Was South Korea's Election Rigged? Dr Gong Byeong-ho Speaks Out

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Was South Korea's election rigged? Since President Yoon Suk Yeol's martial law declaration on December 3, this once-sidelined question has resurfaced at the center of South Korea's political debate.

At the heart of President Yoon's controversial move was a pledge to investigate election fraud allegations. Proponents have long claimed that electoral irregularities unfairly skewed the political landscape against the conservative camp.

On the night of the decree, around 300 troops were dispatched to the National Election Commission (NEC) premises to secure its computerized server — evidence some see as a smoking gun.

While many South Koreans still dismiss such claims as fringe conspiracy theories, public sentiment is gradually shifting. Nearly half the nation now supports a formal probe into the NEC over its alleged mishandling of previous elections.

In an exclusive interview with JAPAN Forward, Dr Gong Byeong-ho, a PhD economist from Rice University, weighs in on the controversy.

Election Fraud in Contentious Elections

Can you give an overview of South Korea's electoral fraud controversy?

South Korea's election fraud issue runs deep. For the sake of brevity, I'll focus on two of the most contentious elections: the general elections held on April 15, 2020, and April 20, 2024. In both, the early voting system, first introduced in 2014, was at the core of controversy.

In the 2020 general election, statistically improbable patterns emerged in the early vote. Notably, the liberal Democratic Party candidates consistently outperformed the conservative Future Korea Party in every district nationwide. The Democratic Party's early vote share was on average 12.5 percentage points higher than its same-day voting share, while the Future Korea Party's was 12.5 percentage points lower. This suggests that approximately 25% of additional early votes went to the Democratic Party, amounting to around 2.22 million votes.

The same pattern reappeared in the 2024 general election, where the Democratic Party's early vote share was 13% higher than its same-day vote share, while the conservative People Power Party's was 13% lower.

Such discrepancies are unlikely to occur naturally without external influence. In mathematical terms, this is known as a statistical anomaly. When anomalies of this magnitude arise, a thorough investigation is required.

*Martial law troops take photos of NEC's server on the day of the martial law decree. (©National Assembly Public Administration and Security Committee)*

Early voters may have different preferences than same-day voters, no?

Not in South Korea's elections. By analogy, early and same-day voting are like two siblings born to the same mother — their characteristics should be inherently similar. Although there is a gap of about four days between early voting and election day, it is unrealistic to expect a drastic shift in the electoral composition within such a short period.

Under normal conditions, therefore, the ratio of early voting results should closely resemble both the same-day voting results and the overall voting ratio within a given district. For instance, if candidates A and B have a total vote share of 6:4 in a district, early voting and same-day voting would reflect a similar 6:4 distribution.

In the vast majority of districts during both the 2020 and 2024 general elections, this expected pattern did not hold.

How It Happened

How do you believe the manipulation was carried out?

In South Korea, early voting occurs over two days, five days before same-day voting. During this period, a manipulation value, N, is set for each region. This means that for every x number of early voters, one fake vote is added to the left-wing candidate.

For example, if the manipulation value is 3, one fake vote is inserted for every three real votes. This value varies across different regions and is carried out digitally. An external actor gains access to the Election Commission's internal computer systems and artificially alters the numbers.

Some may question whether such interference is even possible. An investigation by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 2023 suggests that it is. The NIS conducted a security test using simulated hackers to probe for vulnerabilities in the Election Commission's computer network. Their findings revealed that the voting system, counting system, and internal network were all susceptible to external interference.

Before the same-day vote begins, fake ballots corresponding to the number of manipulated votes are physically placed into each district's ballot box. This step ensures that the artificially altered numbers in the system align with the actual vote count.

A truck displaying a sign, "The real insurrection is election fraud." Since the December 3 martial law declaration, many South Koreans have been calling for a formal investigation into the NEC. (©Min Kyung-wook)

How did experts determine the manipulation value (N) for each district?

The Election Commission publishes the vote counts for each candidate in every district. Experts have analyzed these numbers and identified a consistent pattern across districts. By working backward, they discovered a manipulation value, N, which has been systematically applied.

The method involves analyzing the data released by the Election Commission to uncover specific rules or patterns that shaped the results. In other words, it's a process of reverse engineering using the synthetic data provided by the Commission.

Election results should naturally be random, reflecting the independent choices of voters. However, if the vote counts consistently adhere to a discernible pattern, that in itself can serve as evidence of external intervention.

What is the most effective way to verify claims of election fraud?

First, a comprehensive audit of the Election Commission's server system is needed. The 2023 NIS investigation examined only 5% of the servers, leaving much of the system uninspected. If computer manipulation took place, there should be logs or traces of data tampering on the servers, providing critical evidence of fraud.

*National Election Commission headquarters in Gwacheon City, South Korea.*

Another approach is to publish the list of early voters and compare it with the actual voter turnout. By verifying in person whether each individual on the list cast their vote, any discrepancies could provide clear evidence of fraud. The Election Commission has refused to release this list, citing privacy concerns.

Risks in Calling for Investigation

Have you faced any backlash for preaching election fraud claims?

I have spent years researching and tirelessly advocating for election fraud claims. Those of us leading this effort have been dismissed as conspiracy theorists, labeled far-right extremists, and vilified by segments of the media, politicians, and the public.

Recently, a documentary aired in South Korea that took an in-depth look at the electoral fraud allegations. I also made a brief appearance. The film gained national attention and amassed significant views on YouTube.

However, after its broadcast, my wife and I experienced a surge in threatening phone calls and harassment, making it increasingly difficult to live our lives in South Korea. We have thus decided to move abroad and monitor the situation from afar.

Do you have any last words?

Challenging the fairness of elections is not about ideology or partisanship — it's about safeguarding our democracy. If allegations of electoral fraud are dismissed, certain political factions will solidify their grip on power in South Korea for very long.

Author: Kenji Yoshida

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