
Lawmaker Seki Hei during an interview with JAPAN Forward. (©Japan Forward by Kenji Yoshida)
China's military parade in early September was more than mere pageantry. It was an unmistakable signaling of Beijing's growing hegemonic ambition and alignment with what analysts now call the new "axis of upheaval." Under Xi Jinping, this outward projection of power is mirrored by an increasingly tight grip at home, where dissent is ruthlessly stifled and critics are pursued even beyond China's borders.
Few understand this trajectory more intimately than Seki Hei, a prolific writer and conservative commentator born in Sichuan and educated at prestigious Peking University.
In his youth, Seki joined China's democratic movement, working to prevent a return to the repressive practices of the Mao Zedong era. But following the crushing of those dreams in 1989, he left his homeland and eventually became a naturalized Japanese citizen in 2007.
In July, Seki, a vocal critic of authoritarianism, was elected to Japan's Upper House for the first time as a member of Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party). Those in Beijing quickly took notice. Earlier this month, the Chinese government sanctioned the new lawmaker, accusing him of spreading "false information" about China.
In an exclusive interview with JAPAN Forward, Seki spoke on Beijing's intimidation, the deepening authoritarianism of Xi's China, and the uncertain future of Japanese conservatism.
A World of Divided Blocs
The Chinese government recently imposed multiple sanctions on you, including a ban on reentering the country. How do you respond?
I left China many years ago and have no intention of returning. So when Beijing responds with sanctions or punitive measures against me, I find their rationale baffling and abrupt. Out of many Diet members, I alone was singled out. Why?

Until now, I have criticized China's communist dictatorship and tried to shape Japan's China policy from the outside as a writer, commentator, and academic. Now, as an elected Diet member, I sit where policy is actually made, and that changes the calculus.
My sense is that Beijing officials intended to send a blunt, preventive message — a clear "we're watching you" warning. It does not bother me in the slightest.
Are sanctions and restrictions on dissent intensifying under Xi's reign?
As we all know, dissent and criticism against the government are not merely criticized in China. They are investigated, prosecuted, and suppressed. It's nothing new.
But that repression may be intensifying against a backdrop of serious economic strain. Youth unemployment, for instance, has persistently exceeded 15% — roughly four times that of Japan. And as social discontent grows, so too does the impulse to tighten control.
China held a major military parade on September 3. What message was Beijing sending, and what does it signal for rising geopolitical tensions?
China's military parade is, at its core, a farce built on falsehoods. The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 and has never fought, let alone defeated, Japan. What Xi Jinping signaled through this display was unmistakable: China now stands in alignment with Russia, North Korea, and other aggressor states in open defiance of the free world anchored in universal values.


For the West, this marks the total collapse of a long-held illusion. Since Deng Xiaoping's reforms, Washington and its allies have clung to the fragile belief that China's rapid economic growth and modernization would inevitably lead it toward Western values and democratic reform. The opposite has happened.
As China grew wealthier, Western dependence on its economy deepened, and Beijing's authoritarian proclivities grew even stronger. The reality is unavoidable. China has emerged as the most formidable threat to global peace and to the community of democracies.
Has Japan's response to the latest developments in China been effective?
Japan does deserve credit for joining the West in boycotting the latest military parade. Yet, the reality is that the current ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), under Prime Minister [Shigeru] Ishiba, has pursued a consistently weak-kneed diplomacy toward Beijing, at times amounting to outright appeasement.

Even this year alone, China's intrusions into Japanese territorial waters and airspace have grown ever more flagrant. At the same time, rising anti-Japanese sentiment has already cost the lives of Japanese nationals in China. Still, the Ishiba administration has failed to take any meaningful action.
With China's influence expanding, should Japan view Chinese property purchases as a security threat?
There are, of course, different cases to consider. China is a one-party dictatorship where private land ownership is prohibited. Some Chinese citizens purchase property in Japan as a way to preserve their assets, safeguard their future, or provide for their children. These cannot be dismissed wholesale as malicious.
But two serious concerns arise. The first involves acquisitions not driven by private or commercial motives, but by alignment with Beijing's national strategy. For instance, purchases of land or buildings in strategically sensitive areas near American or Self-Defense Forces bases, or Japan's remote islands.
The second stems from China's National Defense Mobilization Law. Under that law, any Chinese national residing abroad remains subject to mobilization. They are legally obliged to support the central government's war efforts if called upon. The law, however, applies not only to individuals but also to their assets overseas. In theory, property held by Chinese nationals in Japan could be mobilized to serve Beijing's strategic interests.
Japan's existing legal framework is nowhere near adequate to address these vulnerabilities.
What do you think explains the LDP's crushing election defeats and the rise of third parties?
Not only has the LDP lost sight of its founding principles, but it's questionable whether the party has truly been conservative. Especially since the passing of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the party has steadily drifted leftward. In recent years, we've seen conservative lawmakers within the LDP steadily lose ground at the ballot box.
That outcome, I think, reflects a growing frustration among conservative voters. Voters who once formed the LDP's bedrock are looking elsewhere, like Sanseito and Ishin no Kai, for a credible conservative voice.
Within the conservative base, I believe there's a growing sense of crisis. The idea is that if the current trend continues, Japanese conservatism itself might be permanently wrecked. This urgency explains why voters shifted, why third parties gained momentum, sending a crippling blow to the ruling LDP coalition.
For us, Ishin no Kai, the challenge is clear. We need to emphasize our reformist credentials, but equally, we must make it unmistakable that we are rooted in conservative principles.
RELATED:
- China Flaunts Might, but Exposes Cracks in Recent Military Parade
- US-China Trade War: How Long Can the CCP Hold On?
- Rewriting History: US Think Tank Challenges CCP's WWII Victory Claims
Author: Kenji Yoshida