuses on the impacts of the war in Ukraine on Japan and also elsewhere in Asia. Excerpts follow.

Read part one: INTERVIEW | The Changing Face of War in Ukraine with Kimberly Kagan

Asia's Eyes on Ukraine

How does the situation in Ukraine relate to Japan?

The United States and Japan have an alliance with mutual security cooperation. The US has forces based in Japan and has extended its nuclear umbrella to Japan as part of its protection.

[Elsewhere,] Xi Jinping is pursuing greater hegemony in East Asia, stating he will subordinate Taiwan to the People's Republic of China. I presume that Mr Xi is learning lessons about whether the United States and its allies can and will withstand aggressors.

Mr Xi and Mr Putin, with other state leaders, are also trying to challenge the value of alliances that the United States has created and the credibility of the deterrence that the United States has established. The other states include Iran and North Korea.

Do you see differences between Putin and Xi?

I see some similarities and some differences.

With growing cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, we assess that these states seek to overturn the international order. They have shared destructive objectives. [Yet,] they do not agree about what should replace it. Only some have positive objectives and a vision for what they want.

Mr Xi also wants to change parts of the international order and make himself the hegemon of Asia. And he is willing to use armed force and other coercive measures to change the balance of power here in Asia. We can refer back to his statement that he wishes to be prepared for China to take Taiwan by the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

There are aspects of the economic order that benefit the People's Republic of China. It depends on integration with the European economies. China also seeks economic integration with the global South.

Russia, Iran, and North Korea do not speak of the same global governance. There are fissures in the relationships between these four states that come from their differing objectives, but also from their different degrees of power.

At the recent BRICS summit [in October 2024], Vladimir Putin wanted to issue a communique that very strongly backed the Kremlin's view of the Ukraine war. The BRICS states did not agree to Mr Putin's language but to a weaker version of Ukraine proposed by Mr Xi.

That shows something about the relative strength of Mr Xi and the relative weakness of Mr Putin. Therefore, there is a limit to the [so-called] "no-limits partnership" between China and Russia. I also suspect that Beijing is not truly comfortable with the new degree of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

Lessons From the Battlefield

What is there to learn from the war in Ukraine?

It's essential to prepare to defend against aggressive states that are willing to use military means to achieve their objectives.

The enemies and adversaries, certainly of the United States and of like-minded peoples, are preparing and waging war. They are no longer in a peacetime mentality. Whereas we, as peaceful countries, remain, for the most part, in a peacetime mentality. We need to prepare ourselves for wartime.

The Ukraine war is showing a changing warfare in this age. It is showing the United States and Europe, and should also show Japan and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific, that our forces, defense structure and industry will not suffice for modern war. We need to reform our militaries and our defense industry.

Why is reform needed?

We have developed our defense forces in the United States and in Japan based on geopolitical assumptions perhaps valid in 1991. [That was] the end of the Cold War. But [they are] no longer valid today.

One assumption is about remaining on the defensive. Ukraine was standing on the defensive from 2014 to 2022, even to this day. [In Ukraine] they have found that may not be sufficient to deter an attack.

Second, our armed forces are too small and the technologies adopted are too old.

*Kimberly Kagan sits down for an interview with Yoshihisa Komori and Arielle Busetto in Tokyo on December 4. (©Sankei by Toshiyuki Sakamaki)*

What does the modern battlefield look like?

War will be more lethal. [This is] because of emerging precision munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), even maritime [UUVs], and increasing battlefield intelligence that allows those who can see or sense to shoot precisely.

In the war in Ukraine, we are seeing a new character of warfare. There is a mixture of new technologies — such as UAVs, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare — with legacy systems — such as tanks and artillery and armored vehicles.

UAVs are inexpensive, and some offsets are very expensive precision weapons systems. Ukraine has been truly creative and brilliant in leveraging these unmanned systems to help offset its manpower deficit.

How important was defense preparedness in Ukraine?

Ukrainians were not fully ready for the Russian invasion.

However, they had some learned experiences from the period from 2014 to 2022 when Russia occupied Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. They [Ukraine] reshaped their land forces and command-and-control structures in order to evolve from a post-Soviet army to a more modern armed force.

A second thing is that Ukrainian civil society developed capabilities to respond to attacks: volunteer organizations that give first aid, combat medics, and veterans' organizations.

But [more importantly], Ukraine was able to defend itself in part because its people mobilized, recognizing the aggression and the intent of the Russian occupying forces. Because of civil society organizations, a robust civilian economy, and the development of dual-use technologies and logistic systems bridged the gap between the readiness of the military forces and the needs of the military forces the state could not fulfill.

In fact, the drone program came from various units on the ground in Ukraine. [They saw] ways to use their civilian hobby, drone photography, to create greater reconnaissance and defense.

What is the role of drones, specifically?

Ukraine has produced 1.5 million drones this past year (2024). With more money, they could make up to 2 million, and increase capacity to 4 million drones in 2025.

These [drones] are cheap. Some cost $3,000 or $5,000, up to $20,000 or $25,000. However, they can be used against very expensive precision systems to create cost-effective ways of fighting Russia.

Japan's Readiness

What should leaders in Japan and Asia do?

Get ready. What we have learned from Ukraine is that there are many things to do for our defense that involve the preparedness of our military forces, arms and weapons, and our defense industry. And we need to do that now. We can't wait until wartime to revitalize our defense industry.

Because we're not ready for the scale and lethality of what will be required for our deterrence and our defense. Early preparation and increased resources for our armed forces are essential, whether here in Japan in the Self-Defense Force or in the United States in our armed forces.

What we have seen in the war in Ukraine is that we will exhaust the stocks of high-end weapons systems very rapidly. We cannot actually produce enough high-end weapons systems in peacetime to provide ourselves with a degree of missile defense that we will need in the event of war. [Also,] we do not have enough patriot interceptors. Even the United States cannot make enough for the volume and lethality of fire that we may see here in the Asia-Pacific.

We must prepare to have industrial capacity that may be less efficient, dollar for dollar, but more effective and resilient in war.

Our armed forces need to be staffed and manned so that they have sufficient personnel and training. So that they can engage in the defense of Japan in the event of war.

The joint headquarters that Japan is developing [with the US] is very important. Maturing it before wartime is absolutely essential to make sure that the self-defense forces can defend Japan, and that they have a way of interacting with US forces based here in Japan in the event of Chinese aggression.

What does a stronger defense mean for Japan?

Japan does not make itself an aggressive nation by preparing to defend itself. It makes itself more capable of defending itself and of deterring aggression.

Japan is not seeking to make changes, it is trying to defend itself against potential aggression by China or other actors in the Asia-Pacific region. And it's important actually to prepare for the defense before the war.

Ukraine has had to defend itself with delays in the provision of assistance from the United States and other European states.

The United States has an alliance with Japan. We're not in Ukraine, and we don't have an alliance [with Ukraine]. So, the situations are not entirely identical.

But China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea test the credibility of the United States and the defenses of the United States. As that happens, it is also important that there are actually ways that like-minded people have of defending themselves and making them strong as the United States brings assistance or as other like-minded states bring assistance. And that actually creates greater resilience for Japan.

Read the related Japanese article.

Author: Arielle Busetto with Yoshihisa Komori

This interview was conducted jointly by JAPAN Forward with The Sankei Shimbun.