Cabinet officials look on as PM Takaichi addresses a press conference on January 19. (©Prime Minister's Office)
The Sanae Takaichi administration, launched in October 2025, has made a flying start in foreign and security policy.
Early engagements with Southeast Asian leaders, followed by a carefully choreographed rendezvous with President Donald Trump in Tokyo, projected clarity of purpose and diplomatic confidence.
I received messages from former prime ministers Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison, with whom I had forged close relationships during my tenure as Japan's Ambassador to Australia. Both offered unreserved praise.
Their responses reflected a broader revival of international expectations toward Japan, following a period of relative absence after the end of the Shinzo Abe era.
China, Once Again
Yet the real test was never far away. And as expected, it emerged on the Chinese front.
Calls for Takaichi to retract her Diet response have emerged not only from Beijing but also from some Japanese opposition parties and members of the expert community.
The remarks in question, however, did no more than restate basic legal principles in response to a hypothetical contingency raised in the Lower House Budget Committee in November.
Having spent four decades as a diplomat navigating divisions over the Japan–United States security treaty, participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and collective self-defense, I found the reaction exasperatingly familiar.
At the same time, it laid bare the political and diplomatic constraints within which Takaichi's foreign policy must operate.
Despite the advent of the Takaichi era, certain longstanding problems from the Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba periods continue to linger.
When Appeasement Backfires
The first is "China-pandering." The root of the problem lay not in Takaichi's response, but in the outrageous remarks made by Xue Jian, China's consul general in Osaka.
While merely a junior diplomat in rank, Xue hurled a barrage of inflammatory insults, including a threat to "cut the dirty head right off" the host country's prime minister.
By any international standard, such conduct would constitute grounds for being declared persona non grata.
But the Japanese government, wary of provoking friction, hesitated. That hesitation proved consequential. It enabled Beijing to shift its focus from the controversy, redirecting domestic and international attention away from Xue's conduct and toward Takaichi's response.
Surrendering the Narrative
The second problem is the delay and weakness in responding to information and cognitive warfare. Beijing not only succeeded in shifting the focus of the debate, but once again played the "history card," accusing Japan of "returning to militarism" and disparaging it on that basis.
Passive responses with platitudes such as "postwar Japan has been a good boy" would not resonate with the international community.
Japan should instead state plainly that China's continued massive military expansion and persistent belligerent rhetoric compel neighboring countries to take defensive measures.
It should also make clear that Beijing's unwillingness to commit to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue leaves Japan with no choice but to respond — including, if necessary, through the limited exercise of collective self-defense.
The timidity of Japan's foreign policy messaging on this front is difficult to overstate.
Deterrence as Diplomacy
That said, Prime Minister Takaichi must not be left to fight alone. Precisely because this is the Takaichi administration, Japan's diplomatic authorities must shift gears and provide firm, proactive support.
The central challenge confronting Japanese diplomacy today is how to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities to prevent a Taiwan contingency from ever materializing.
In this context, it was prudent not to rush into alignment with Beijing and Moscow in labeling the American military operation against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro a "violation of international law."
Following airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in 2025, the US again demonstrated overwhelming military and intelligence capabilities by successfully executing an operation against Venezuela — a nation that should have been on high alert.
It was precisely this display of power that would have unsettled Xi Jinping. And precisely, that is how such demonstrations are meant to function as deterrence.
No Equilateral Triangle
As I argue in my book The Malady of Worshipping America, it's a fundamental mistake to treat Japan–US relations and Japan–China relations as separate.
The notion of an equilateral triangle in which the two relationships carry equal strategic weight is untenable. What matters instead is a realist calculation of how Japan can leverage American power when confronting the national-security challenges posed by China's rise.
To that end, Prime Minister Takaichi's visit to Washington in March is crucial. Japan cannot afford a posture of subservience, whether by scurrying to avoid offending President Trump or by relying on excessive flattery.
Rather, Takaichi must engage him directly, step confidently into his inner circle, and ensure that Japan's interests and strategic perspectives are clearly conveyed and fully understood. This is precisely the role she is uniquely positioned to fulfill.
It is also Japan's responsibility to caution Trump against overreaching in his eagerness to make his April visit to China a success.
The bitter memory of December 2008 still lingers. Just ahead of the Japan–China–South Korea summit hosted by Japan, Chinese government vessels entered Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands for the first time.
Beijing has long exploited its counterparts' desire for diplomatic success, using high-profile engagements to extract even incremental strategic gains.
Time for a Credible Stick
Moreover, the Takaichi government must not turn a blind eye to the abductions issue. Nor can it afford to lose sight of North Korea, which has continued to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while repeatedly dispatching troops to the war in Ukraine.
The reality is that Tokyo's diplomatic approach centered on dangling post-normalization compensation as a carrot has produced no tangible results.
What is required now is a credible stick. Both the establishment of a new intelligence agency, as stipulated in the ruling party coalition agreement, and the enactment of a comprehensive anti-espionage law are urgent priorities.
Precisely because these issues have long been debated, the public now expects the Takaichi administration to match ambition with action.
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Author: Shingo Yamagami, former Ambassador of Japan to Australia
(Read this in Japanese)
