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After the Third Plenum: CCP Secrets and Rumors About Xi Jinping's Power

In China where information is scarce, every rumor and news pattern detail is noted, especially when the CCP is opaque about a succession plan for Xi Jinping.

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A giant screen shows news footage of Chinese President Xi Jinping attending the third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, in Beijing, China on July 18, 2024. (©REUTERS/Tingshu Wang)

The much anticipated, repeatedly delayed, closed-door Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has brought us no surprises. Except…for the rampant rumor that Xi Jinping suffered a stroke and had to be rushed to the hospital. With the television reappearance of Xi Jinping on July 20, two days after the session, the rumor finally cooled down. However, the questions remain: Why are people so interested in and so eager to spread this rumor, and what would happen to China if Xi really did suddenly die?  

First of two parts

Why Are People So Interested In Spreading the Rumor?

I believe there are mainly four reasons why people are so interested in rumors about Xi Jinping. 

1. Lack of Transparency

The first reason is the lack of transparency in the information provided by the CCP. 

There was virtually no official information about what was happening during the four days when the Third Plenary Session was on. Instead, the CCP implemented extraordinary measures for controlling information during the session. Former CCP official Du Wen revealed that the mobile phones of all attendees were confiscated. The venue experienced significant electromagnetic interference and intense radio surveillance. No one was allowed to get close to the meeting venue.

Moreover, the Central Propaganda Department must organize all news reports uniformly. Furthermore, before publication, all articles require centralized approval from the CCP's Central Office, etc. 

Du Wen commented that the CCP was more secretive than the underground when it came to meetings. Given the opaque practices, it's difficult to fault people for seeking information through alternative means.

2. An Article Touting Xi Jinping Was Deleted

The second reason is that a major unusual phenomenon actually occurred in the course of the Third Plenary Session. A 10,000-word article touting Xi Jinping was published by Xinhua on July 15, the opening day of the Third Plenary Session. However, it was deleted in its entirety the next day, on July 16. Its presence was cleaned up so completely that one can't find any trace of it at all on Chinese search sites.

Screenshot showing that a search for Xinhua's special article about Xi Jinping on Chinese search site Baidu yields no results. (©Jennifer Zeng)

It is understood that this long article was meant to be a tribute to the session. It must have undergone extensive vetting and meticulous editing before publication. So why was it deleted?

Nobody had any idea at that time. Then, on July 25, Chinese language media The Storm Media revealed that the reason it was deleted was that the article, entitled "Reformer Xi Jinping," portrayed Xi as the successor of Deng Xiaoping's line. Although on the surface it praised Xi, this was not acceptable. Xi did not want to be seen as a successor of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy. So Li Shulei, head of the CCP Propaganda Ministry, urgently ordered it to be taken down.

However, at the time the rumor about Xi's stroke was spreading widely, nobody knew the reason. Therefore, the deletion of this article only added fuel to the fire.

3. Chinese Public's Growing Impatience for Change

The third reason is the public's growing impatience for change.

For instance, on July 15th, searches for the term "stroke" on China's search engine Baidu surged dramatically, only to be subsequently censored.

A Screenshot shows that on July 15, searches for the term "stroke" on China's search engine Baidu surged dramatically. (©Jennifer Zeng)

A Screenshot shows that the term "stroke" was later blocked on the Baidu search index site. (©Jennifer Zeng)

This surge indicates a shift in the mindset of the Chinese populace. Lacking the means to dismantle the CCP's regime, their sole hope rests on the potential opportunities that might arise from the dictator's death.

In other words, the desperate Chinese populace is pinning its hopes on the sudden demise of one individual, perceiving his death as the sole resolution to the current political deadlock. This situation is indeed profoundly tragic for the Chinese people.

Internationally, there are also quite a few who undoubtedly wish that this dictator could go away sooner. 

4. Xi Jinping Has no Successor

The fourth reason stems from the structure of the CCP itself. This is unlike in the United States, where succession is clearly defined by law in the event of a president's sudden death, preventing significant political turmoil.

However, the CCP system lacks mechanisms for leadership succession. Moreover, Xi Jinping's elimination of term limits not only signals his intention to remain in power forever but also leaves no appointed successor. 

Consequently, any health issues he might face could unpredictably disrupt both China's political landscape and global affairs.

Given these circumstances, people naturally show extra concern about the health of Xi Jinping.

Key Takeaways from the Third Plenum Communique 

Critics argue that the 5000-word communique from the Third Plenum lacks meaningful content and fails to offer any valuable proposals.

However, upon reviewing it closely, I identified several noteworthy aspects.

First, the document acknowledges the "severe and complex international environment and the heavy domestic tasks of reform, development, and stability." This indicates that the CCP is acutely aware of the intense pressures it faces both at home and abroad. It is conscious of the crises it is facing. 

