Members of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade carry reconnaissance boats during training on June 21 in Minamishimabara, Nagasaki Prefecture. (©Sankei by Keita Ozawa)
The Defense Ministers from Japan, Australia, and the United States met in Darwin, Australia recently aiming to deepen trilateral defense cooperation. One highlight: They agreed that the Japan Ground Self Defense Force's (GSDF) Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) ― akin to Japanese "Marines" ― would regularly deploy to Australia in larger numbers There ― and elsewhere in the region ― they would conduct more complex training alongside US and Australian forces.
Japan is different than it was over a decade ago when the word "amphibious" was taboo. So was the idea of Japanese troops deploying in the Asia-Pacific region.
Indeed, "amphibious" conjured up images of Japan's 1930s and 1940s aggression and the ensuing catastrophe for the Japanese people themselves.
Japan's amphibious force started developing in late 2011 after Operation Tomodachi. It began with the quiet efforts of a few Japanese and Americans who were wise enough not to ask permission from USINDOPACOM or the Pentagon.
In 2018, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was formally activated.
The ARDB symbolizes the shift in the JSDF towards becoming a more regular military. That's a move as much mental as it is a question of hardware and weaponry.
Even early on, the amphibious effort faced surprisingly little public or political opposition. Now it faces none at all. Further evidence of a changed Japan.
Hasegawa's Assessment
However, while the ARDB demonstrates progress, it also reflects the shortcomings in Japan's efforts to build up its defenses.
How so?
Training and exercises such as those planned for the ARDB in Australia, are carefully planned months in advance. The same holds anytime the Self-Defense Force deploys troops overseas.
That is not the same as the Japan Self-Defense Force being able to fight a war.
Rather, consider the difference between a piano player who memorizes one or two songs really well ― but can't read music or perform an actual concert ―– and certainly not on short notice.
A GSDF officer, Captain Kazuki Hasegawa wrote an article in USNI Proceedings in November. He claims the ARBD isn't able to deploy rapidly In the way needed to respond to a real-world contingency or fight a war. (And the same is true for the JSDF Parachute Brigade ー Japan's other "rapid deployment unit.")
As for the ARDB, the main problems include transport, logistics, and training.
Transport
The ARBD lacks organic or assigned ships and air transport. Normally, that would be provided by the overstretched and too-small by half Japan Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces.
As the article notes, the ASDF only has 30 transport aircraft. Also, the MSDF has just three landing ship, tank transports, known as LST, that are most useful for amphibious operations. And even what exists is not well integrated with the ARBD for training, much less for wartime.
Captain Hasegawa states bluntly:
"These numbers are insufficient to meet the intensive transportation demands of airborne and amphibious contingency operations, especially the possible invasion of Japan's most remote islands."
Logistics
The ARDB reportedly lacks the necessary logistics, including weapons and equipment on hand and ready for rapid deployment. It is also without pre-staged stocks of weapons and equipment throughout Japan, including in the southern islands that facilitate ARDB deployment. In short, it is missing the ability to get into action.
Training and Readiness
Captain Hasegawa offers another grim assessment:
"The current JSDF training system makes it difficult to improve or even sustain readiness for its anticipated operations."
It takes a focused effort to prepare a unit for immediate combat. And the ARDB training cycle doesn't lead to having a regiment (a big battalion by US Marine Corps standards) ready to go on immediate notice.
Captain Hasegawa recommends adopting the US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) training and rotation cycle. Simply put, one regiment is greased up and ready to fight while another is in training to be the "ready to go" unit. The third is recovering from being the "on-call" regiment on active operations.
The Captain correctly states that the "backbone" of Japan's defense is coordination with US forces."
Thus the ARDB should match the deployment speed of the Marines. That's not a bad objective for the rest of the JSDF as well.
In closing Captain Hasegawa recommends that to boost ARDB capabilities and interoperability with US forces, more frequent and complex joint training with US forces in Japan, especially the US Marine Corps is needed.
This is sound advice.
But beyond just training together, the Japanese can aim for a high degree of integration with the Americans (and vice versa). That should include writing ARBD into operational plans, joint command and control, and exercises ― so they can fight together, rather than in parallel or separate "battlespaces."
Done right, the ARDB and the Marines (and US Navy) can be a bite-sized proof of concept that might bleed over to the entire JSDF-US forces relationship.
Suggestions
A few ideas to bring this about:
Integrate an ARDB regiment and a Japanese amphibious ship into the Marine Corps' 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on Okinawa and the US Navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) at Sasebo, Japan. These units provide the MEU's amphibious shipping.
- Create a multinational Australia, Japan, US amphibious group. Each nation would provide ships and troops, and operate out of Darwin in northern Australia.
- Form Joint Task Force – Nansei Shoto. Make defense of Japan's southern islands a joint effort, with a headquarters on Okinawa. There, Japanese and Americans could work side-by-side on a real-world problem – and conduct necessary planning, training, patrols, and contingency operations.
Each of these options serves as a "forcing function" to improve capabilities (in the case of ARDB). They would force US and Japanese (and any other forces) to become linked (physically and psychologically) to the point they could conduct real-world short-notice operations of all sorts, including fighting.
Half tongue in cheek, the Marines also might wish to prepare the paperwork for an inter-service transfer for Captain Hasegawa ― and maybe make him a Major as well. At least in this writer's experience, the ruling class in most militaries doesn't like being told it's got problems.
Captain Hasegawa has, nonetheless, done Japan and the US a service by calling a spade a spade.
RELATED:
- 70 Years of the Self-Defense Forces: The Amphibious Brigade's Pledge
- The Japan Self-Defense Force Goes To Australia: That's Good, and That's Bad
- Inside the Izumo: A Look at the Lives of Japan's Largest Destroyer Crew
Author: Grant Newsham
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book "When China Attacks: A Warning To America."
