Kenji Yoshida 
John Bolton during a Zoom interview with JAPAN Forward (Screenshot)
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As the war in Ukraine stretches into its third year, questions loom over how it might come to a closure. A recent United States-brokered temporary ceasefire calling on Russia and Ukraine to halt attacks on each other's energy infrastructure marked an attempt to de-escalate the tension.
But that, too, has been fraught with contention. Both sides have already been accused of violating the agreement, with disputes over its exact terms.
Meanwhile, amid uncertainty in the European theatre, apprehensions are brewing among America's East Asian partners and allies over Washington's continued commitment to the region.
In an exclusive interview with JAPAN Forward, former US National Security Advisor John Bolton discusses the fragility of the 30-day truce, the shifting dynamics of the Ukraine conflict, and his perspective on President Donald Trump's foreign policy.
Bolton was the longest-serving National Security Advisor under Trump's first tenure and a former US Ambassador to the United Nations (2005-06) under President George W Bush.
How do you assess the temporary ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia?
I don't think it's holding up very well. Obviously, both sides have attacked each other's energy infrastructure, which the ceasefire was intended to stop.
There are still ongoing discussions in Saudi Arabia. They went on for quite some time on Monday, apparently still continuing on Tuesday (March 24-25) to deal with the potential for a Black Sea ceasefire. But there's no evidence that the Russians are in any hurry here. Their view is that things on the battlefield are moving in their direction.
I think Vladimir Putin does not want to squander the goodwill he has from Donald Trump and the many concessions that Trump has already made to Russia at Ukraine's expense. But while Putin is sensitive to that, he's not rushing for a more substantial ceasefire. He just doesn't think it's in Russia's interest.
On Russia's War in Ukraine
Any chance the ceasefire could evolve into a lasting peace agreement?
It's unlikely in the near term. They may get to a full ceasefire, but I don't think that's coming in the next 24 hours or the next week. I think we're talking about a substantially longer period of time.
Putin still believes that on anything significant, he wants to talk directly to Trump because he thinks he can manipulate Trump and get what he wants from him rather than relying on lower-level negotiators, the foreign minister, or even below that, to accomplish Russia's objectives.
Do you see a more viable alternative to end this war?
Coming to the Ukrainian side, I don't think they're that interested in ending the war on terms that leave Russia in control of 20% of Ukraine's territory. This would, in effect, create a new boundary between Russia and Ukraine and give Russia a year or two to recover from the enormous losses it suffered in the current war.
The Ukrainians hope that both the US and Europe will continue to supply them with military and economic assistance so that they can change the momentum on the battlefield.
Ukraine lost the territory inside Russia [Kursk] that it had captured in 2024, and perhaps hopes to get some of that territory back. So a lot of this has to do with each side trying to put itself in a better bargaining position.
Can Ukraine reclaim some of its lost territory if the US and NATO continue supplying weapons?
It's possible. That's certainly what they hope for. Take a look at the entire three-year course of the war. The Ukrainians have driven the Russians out of a substantial amount of Ukrainian territory that the Russians grabbed right at the very beginning, when many, including Western intelligence services, believed that Russia would win within a matter of weeks.
The trouble is that Russia and Ukraine are very heavily dug in in the eastern part of the country. So, attacking these fortified positions without substantial air superiority makes it hard for either side to make much headway on the ground.
Is deploying US or European troops inevitable to uphold a ceasefire?
The peacekeepers would have to decide what their mission is. Is it to enforce the peace? That is to say, to take steps against one side if it violates the peace, including military force? Or is the mission more like a traditional United Nations peacekeeping force, where it's to observe the ceasefire? In other words, to use force only in self-defense if the peacekeepers themselves are threatened, and to report violations to the UN headquarters in New York.
As we see from the discussion among the Europeans ー and it's still underway ー it looks like boots on the ground are less and less likely. Even from the British side, which has been leading these discussions, [they are] talking more about naval and air assets. They may be considerable, but it's not the same thing as an actual peacekeeping force along the front line.
On Washington's Commitment to East Asia
Should Japan and South Korea worry about Washington's commitment to East Asia under Trump?
I think the United States itself, the people of the United States, strongly support the existing commitments. The problem is Donald Trump, and it's a pretty substantial problem because he's president for 46 more months.
But the debate is still up in the air. Take the AUKUS group, for example, along with Japan and South Korea's agreements to conduct trilateral military exercises with the United States. Japan has also pledged to increase its defense spending to 2% of GDP over the next five years. These are all powerful arguments to President Trump that these alliances make sense. As I say, the overwhelming majority of Americans agree already. But that case has to be made.
We've seen from the recent leak of the Signal group chat over Yemen that people like Vice President JD Vance have no interest in Europe at all. They may well have a different position on Asia because of China's threat. And so it's important to work on that issue, too.
What are your thoughts on increasing discussions in Japan and South Korea over developing nuclear weapons or hosting US tactical nukes?
It goes to the same point as the one before it. A growing lack of faith in American resolve and commitment. And particularly in the case of nuclear weapons, of the extended deterrent provided by the US nuclear forces.
My view, again, is that Trump is an aberration here. I think most Americans believe that the extended deterrent benefits American national security and helps counter nuclear proliferation around the world.
It's not that I would worry about Japan, South Korea, or Australia getting nuclear weapons. That wouldn't worry me. What worries me is that every other nation looks at that and says, as more nations get nuclear weapons, we need nuclear weapons. That's how proliferation works. So I think that in bilateral discussions or even trilateral discussions among Japan, South Korea, and the US, we ought to face up to this. The US took some steps in the last year of the Biden administration to reassure South Korea.
I'd certainly be willing to think about resuming deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the [Korean] peninsula as a deterrent to the North Koreans. But we ought to have behind-closed-doors talks, where the sides can really talk about this.
It is in America's interest to recognize that the extended deterrent is being questioned and to show that we mean it. That's for the greater safety of everybody looking over the long term, not just the remainder of Donald Trump's presidency, but the decades that we're going to have to confront China and North Korea going forward.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
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