Need a Job? Who's a Target for Chinese Spies

On February 6, this notice appeared on a Craigslist.org Washington DC job board:

Job Opportunities for Recently Laid-Off US Government Employees

Wavemax Innovation Co, Ltd

The linked advertisement included the following language:

As many dedicated public servants are facing job transitions, we are proud to extend a warm invitation to those affected by recent layoffs to explore exciting new career opportunities with us.

At Wavemax Innovation Co, Ltd, we value the experience, skills, and commitment that government employees bring to the workforce. We are actively seeking talented professionals with backgrounds in project management, research, technology, communications, policy analysis, etc to join our team.

Wavemax Innovation claims to be a Singapore-based company. But according to a May 16 report by Max Lesser, a senior analyst on emerging threats at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), it is likely a dummy company. And it is part of a broader network of websites, LinkedIn pages, and job advertisements from fake consulting and headhunting firms used by Chinese intelligence to target former government employees and artificial intelligence researchers worldwide.

A Global Issue

The US National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) recently warned that foreign intelligence services are posing as recruiters and headhunting firms on professional networking platforms to gather information. And it is hardly a problem limited to the United States.

In 2017 German intelligence reported that China used LinkedIn to target at least 10,000 Germans as potential intelligence sources. Thereafter, in 2019 French authorities claimed that more than 4,000 French citizens had been contacted by Chinese operatives via social media. In 2023 British intelligence pegged the number of Britons approached by active Chinese state actors on LinkedIn at 20,000.

The situation in Japan is probably not much different. Consider, for example, that nearly 100,000 Japanese are still living in China, although the social media approach likely differs.

*Aldrich Ames was a CIA analyst who famously sold US secrets to the Soviet Union and Russia. He was convicted of espionage in 1994. (Public domain image)*

A LinkedIn CIA Recruit

One case is that of Kevin Mallory. He was recruited in 2017 by a Chinese intelligence officer posing as a headhunter on LinkedIn. The former CIA officer, who had fallen $230,000 USD into debt and was late on his mortgage, eventually agreed to spy for China. Later, the FBI and National Counterintelligence and Security Center produced a film (The Nevernight Connection - FBI) loosely inspired by the Mallory affair. However, it hardly captures the gravity of his crime.

Mallory even gave his Chinese handlers highly classified information about US intelligence officers who were scheduled to go to China. As one of the US attorneys who prosecuted the case put it, "Mallory not only put our country at great risk, but he endangered the lives of specific human assets who put their own safety at risk for our national defense."

The Nevernight Connection is a fictional account about a former US intelligence community official who was targeted by a Chinese agent via a professional networking site. It explains how he was recruited to turn over classified information and ended up arrested. Frankly, the plot is rather ludicrous in some respects. For example, the main character ー despite being a former intelligence agent ー is unaware that a foreigner in China cannot access the worldwide Internet without use of a VPN.

Vulnerable Targets

However, the fact that China's intelligence services have targeted thousands of individuals in the US and other Western nations for recruitment using social networking platforms is certainly no laughing matter. Those targeted include current and former officials, business professionals, academics and researchers. Individuals who agree to spy for China are typically paid through overseas bank transfers, frequently through front companies.

*American businessman Elon Musk headed the Trump administration's Department of Government Efficiency, known as DOGE. (©AP via Kyodo)*

According to a report issued by Challe n ger, Gray & Christmas dated May 1, during the first quarter of 2025, the US Government shed 282,227 jobs. Of those, 281,452 were attributed to DOGE-related cost-cutting. The number was up 680 percent from the same period a year before.

Another 75,000 Federal workers accepted buyouts before the February 12 deadline set by DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency).

Fired with Access to Classified Information

Many of the jobs cut were sensitive positions in intelligence, defense or other fields requiring a security clearance. According to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), as of October 2019, over 1.25 million US government employees, contractors and others held top-secret clearances.

There have also been multiple media reports that many employees let go by DOGE did not receive the mandatory security exit briefing. However, that exact number is unknown.

Experts emphasize that the failure to conduct exit briefings for employees with high-level security clearances is a grave concern for counterintelligence efforts. That is because during these debriefings it is emphasized that after leaving government service the employee must not divulge any confidential information and doing so is a violation of the Espionage Act.

Veteran US officials like Mallory or the infamous counterintelligence officer Aldrich Ames who spied for the Soviet Union were willing to sell out their country. Therefore, confused, angry former government employees who suddenly find themselves in dire financial straits could also at least be tempted.

China's Motivations

In December 2023, the European Intelligence Academy published a research paper by Nicholas Eftimiades, entitled "China's Espionage Recruitment Motivations: Getting Rid of the MICE." Eftimiades is also the author of the book, Chinese Intelligence Operations.

He explains the traditional motivations of individuals who spy for a foreign power, namely Money, Ideology, Coercion and Ego, summed up in the acronym MICE. However, in the paper, he argues that the traditional motivations of individuals who spy for a foreign power are not sufficient to explain China's "whole of society" approach towards collecting vast amounts of commercial, scientific and national security information for the PRC.

This effort involves several Chinese Communist Party entities, such as the United Work Department. Government ministries, state-owned enterprises and private businesses are also involved. According to Eftimiades "hundreds of thousands of people are available to support these varied intelligence collection efforts."

In the paper, Eftimiades proposes a new acronym to account for several added dimensions of complexity when considering motivational factors in Chinese espionage recruitment efforts. That is BEWARE (Business Opportunities, Ethno-Nationalism, Wealth/Money, Academic Advancement, Repression/Coercion and Emotional Bonds).

*Chinese American historian Shujan Wang was convicted of espionage for China, but he also explained how he got caught in the recruitment process. (Radio Free Asia YouTube, screenshot)*

How It Works

The "thousand grains of sand" metaphor has also frequently been used to describe how China spies on other countries. It conjures up an image of spymasters in Beijing running a supercomputer that collates and synthesizes all the intelligence that legions of Chinese spies have collected worldwide.

However, that is not how things actually work.

Many different parties with their own distinct motivations are involved. They also have a vast range of collection targets. Those include national secrets, commercial and military technology, academic research, intellectual property and trade secrets.

When the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is involved, its case officers typically try to win the trust and cooperation of individuals targeted for recruitment.

The primary exception is intelligence concerning dissident groups abroad. Those include especially democracy advocates, Falun Gong believers, Taiwan "separatists," Uyghurs and Tibetans. For these individuals, the gloves are off and coercion, appeals to ethno-nationalism and financial rewards are the preferred tools.

Eftimiades warns, "If Western law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies are to meet the current challenge posed by Beijing's massive global intelligence program, they will need to start by better understanding recruitment process and motivations."

That warning includes Japan.

Continues in Part Two: An Offer You Should Definitely Refuse

Author: John Carroll