Second, the communique, while reaffirming commitment to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, unusually references other CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents,' and Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook on Development. Those come before it concludes with the need to "fully implement Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era."

In many recent official CCP documents, after mentioning Mao Zedong, the text has jumped straight to Xi Jinping, with no mention of the three leaders in between. 

So, the fact that they added the other three leaders back suggests that Xi Jinping may be experiencing pushback from other party factions. 

Third, the communique addresses the need to both "liberate" and "regulate" the economy. This envisions steadfastly consolidating and developing the state-owned sector while equally supporting the growth of the non-state sector, aiming to establish a unified national market. However, the primary focus is on creating this unified market and enhancing regulatory measures.

Fourth, it discusses employing a national approach to advance science and education. This reflects the CCP's awareness of its technological lag and the pressures of US sanctions. 

So the CCP's next step is to focus on achieving breakthroughs in high-tech fields.

The communique also highlights the emerging technological revolution and industrial transformation. Specifically, it acknowledges the opportunities and challenges posed by the rise of AI.

'Absolute Control' of the Military

Furthermore, it emphasizes maintaining the Party's absolute control over the military. In doing so, it indicates it will pursue achieving the military's centennial goals, building a modern socialist country, and striving for the second centennial goals through Chinese-style modernization to drive the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, etc. 

This suggests that the CCP continues to harbor ambitions of "reclaiming" Taiwan and achieving global dominance. It also indicates that Xi intends to remain in power forever, as the goal for 2049 has already been laid out. 

However, overall, Xi Jinping's name is mentioned only six times. That is down by one-third from the nine mentions in the 2023 communique, indicating potential internal opposition and constraints on his personal rule.

'Deepening Reform' Equates End of Reform

Upon reading the lengthy "Resolution" adopted at the third plenary session, some commentators say the so-called "deepening reform" means the official end of the reforms as people knew them before. 

In the face of a series of major economic and social crises, the CCP has not offered any effective solutions.

Instead, people see local governments being given more power to tax the public, the possibility of real estate taxes being imposed, and a higher cost of living.

In a word, the CCP has no solution to the fiscal crisis. And the only thing it can do is to continue to squeeze money from the people.

Xi Jinping Forced to 'Personally' Refute 'Rumors'

China Central Television (CCTV) evening news on July 18, the closing day of the Third Plenum, is joked to be one of the most watched newscasts in recent years. So many people were waiting to see whether Xi Jinping would appear after the rumors that he suffered a stroke had spread rampantly for days. 

He did appear, looking perfectly normal. Some people stopped talking about his rumored stroke. However, many still tried to fervently prove that the CCTV report was faked. Among them were Du Wen, and former high-profile CCP party school professor Cai Xia. Du Wen once served as a legal adviser to Hu Chunhua, the current Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, who was once designated by Hu Jintao as Xi Jinping's successor.

On July 19, Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, suddenly died. In an unusual gesture, as soon as July 20, the following day, Xi Jinping personally led a delegation to the Vietnamese Embassy in China to offer condolences. Accompanying him were key figures such as the CCP's de facto number two figure Cai Qi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. 

All seven members of the CCP's Standing Committee of the Politburo, as well as key institutions, sent wreaths to the Vietnamese embassy. They included the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the National People's Congress, the State Council, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central Military Commission, the International Liaison Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Beijing Municipal Committee and Government. 

CCTV aired a 4-minute and 20-second video report on the death.

Surprising Emphasis on a Foreign Death

Why is this unusual? 

In August 2020, when the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Kha Phieu passed away, the CCP only sent Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, to the Vietnamese Embassy in China to pay respects seven days later.

CCTV only aired a 37-second news report.

A year earlier in May 2019, former Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh passed away. That time, the CCP sent only Liu Qibao, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, to the Vietnamese Embassy in China to pay respects 12 days later. 

Xinhua News Agency only published a one-line news report without a photo, and no video report from CCTV was found.

Former General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Do Muoi passed away in October 2018. That time, the CCP sent Yang Jiechi alone to the Vietnamese Embassy in China to pay respects, five days afterward. CCTV aired a 38-second news report.

Chinese people often say, "When something unusual happens, there must be a reason." So what could be the reason for Xi's unusual appearance on July 20?

Obviously, it was to offer "stronger" evidence of his health status, to further subdue the stroke rumors.

The sad thing is that some people found more "evidence" that the person appearing on the TV news was not Xi Jinping. Rather, they argued, he was instead a body double.  

I don't quite agree with these arguments. Nevertheless, the fact that people don't want to believe the CCP anymore no matter what reflects the CCP's awkward position. Perhaps it is a retribution of the CCP's years of rumor-mongering. 

Next in Part Two: Post-Third CCP Plenum, What Would Happen If Xi Suddenly Died? 

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Author: Jennifer Zeng
Find articles by Jennifer Zeng on JAPAN Forward. Follow her on X (formerly Twitter) and on her blog page, Jennifer's World.