A helicopter flies with the Taiwanese flag during the inauguration ceremony of new President Lai Ching-te. On May 20, in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei. (©Kyodo)
At the very time of the presidential inauguration in Taiwan on May 20, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao made an intimidating remark. He said that the Japanese people would suffer China's armed attack if Japan took an active part in the cross-strait split. Two days later, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi made it clear that his government delivered an immediate and strong protest against China through diplomatic channels.
Unfortunately, given the circumstances, since Wu became ambassador in 2023, Japan's protest has not only been insufficient but also irrelevant. Therefore, it is now imperative to take an effective countermeasure.
Moreover, Wu's remark did not make any good sense. After all, Japan has consistently adhered to unofficial relations with the Taiwanese authorities since derecognizing the Republic of China in 1972. Recently, though, Tokyo has taken some significant defense policy measures by itself and through the Japan-US alliance. But this is only in response to Beijing's intensifying saber-rattling in general and military and paramilitary pressure against Japan's Senkaku and Southwesternmost islands. These islands are located within the larger Taiwan theater of military operation.
Beijing's Japan Policy Line
Wu's remark, however, cannot be imputed solely to his personal opinion or initiative. It was almost identical to a remark he made during his speech at the Japan Press Club on April 28, 2023, soon after arriving in Japan. The iteration surely reflected careful prior preparation by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This suggests the two similar remarks can be attributed to Beijing's persistent Japan policy line. In fact, Wu looked at a memo in referring to the iterated remark concerned.
Obviously, both of Wu's iterations attest to Beijing's contempt of Tokyo, making Japan's protest of his second remark totally irrelevant. Beijing has been engaged in a salami-slicing strategy to paralyze Tokyo's sense of crisis over time. It aims to establish Japan's underdog mindset and status as the new normal. Without a decisive pushback, Beijing will surely push its luck and repeat similar remarks and, probably, increasingly terrible ones.
Notably, Tokyo can declare Ambassador Wu persona non grata as a countermeasure against Beijing according to the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations. This can be done without having to offer any explanation. Such a declaration is usually made to expel diplomats suspected of espionage and overt criminal acts. However, it can be used to achieve other objectives, including as a response to Wu's threats.
Possible Strategies
Would such a move invite a tit-for-tat against the Japanese Ambassador to China? The Japanese ambassador has not threatened the Chinese people. However, Beijing could also impose countermeasures across other policy areas that Tokyo considers important. This may plausibly increase tension in bilateral diplomatic relations. Yet, Tokyo's perseverance is now more essential than ever to excel in such a game of chicken against Beijing. Tokyo now stands at the crossroads of retaining or losing its current power position vis-à-vis Beijing.
To avoid unnecessary complications, Tokyo could take a first step by temporarily recalling the Japanese ambassador to China. This softer method is often used to symbolically express strong displeasure. Tokyo could then consider declaring Ambassador Wu persona non grata if Beijing escalates the issue.
Most importantly, Tokyo's diplomatic countermeasures are necessary but not sufficient in dealing with Wu's case. This is because, given its timing, his second remark also aimed at the broad non-partisan delegation. It consisted of some 30 pro-Taiwan lower and upper house legislators who attended the inauguration ceremony and events.
Clearly, Wu's intimidating remark expressed Beijing's displeasure with Japan's parliamentary diplomacy with Taiwan, including relations outside of the formal interstate channels. In this sense, the remark signified Beijing's sinister design to circumscribe the Japanese Diet's freedom. By extension, it challenged the Japanese people as a whole.
Need for a Bicameral Resolution
Therefore, it is high time for the Diet to make its position crystal clear on the collective freedom of parliamentary diplomacy. In particular, this includes the freedom to express support for a free, democratic, and prosperous Taiwan. More specifically, the Diet can and should pass a nonpartisan, bicameral resolution for this purpose.
The advantages of this option lie in its non-legally binding and exclusively domestic political nature. It is free from both international and domestic legal constraints. Namely, this option does not contravene the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, the Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972, or the bilateral Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978.
The Taiwan lobby, both within and without Japan, has long advocated a Japanese version of a Taiwan Relations Act that emulates the American precedent. However, it is simply a nonstarter due to the total lack of legal interests and protection. That is, Japan abandoned the sovereign title of Taiwan without reassigning it to another country according to the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. Tokyo has not had any official inter-state relations with Taipei since its derecognition.
Therefore, a bicameral resolution can serve to reinforce good informal relations between Japan and Taiwan. With such a resolution, Beijing's crafty schemers will find themselves mired in their own scheme.
RELATED:
- Japan to Taiwan: We Salute Your Bravery
- Japan Stands with Taiwan as China Resorts to More Threats
- Taiwan on High Alert As China Conducts Military Exercises
- EDITORIAL | Expel the Chinese Ambassador for Threatening the Japanese People
Author: Masahiro Matsumura
Masahiro Matsumura, PhD is a professor of International Politics and National Security at St Andrew's University in Osaka. He is a 2024 ROC-MOFA Taiwan Fellow-in-Residence at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
