Former Japanese Foreign and Defense Minister Kono Taro speaks during an interview in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo. (©Sankei by Shunsuke Sakamaki)
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party's landslide victory in February's lower house election has handed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi the political capital to advance overdue defence and economic reforms. By most accounts, the mandate was decisive.
Yet electoral dominance does not always dissolve structural constraints. Japan still faces formidable challenges at home and abroad, says Kono Taro, an eleven-term LDP lawmaker who was recently reelected.
A former defence and foreign minister, Kono argues that "Trump's unpredictability buoys China," at a time when Japan confronts mounting economic pressure from Beijing. For Japan, a staunch American ally that remains deeply intertwined with China economically, the dilemma is unavoidable. Security rests on Washington, while trade and supply chains still run through its powerful neighbor.
The timing could hardly be more delicate. Takaichi is scheduled to visit Washington in March, followed by US President Donald Trump's expected state visit to Beijing.
In an exclusive interview, Kono reflects on what this moment demands of the world's fourth-largest economy caught in a growing geopolitical quagmire.
Excerpts follow.
What accounts for the scale of the LDP's latest electoral victory, and did the opposition misread the electorate?
Even a cursory glance at the opinion polls suggested that support for the LDP was surging, while the Centrist Reform Alliance's backing appeared to erode midway through the campaign.
Ms Takaichi articulated an expansive vision for Japan's future, whereas the opposition remained preoccupied with familiar themes such as money-in-politics and whether the country might be drawn into war. That seemed somewhat out of step with the general voters.
I suspect very few people in this generation genuinely believe Japan itself would initiate a war. Given the widening gap in military capabilities, most assume that if conflict were to occur, China would move first. The real question, then, is not whether Japan seeks war, but how it would defend itself if one were imposed upon it.
How do you interpret Beijing's recent moves in the context of Taiwan?
I think [Chinese President] Xi Jinping is seriously weighing his options regarding Taiwan. It was against this backdrop that Ms Takaichi made her remarks about a potential Taiwan contingency in the Diet.
From Xi's perspective, if relations with the United States were likely to become strained, he may have considered leveraging Japan to draw Tokyo closer to Beijing's orbit. However, after his conversations with Trump, Xi appears to have reassessed the balance of power, perhaps concluding that Washington lacks resolve.
If that's the case, he may now feel less need to cultivate Japan as a counterweight.
Do you see scope for a reset in Japan–China relations?
Improving relations going forward will be no easy task. China can, to a considerable extent, manage without Japan, whereas Japan remains deeply embedded in supply chains that run through China.
This dependence extends from rare earths to intermediate inputs essential for pharmaceutical production. At the same time, many Japanese industries continue to rely heavily on the Chinese market for growth.
Japan must therefore develop sectors in which China cannot readily dispense with Japanese technology, expertise, or components. Only by strengthening areas of indispensable advantage can Japan rebalance what is currently an asymmetrical economic relationship.
Why is Japan ramping up efforts to strengthen its defense posture?
Beijing's rapid military expansion inevitably compels Tokyo to make its own preparations. In this evolving strategic environment, inaction is not a viable option. Looking back, the United States has borne a substantial share of the burden for maintaining global peace and stability since the end of the Second World War.
It is only natural that, as the American economy weakens, voices within the United States will begin to question why it alone should continue to shoulder such a disproportionate burden.
For many years, Japan took comfort in the Japan-US Security Treaty, assuming that this framework was sufficient even as the international environment steadily deteriorated. As a result, there was little serious debate about substantially increasing defense spending.
The fact that Japan has now begun to take the measures it long postponed is therefore of profound significance.
Does Tokyo need to revise its postwar security framework?
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how difficult it is for any single nation to defend itself entirely on its own. In reality, only powers on the scale of the United States, China, or Russia possess that degree of self-sufficiency.
Japan must therefore confront its own constraints. This includes revising Article 9 of the Constitution, establishing the legal standing of the Self-Defense Forces, and fully participating in frameworks of collective self-defense and collective security. Safeguarding peace requires a willingness to act when nations that share our values come under attack.
At the same time, solidarity is reciprocal. If a contingency were to arise in East Asia, Japan must be in a position to rely on others just as we expect them to stand with us. That is the responsibility that accompanies genuine participation in the international security order.
Middle powers are increasingly recalibrating their strategic positions—a trend reflected, for example, in the Canadian prime minister's Davos speech. What do you make of that shift?
That view is already well established, and frankly, Japan should have articulated it first.
Relying solely on the alliance with the US creates uncertainty about American commitment in a crisis. But it's likewise unrealistic to claim Washington has no stake in Japan's security. What is needed is firmer cooperation among countries that share fundamental values.
The problem is Trump's unpredictability. Europe shares the concern that the US President could dismantle existing frameworks and seek accommodation with China. Even that possibility buoys Beijing's hand.
Ideally, Japan, Europe, and the United States would coordinate on issues such as China's industrial overcapacity, military expansion, and human rights violations. Instead, American ambivalence has stalled progress, effectively elevating China's position. Japan is left navigating an exceptionally narrow path.
Going forward, what is the top defense priority for the Takaichi government?
Japan, as an island nation, must rely on ships, unlike Ukraine, which can resupply by rail. With China operating 55 submarines to our 22, maintaining maritime supply lines in a crisis would be extremely difficult. That is why domestic production of ammunition, missiles, drones, and essential supplies is critical.
But Japan's defense industry has long produced in small quantities for a single customer, the Self-Defense Forces, driving up costs and limiting capacity. When I oversaw the defense ministry, fighter jets were sometimes grounded for lack of spare parts, with components taken from one aircraft to keep another flying. That is no way to defend a country.
We need stable production lines, reliable output, and the ability to source and assemble key components at home.
How do you see the future of Japan–South Korea relations?
Back when I was serving as Foreign Minister, my counterpart was Kang Kyung-wha. As we approached the twentieth anniversary of the Obuchi Keizo–Kim Dae-jung Partnership Declaration, we explored a range of initiatives to commemorate it.
However, the 2018 ruling by the South Korean Supreme Court [on the wartime labor mobilization issue] fundamentally altered the atmosphere. In its aftermath, those efforts unraveled.
To that end, former President Yoon's greatest achievement was, after all, the restoration of Japan–South Korea ties. Because Seoul took the initiative then, Tokyo now has a responsibility to do the same.
Europe may speak of strategic autonomy and its determination to endure within NATO and the EU even if American engagement weakens. But Japan and South Korea stand on the front lines of an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific. Precisely for that reason, the consolidation of a durable Japan–South Korea partnership is a strategic necessity.
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Author: Kenji Yoshida
