Ministry of Defense
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Nagatacho and Kasumigaseki, Japan's political and bureaucratic nerve centers, are reeling from an unprecedented "triple shock." First, Sanae Takaichi defied almost every prediction by winning the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) leadership election.
Second, the longstanding LDP-Komeito coalition, a partnership that shaped Japanese politics for 26 years, has abruptly come to an end as Komeito leaves the government. And third, and most dramatically, a new coalition has been formed with Nippon Ishin no Kai.
Ishin is a party that openly advocates revising the constitution (especially Article 9) and fundamentally strengthening Japan's intelligence system.
Policies of the Takaichi Administration
The speed of this political upheaval has left many observers stunned. Some welcome the changes with enthusiasm, while others are openly resistant.
For politicians and bureaucrats who grew accustomed to the long-running LDP–Komeito framework, the sweeping policy shifts pursued by the Takaichi administration have been especially disorienting.
Yet in reality, many of the initiatives Takaichi is now advancing are not sudden departures at all. They are policies that the LDP has debated internally for years. One of the clearest examples is the push to fundamentally strengthen Japan's intelligence capabilities.
On her very first day in office, Prime Minister Takaichi issued written instructions to her Cabinet. She directed Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara to "work with relevant ministers to examine how to enhance the government's overall intelligence command-and-control functions."
A prime minister directly instructing the chief cabinet secretary to reinforce Japan's intelligence command structure is, as far as records show, unprecedented in postwar history.
A Strategy Ahead of Public Awareness
The prioritization of intelligence as a core national strategy did not begin with Takaichi, however. It took shape under the Fumio Kishida administration, which revised the National Security Strategy in December 2022.
The updated strategy made clear that Japan must strengthen not only its diplomacy and economy, but also its military capabilities, intelligence capacity, and technological power.
A stark assessment drove this shift: Japan now faces "the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II," bordered by nuclear-armed China, Russia, and North Korea.
Compounding this is the relative decline of the United States' power. This means Japan can no longer assume that the American security umbrella will offer the same level of protection as in the past.
Yet it is doubtful that the Japanese public fully understands the dangers posed by China, Russia, and North Korea.
Take the Taiwan-contingency scenario. The government has begun planning for the evacuation of residents from Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands. However, that sense of urgency has not spread to the rest of the country.
The core reason is a chronic shortage of government-provided information, stemming from Japan's limited capacity to properly investigate and analyze the realities of these crises.
Japan's Intelligence Analysis System
Japan has multiple intelligence-gathering bodies. These include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Police Agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, and the Japan Coast Guard.
However, for many years, the information they collected was trapped in what officials called a "triple deadlock." That is, agencies did not share information with one another, reports failed to reach the Prime Minister's Office, and sensitive details sometimes leaked externally.
To break this deadlock, the second Shinzo Abe administration enacted the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated State Secrets in 2013. The law tightened controls on leaks. Additionally, it established a formal framework to ensure that intelligence gathered across ministries would be reliably transmitted to the Prime Minister's Office.
Still, while Japan has improved the channels for collecting information, it has yet to build a unified, integrated system for analyzing it as a whole.
Toward a New Bureau
Meanwhile, since the Abe administration, Japan has steadily expanded its intelligence partnerships. Tokyo has signed information-protection agreements with the US, NATO, France, Australia, and, more recently, with the United Kingdom, India, Italy, South Korea, and Germany. As a result, the volume of classified information flowing into Japan from abroad has increased dramatically.
Recognizing the need for a stronger system to handle this influx, the LDP's Research Commission on Public Security, chaired by former defense minister Itsunori Onodera, issued a set of recommendations on April 26, 2022. The proposal called for the creation of a new national intelligence secretariat to more fully integrate intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis across the government.
Building on this, the LDP–Ishin coalition agreement explicitly states that during the 2026 ordinary Diet session, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and the Director of Cabinet Intelligence will be elevated. They will be reorganized into a national intelligence secretariat headed by a director.
Protecting Our Freedom and Independence
In short, Japan's push to strengthen its intelligence capabilities is not some sudden policy lurch. It is the culmination of a years-long effort to respond proactively to what is now the most difficult and complex security environment Japan has faced since World War II.
That said, some misunderstandings remain.
The planned national intelligence secretariat is not meant to function like the US Central Intelligence Agency. Establishing a full-fledged foreign-intelligence service would require a fundamental overhaul of Japan's legal framework.
The first step is to establish the national intelligence secretariat. From there, Japan can thoroughly study the legal framework, operations, budgets, and personnel systems necessary to establish an intelligence structure that meets Western standards. It can then explain each step carefully to the public.
That is because creating a national security system that includes an external intelligence service, effectively a form of rearmament, requires a broad public consensus and resolve. It rests on two shared convictions: that a country must protect itself, and that safeguarding the freedom and human rights of its people depends on national security. In other words, Japan must move beyond the passive assumption that the US will protect us when the time comes.
Japan's freedom and independence are not gifts from others. They are something the Japanese people must secure with their own hands.
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(Read the article in Japanese.)
Author: Michio Ezaki
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