Seeing stability beyond unpredictability, recent developments in the US-Japan alliance have been received well in India, further strengthening trilateral ties.
Hegseth Nakatani in Japan

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reviews an honor guard with Defense Minister Gen Nakatani at the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo on the morning of March 30.

On March 30, in a joint press conference in Tokyo, United States Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the Defense Department (DoD) had started phase one of upgrading US Forces Japan to a joint force headquarters. The planned reform would be the biggest organizational change since the establishment of US Forces Japan (USFJ). A Joint Statement of the 2024 US-Japan Defense and Foreign Ministerial Meeting (2+2) announced the upgrade, shifting from a primarily administrative command over all US forces stationed in Japan to a joint force headquarters reporting to the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). 

The intent is to reconstruct USFJ with more warfighting and operational responsibilities. DoD originally announced the plan in 2024 as an extension of the idea mooted by then-President Joe Biden with the agreement of Japan. It signals a major revamp of the US military command in Japan to deepen coordination with Tokyo's forces. 

What does this hold for Japan and the US-Japan partnership? How is India placed in the broader Indo-Pacific framework?

How it Works

This move will place a combined US operational commander in Japan, who would be a counterpart to the head of a joint operation command established by Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Japan's Joint Operations Command was established in March 2025 with responsibility for the unified command of the Self-Defense Forces. This latest development will help improve the command's ability to operate further. It signifies the urgency of having a joint force headquarters and allows for more cooperation in real time. 

Hegseth listed three core pillars, including reestablishing deterrence, restoring the warrior ethos, and rebuilding the military. 

Japan currently hosts 50,000 US military personnel, squadrons of fighter jets, and Washington's only forward-deployed aircraft carrier strike group along a 3,000-km (1,900-mile) East Asian archipelago.

The reorganization of USFJ into a warfighting headquarters would necessitate increased staff and the empowerment of USFJ's commander with the authority needed to accomplish new missions. Therefore, as part of the USFJ's upgrade, DOD will soon add additional personnel to both Tokyo and USFJ headquarters at Yokota Air Base. This would aid in conducting activities that strengthen bilateral bonds with the US military's Japanese counterparts and deepen operational cooperation. 

A member of the JGSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (left) deploys with US Marines during the Japan-US joint training exercise "Iron Fist" on March 11, 2024, on Okinoerabujima, Kagoshima Prefecture. (©Kyodo)

What To Expect

Expect an improvement in the warfighting capabilities and lethality. As well, the changes would enhance readiness to respond to any contingency or crisis in the region. It is closely related to situational awareness, driven by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. 

The reorganization would serve the twin purpose of defending Japanese territory and supporting US operations in the Indo-Pacific region. It also marks a commitment to sustaining a ready, robust and credible deterrence throughout the US INDOPACOM area of operations. An alliance that is robust and considers both the reality and the perception of deterrence.

In his first term, US President Donald Trump said that Japan should pay more to host US troops. He also complained that the bilateral defense treaty, in which Washington pledges to defend Tokyo, was not reciprocal. In the earlier stance, the US made it clear Japan should not assume the US presence would last forever. 

This latest development stands in stark contrast to the earlier trend. It points to a larger equation as US policy reiterates that America will continue to work closely with its key Asian ally.

President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba shake hands on February 7 in Washington. (©Prime Minister's Office)
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What Changes

The two sides agreed to accelerate a plan to produce beyond-visual-range air-to-air AMRAAM missiles jointly. They also agreed to consider collaborating on the production of SM-6 surface-to-air defense missiles to help ease a munitions shortage. 

Additionally, Japan is doubling military spending, including money to purchase longer-range missiles under its remilitarization program. This reflects the major leap forward in bilateral defense industrial integration and operational readiness. It could potentially be a force multiplier for the Indo-Pacific regional security framework.

Furthermore, beyond air combat, the Japan Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces also maintain a wide array of US-made or co-developed systems. These include the Aegis Combat System deployed on Japan's advanced destroyers. Other assets include the upcoming Aegis Ashore missile defense system, Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile batteries, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, AH-64D Apache, and interoperable naval assets designed to operate jointly with the US Navy's 7th Fleet. Additionally, a robust network of US military bases across the Japanese archipelago reinforces the US-Japan alliance. These include Kadena Air Base, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Misawa Air Base, among others.  

