From left: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa. Quad foreign ministers' meeting on September 22, 2023. New York, United States. (Inside image courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)
Recent developments have somewhat reinforced the growing acceptability and adequacy of minilaterals in Asia's security architecture. For example, the first-ever United States-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit was held on April 11. This was well-timed with a joint maritime patrol in the South China Sea involving the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines on April 7.
Individual Asian countries are observed to assess and interpret security minilaterals in their own ways. However, the predictability of the relevance and objective-delivery mechanisms of these minilaterals remains uncertain.
The Quad and AUKUS
The apprehension is not entirely unfounded. It stems from a glaring case-in-point named Quad. The Quad (comprising India, America, Japan, and Australia) was projected as the cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific's nouveau structured security classification. However, the Quad has not been able to deliver tangibly either by providing security assurances or deterrence.
Thereafter, AUKUS was announced in September 2021. AUKUS is an enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was heralded as the Indo-Pacific's ultimate guarantor in strict traditional security terminology. This partnership involves the transfer of critically sensitive nuclear technology, beginning with the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet to Australia.
The dawn of the AUKUS pushed the Quad to a point where the latter found itself relegated primarily to handling non-traditional security agendas. These include, for example, global health and climate change, etc.
This was amply noticeable during the first-ever in-person September 2021 Quad Leaders' Summit. It was hosted by US President Joe Biden for Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan at the White House. The entire list of agenda items put forth centered around a series of initiatives that placed major focus and attention on arenas of non-traditional security.
US Presence in Asia
In stark contrast, China's belligerent Asia strategy centers on hardcore realpolitik and military avenues. This has only crystallized in a well-orchestrated manner in the past few years. Beijing's raucous rise and ambitions remain incompatible and problematic for America's position and that of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
As the growing material imbalance between Beijing and the rest of the region widens, China's intrepid posture and role in Asia is furthering the probability of a glaring power contest. Furthermore, the Biden administration, especially President Biden, has been rather inaccurate in his assessment of China throughout his political career.
In terms of realpolitik, the US presence and lead in Asia have not been lucidly established. The debate surrounding Washington's relative waning on the global political scene gains momentum. Without any tangible and action-backed pushback, be it AUKUS, Quad, the Japan-US-South Korea pact, or the latest US-Japan-Philippines trilateral, America's primary 21st-century challenger, China, shall only become further emboldened.
As far as Beijing is concerned, it would rather have all these new groupings being announced every once in a while, only to wither away with the passage of time. The fate of the Quad with heavy political capital and resources invested in it, comes across as a big disappointment in terms of sheer deliverables. Perhaps, the only country that is rejoicing in the Quad's current state of affairs and America's credibility crisis vis-à-vis its commitments to its Asian allies and partners is China.
Lacking Concrete Deliverables
This reality underscores the susceptibility of many other key determinants. The US was a preeminent power of the 20th century. Now, however, it finds itself at the strategic crossroads directly at odds with China. This is happening primarily in four key hotspots: the South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Korean Peninsula. Whether or not Asia's minilaterals will succeed in enhancing the network of partnerships across the Indo-Pacific and deliver in empirical terms to counter China remains to be seen.
Asia's security needs balance, continuity in terms of security policy, and deliverables in hardcore realpolitik currency. This, in short, can be interpreted as a pushback to China. Also, it is an effort to reestablish the subverted territorial status quo according to international norms across Asia.
The latest minilateral was launched with much fanfare. However, what Asia's security certainly does not need, and cannot afford, is any further security chaos. That includes the plethora of security announcements that prove to be mere shop talk.
RELATED:
- Lessons From Israel, Timely for Japan
- Birth of an Asian NATO: A New Strategic Alliance Emerges Amid Regional Tensions
- Keio Professor Yuichi Hosoya: Japan-US-South Korea Cooperation is the 'Final Piece' in Abe's Security Vision
- INTERVIEW | India-Japan Relations Now and Moving Forward with Ambassador Sibi George
Author: Dr Monika Chansoria
Learn more about Dr Chansoria and follow her column "All Politics is Global" on JAPAN Forward, and on X (formerly Twitter). The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which she is affiliated.
