Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized Japan, accusing it of militarism, at the Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany, on February 13. (Reuters)
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There is a Tibetan proverb that says, "Ill-intended acts only bring self-destruction." The same could be said about China's behavior towards Japan.
China's approach towards Japan has reached an inflection point in the past few months since the autumn of 2025. What began as managed rivalry has now hardened into a posture of sustained pressure. And in doing so, Beijing has locked itself into a strategy that is increasingly being viewed as self-defeating.
Rather than reshaping regional behavior in China's favor, Beijing's hard policy has intuitively accelerated security alignments and deepened its negative perceptions prevailing across East and Southeast Asia. The effects of such a policy are already visible, and its long-term implications are unlikely to favor Beijing.
Over the past year, Beijing has made clear that restraint is no longer its preferred mode of engagement with Tokyo. Chinese coast guard vessels have entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on an almost daily basis. Moreover, there have been repeated intrusions into Japan's territorial waters recorded month after month. In 2025, Japan logged over 356 days of Chinese maritime presence near the islands, a level of operational persistence without precedent in the bilateral relationship.
Politically, Beijing has also hardened its public messaging. It has rejected crisis-management mechanisms when tensions have spiked, instead framing Japan's defense reforms as evidence of militarism rather than reaction.
Economic levers have also been applied selectively, from export control signalling to informal pressure on Japanese firms operating in China. All together, these actions point to a deliberate strategy of normalized coercion rather than episodic deterrence.
A Changed Equilibrium
For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Sino-Japanese relations rested on an uneasy but functional equilibrium. Strategic distrust existed, yet economic interdependence expanded rapidly. Bilateral trade grew from roughly $60 billion USD in 1995 to over $370 billion by 2021. Although political crises were frequent, they were still contained, and neither side treated the other as an inevitable security adversary.
However, China's recent coercive behavior has all but led to a breakdown in bilateral relations. This was further driven by a strategic misreading of Japan's role both in its immediate neighborhood and across Asia. Beijing increasingly frames Tokyo as an extension of a United States containment strategy rather than as an autonomous regional actor with its own strategic calculus.
Take the Southeast Asian states, for instance. Japan is not primarily a security partner. Rather, it is one of the region's largest sources of infrastructure finance, development assistance, and technology transfer. Between 2010 and 2022, Japan committed over $260 billion in infrastructure financing across Asia. Much of it was through the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Asian Development Bank. This presence no doubt carries political weight for countries that see China's bullish behavior.
Japanese firms have also increased investment in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Between 2015 and 2022, Japanese foreign direct investment stock in ASEAN grew by over 40%, while new investments in China plateaued.
This is not decoupling, but it is dilution. The more production networks diversify, the less leverage China retains over regional economic flows.
Eroding Influence
This shift benefits ASEAN states by strengthening their industrial base. However, it simultaneously ends up weakening China's centrality in regional value chains. Economic interdependence becomes thinner, more conditional, and more politically sensitive. For Beijing, this erodes one of its most effective sources of influence.
Pressure on Japan, therefore, does not remain a bilateral issue. When Beijing chose to escalate coercive behavior toward Tokyo, it sent a signal to ASEAN capitals that disputes with China are unlikely to stabilize through diplomacy alone. Furthermore, it signaled that Beijing was willing to sabotage its bilateral ties in pursuit of compliance.
China's posture has also reshaped Japan's domestic security debate in ways that Beijing may not have anticipated. Japan's defense spending, long capped at around 1% of GDP, is now set to reach 2% by fiscal year 2026. In absolute terms, this represents an increase from roughly $50 billion in 2021 to nearly $80 billion annually.
Japan has also acquired counterstrike missile capabilities, expanded joint operational planning with the United States, and reinterpreted constitutional constraints that once limited its military posture. These are responses to perceived shifts in the regional threat environment. Chinese actions have supplied both the strategic rationale and the political legitimacy for Japan's transformation.
Region Reassesses Risks
Trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea has also deepened after years of historical friction. Japan has signed reciprocal access agreements with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Furthermore, it has increased security engagement with Vietnam and Indonesia. These are not symbolic gestures but rather reflect a regional reassessment of risk.
From Beijing's perspective, these alignments are often interpreted as externally orchestrated and as part of a containment strategy. Yet this explanation avoids confronting a central reality: regional actors are adjusting because China's behavior has reduced strategic ambiguity. This has led to countries securing more options in lieu of Beijing's hawkish approach.
The narrative dimension of this shift is equally important. China continues to frame itself as a proponent of peaceful development and regional stability. However, its Japan policy undermines that message. Across Southeast Asia, public opinion surveys consistently show higher trust in Japan than in China. In a recent public survey, over 60% of Southeast Asian respondents viewed Japan as a reliable partner, compared to under 40% for China.
Japan's restraint, institutional embeddedness, and predictability in bilateral behavior contrast sharply with China's coercive signalling. This is causing more countries to hedge their bets with Tokyo instead of Beijing. The contrast has invariably also reinforced a narrative in which Beijing is seen as revisionist and destabilizing. Meanwhile, Tokyo is framed as a status quo actor adapting defensively.
China's Tactical Misstep
At a systemic level, China's Japan policy reflects a deeper conceptual error. Regional order in Asia is not produced through dominance alone. It has historically rested on legitimacy, reassurance, and the ability to coexist with multiple centers of power. By treating Japan primarily as an adversarial player rather than as a competitive partner within a shared regional system, Beijing is only narrowing its own strategic options.
China's Japan policy is therefore not merely a tactical misstep. It is a strategic blunder rooted in a misunderstanding of how influence is generated and sustained in Asia. If Beijing continues on its current trajectory, it will face a region that is increasingly aligned not against China's power, but against its conduct. A recalibrated approach would not require concession or retreat. It would require restraint, predictability, and a return to competitive coexistence.
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Author: Professor Pema Gyalpo, PhD
Dr Pema Gyalpo is a Visiting Professor at the Takushoku University Center for Indo-Pacific Strategic Studies.
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