Japan's Constitutional Constraint

Expanding the bilateral presence in Japan's southwest region is also a top priority for the US-Japan alliance. This should strengthen their combined defense posture. Meanwhile, the parties are conducting more sophisticated and realistic bilateral training and exercises while gaining the understanding of local communities. 

The southwest region has overtaken northern Japan in Tokyo's defense concerns due to activities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in recent years. China's military has been regularly transiting and conducting operations in the international waters around Japan's southwest islands. 

Japan's constitution, adopted after World War II, remains a sensitive issue for the Japanese leaders and people. Terms of the constitution constrain Tokyo by renouncing the right to make war, disrupting the operational scope of the Japanese forces. Existing policy and structures also further highlight the challenges. 

Tokyo's shift away from its existing defensive posture to a more offensive strike capability, referred to as the "counterstrike capability," has likely propelled the United States' willingness to coordinate closely with its Japanese counterparts. Nevertheless, Japan has to tread the tightrope between remilitarization and maintaining its past image as a pacifist nation. Despite its limitations, the US-Japan partnership presents opportunities for creative solutions to meet operational requirements and address common security threats.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Prime Minister Narendra Modi meet on the side of ASEAN. October 10, 2024 (©Prime Minister's Office)
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Reading India in this Context

India-Japan's "Special Strategic and Global Partnership" has catalyzed in the last decade. This blossomed based on the personal chemistry between their leaders, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the late PM Shinzo Abe. It can also be attributed to Abe's strategic outreach and the broader idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific

Recent developments in the US-Japan alliance have been received well in India. They are seen as a force multiplier, further strengthening triangular ties between India, Japan, and the US. 

Japan remains a critical element of India's Act East Policy and a vital pillar in enhancing strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. At the Advantage Assam 2.0, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar reiterated India's commitment to the 'Act East, Act Fast, and Act First policy'. Minilateral cooperation under QUAD and the India-Japan-US trilateral dialogue are proving to be areas of serious defense and security cooperation. This includes undersea cable networks to enhance digital connectivity and resilience in the Indo-Pacific, with initiatives like the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience. 

Maritime domain awareness through multilateral exercises such as Dharma Guardian (India-Japan) and Tiger Triumph (India-US) further expand the scope of collaboration, including in the Bay of Bengal. Additionally, defense cooperation between India and Japan has been on a path of ascendancy

In November 2024, India and Japan signed an agreement for Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN) masts for Indian naval warships. The deal comes under the bilateral agreement on defense equipment and technology transfer in 2015. Co-development of the UNICORN mast would increase stealth characteristics for Indian Naval warships. Once implemented, it would be the first case to export Japan's defense technology. 

Tokyo is also seen as a trusted and reliable partner for developmental activities in India. It balances China's assertiveness, ensuring regional stability and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.

US Commitments

Hegseth's push under Trump 2.0 reflects clear strategic commitments to strengthen the existing partnership. It is followed by concrete measures to boost deterrence capabilities in response to evolving security dynamics while solidifying long-term cooperation. 

Hegseth's statement that "... 'America First' does not mean America alone" reflects a nuanced articulation of Trump's 'America First' policy. It suggests that while the US prioritizes its own interests, it remains engaged in global security affairs. 

President Trump and Prime Minister Modi share comments at the White House on February 14, 2025 (Screenshot)

Hegseth's approach acknowledges the concerns among partner countries that fear a reduction in US commitments to multilateral defense arrangements. India welcomes the confluence of defense cooperation and any stance that solidifies existing arrangements and further strengthens the trilateral partnership.

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Conclusion

Japan remains an indispensable partner for both America and India in tackling Chinese aggression in the region. It is a cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. 

Trump and Ishiba have also affirmed their determination to pursue a new golden age for US-Japan relations. This reflects their shared desire for bilateral security and defense cooperation under the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. By providing extended deterrence, their enhanced relationship would be a win-win situation for all, including India. 

Meanwhile, the Joint Command Headquarters inches towards a larger goal of strengthening US alliances and partnerships and achieving a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

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Author: Varuna Shankar

Varuna Shankar is an editorial manager of India's World Magazine (New Delhi)

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