Should Japan Possess Nuclear Weapons? 

In the November issue of Foreign Affairs, Moritz Graefrath, assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and a colleague argued for selective nuclear proliferation among trusted US allies — namely Japan, Germany, and Canada.

Carefully executed, they wrote, it could strengthen deterrence, reduce the burden on American forces, and advance Washington's broader strategic objectives.

For Japan, the proposal cuts against decades of political orthodoxy. Shaped by historic trauma, Tokyo has long adhered to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — no development, no possession, no introduction — elevating them to both a moral lodestar and a political taboo.

But some say that taboo is beginning to fray. While the incumbent administration continues to affirm the principles, it has stopped short of declaring them immutable. Public opposition remains strong, yet a Reuters investigation published in August found a growing willingness among Japanese policymakers to reconsider the long-standing framework.

Graefrath attributes this shift to mounting pressure from an increasingly volatile regional security environment, compounded by lingering doubts over the long-term reliability of American extended deterrence.

In an era of rising tensions, how could a nuclear-capable Japan make logical sense? Dr Graefrath explores the question in an interview with JAPAN Forward.

Excerpts follow. 

How would Japan's possession of nuclear weapons strengthen its deterrence?

Nuclear weapons, for all the tragic effects that they can have when they are used, are an extremely powerful tool for peace and stability. They provide ultimate security in a way that no other strategy can. 

Right now, [Japan's] nuclear deterrence is provided by the United States through extended nuclear deterrence. But very obviously, not having your own nuclear weapons, but relying on someone else to provide that security for you, always comes with vulnerability and insecurity. And that is particularly important in this case, because the US is not itself located in East Asia.

America has a troop presence there, with bases in the area, but its homeland is very far removed from East Asia. This automatically causes some issues for extended nuclear deterrence, because potential revisionist powers might think, "Is the US actually going to risk nuclear escalation over issues that are so very far away from its own homeland?"

That calculation would be very different when we're talking about a nuclear deterrent in Japan.

Would it expand Japan's regional commitment? 

Acquiring a nuclear deterrent does not necessarily change Tokyo's or Washington's, or anyone's, calculus of which issues are worth fighting over. If something happens that would threaten Japanese vital interests, then Japan would be in a conflict right now, in the very same way that it would be if it possessed a nuclear weapon.

So, Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to better provide for its own security in a way that complements or ultimately replaces US extended nuclear deterrents does not necessarily mean all of a sudden Japan has to play the role of peacemaker in the region. 

Would a nuclear-armed Japan reduce the security burden on the US?  

If you're the US president, you want to make sure America is secure and safe from external threats. Having influence abroad can be a powerful tool for that. But that influence is not a goal in and of itself.

The point is that it helps you achieve certain important strategic goals under some circumstances. In East Asia, as well as in Europe, the main interest of the United States is to prevent any single state from dominating that region.

We're talking about Germany doing this in Europe in the past, but now mostly Russia. In East Asia, we are talking mostly about China.

The nice thing about selective nuclear proliferation is, yes, it would sacrifice some of the American leverage it has over Tokyo or Berlin. But that is a very small price to pay, because in return, you achieve the ultimate goal that you have, which is regional stability, no regional hegemons emerging, essentially secured automatically.

Some contend that selective proliferation could drag Washington into an unwanted nuclear conflict. What are your thoughts? 

Selective nuclear proliferation would allow American forces to play a less active role in East Asia, to have less of a military presence, ultimately, if this really turns out to be a great stabilizer, as I expect it would be.

Strengthening deterrence in Asia at large would reduce the likelihood of any conflict, which would automatically reduce the risk of the US military being dragged into unintended or unwanted conflicts.

The main point is that this would ensure Japanese security independent of whatever the US does and what Washington thinks about its interest in the region, which, as we know, is really up for debate over the last couple of years. 

Would Washington ever agree to Tokyo possessing its own nuclear weapons?

It still goes against the consensus view in the United States, but also in other Western countries. But the fact that major outlets like Foreign Affairs and many others now at least feature those kinds of ideas shows that there is a reckoning underway. 

For various domestic and international reasons, the United States, especially under Trump, but possibly going forward, appears more willing to question traditional commitments.

At the same time, despite the uncertainty that comes with selective proliferation, the Trump administration also appears more willing than previous administrations to cast aside old consensus views.

If you're Japan, you're seeing the twin threat of China rising, and the possibility that the United States is less reliable now than it used to be, so Tokyo is coming to terms with a new geopolitical reality.

If selective proliferation is successful, would that mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is becoming obsolete?

First, we're not talking here in any way, shape, or form about Japan using those weapons at all or using them to enhance its offensive leverage. Which we also know from scholarship, nuclear weapons are not particularly good at giving you those coercive advantages. 

Second, we're advocating for selective nuclear proliferation, not the kind of proliferation Kenneth Waltz argued, in which increasing nuclear-armed states could add more stability.

Embarking on a selective proliferation would surely present legal hurdles. And it could require states like Japan, Germany, and others to withdraw from the NPT. But that doesn't necessarily mean the NPT will collapse. There are host of other governance mechanisms that exist outside of the NPT that would remain in effect. 

And the idea that if one country acquires nuclear capabilities, cascades of proliferation follow, is just not how the world works. We haven't seen that happening. And I don't think it would happen in this particular case.

How would it change Beijing and Moscow's strategic calculus? 

There is no doubt that China and Russia would immediately criticize such a move as the US-led Western imperialism further encroaching on their interests, undermining global stability.

But I don't think there's much incentive for Russia and China to take forceful action to prevent possible selective proliferation. US deterrence is simply too strong. 

Beijing and Moscow might look for candidates to potentially bolster their side of the equation. In my eyes, however, there are not the same kind of perfect candidates for selective proliferation among their allies.

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Author: Kenji Yoshida