Masatoshi Muto and Sotetsu Ri reflect on the implications of Yoon's sudden exit, the fragile democracy in South Korea and stakes in the pivotal election ahead.
featured photo Muto Ri Interview Kenji Yoshida

(Office of the President of ROK)

The relationship between Japan and South Korea has undergone a remarkable turnaround in recent years. What seemed like a diplomatic deadlock under former President Moon Jae In's stridently anti-Japan agenda quickly gave way to rapprochement following the inauguration of Yoon Suk-yeol in May 2022.

From the outset, Yoon quickly moved to address the thorny wartime labor dispute. His third-party compensation scheme — a politically risky but conciliatory move by Seoul — helped defuse the lingering tensions that had brought bilateral ties to a near standstill.

Yoon and then–Prime Minister Fumio Kishida went on to meet more frequently than any of their predecessors. They forged deeper cooperation on security, economy, and shared historical grievances. Such efforts culminated in the landmark Camp David Accords with their mutual ally, the United States, in August 2023. 

But all of this now hangs in the balance. In early April, South Korea's Constitutional Court ruled to remove Yoon from office over his controversial declaration of emergency martial law in December. Adding to the uncertainty is the ascent of opposition leader Lee Jae-myung — a staunch progressive and longtime critic of Japan. He leads the polls ahead of the June 3 snap presidential election.

In this dialogue, Masatoshi Muto and Sotetsu Ri reflect on the implications of Yoon's sudden exit, South Korea's fragile democracy, and what's at stake in the pivotal election ahead. Muto is a veteran diplomat who served as Japan's ambassador to South Korea from 2010 to 2012. Ri is a historian at Ryukoku University and a prolific commentator on Korean Peninsula affairs.

Facilitated by JAPAN Forward, this dialogue took place on April 1, 2025. Excerpts follow.

The Shadow of Political Instability

Muto: This year marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea. The current political instability in South Korea has cast a shadow over the future of bilateral ties. How do you see the situation unfolding, Dr. Ri?

Cover of Anti-Japan, Pro-North Korea: South Korea Should be Subjected to Sanctions!, a 2019 book coauthored by Muto and Ri.

Ri: When it comes to Japan-Korea relations, until now, the two countries have inherently maintained diplomatic ties, driven by security and economic interdependence. There were moments, especially during the Moon Jae In administration, when it seemed efforts were being made to deliberately undermine the relationship. 

However,  we are now entering a new phase. Going forward, utilizing anti-Japanese sentiment as a political weapon won't be easy. There are three main reasons for this, I think.

First, South Korea's economy has grown nearly on par with Japan's. This is a significant shift. And in turn, the resentment or inferiority that once fueled anti-Japanese sentiment has largely diminished.

Second, in the past, the media have played a major role in the deterioration of bilateral relations. Traditional outlets often edited out inconvenient parts of press conferences or government statements and sensationalized certain narratives. But with the advancement of digital media, the landscape has changed. The monopoly of legacy media over information has eroded, and today, the two states can engage with each other directly, without the same filters.

Third, people-to-people exchanges between the two countries have become far more frequent. Travel between Japan and [South] Korea has surged. In the last fiscal year alone, over 12 million civilians crossed between the two countries — an all-time high. 

Will There Be an Anti-Japan Resurgence?

Muto: In the past, Japan-Korea relations were largely shaped by disputes over historical grievances, such as issues related to wartime history, the Takeshima [Dokdo] territorial dispute, and visits to Yasukuni Shrine

Then-President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima [Dokdo] island in August 2012, triggering major friction between Tokyo and Seoul (©South Korea Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism)

In recent years, however, civic exchanges have become increasingly vibrant. Grassroots engagement is beginning to define the bilateral relationship in a way that stands apart from political confrontation. The challenge now is how to cultivate this positive momentum.

South Koreans are, by and large, becoming more favorable toward Japan, while Japanese interest in Korean culture, cuisine, and society continues to grow. Mutual familiarity and understanding are deepening on both sides.

The question, then, is how to respond if a future South Korean president once again adopts an explicitly anti-Japan posture. Political approaches rooted in anti-Japan rhetoric are losing their effectiveness, and the Moon Jae In administration may well be the last to rely so heavily on that strategy. However, should opposition leader Lee Jae-myung ascend to the presidency, there is a possibility of a resurgence of such policies.

Ri: I agree. Aside from his anti-Japan rhetoric, Lee Jae-myung has consistently taken a pro-China and pro-North Korea stance. In particular, many individuals within his inner circle have connections to pro-North Korean groups, and Lee himself maintains close ties with entities like the Eastern Gyeonggi Alliance. 

Lee Jae-myung, the opposition leader and frontrunner of the 2025 snap presidential election (©Lee Jae-myung Facebook)

Even during the impeachment proceedings, several lawmakers from the Democratic Party, led by National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, traveled to China to meet with President Xi Jinping. All signs indicate that if a Lee administration were to come to power, it would likely be a pro-China government. This should be a serious concern not only for South Korea but also for the Trump administration.

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Tokyo-Seoul Relations if Lee Jae-myung is President

Muto: Lee Jae-myung may be adopting a pragmatic diplomatic stance, recognizing that worsening Japan and South Korea's relations are not in anyone's best interest. Recently, he has begun to approach Japan more closely. I remain skeptical of his motivations. 

As a populist, his shift toward pro-Japan policies seems simply part of an election strategy. I question his true intentions. Even if he attempts to pursue a pro-Japan policy, those around him will try to maintain a hardline anti-Japan stance.

That said, I don't believe Japan's fundamental approach will change. For instance, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi and Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya have been largely friendly toward South Korea. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani also values relations with South Korea. And I am confident that Minister Yoji Muto of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry shares this commitment.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul meets with Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa in March 2025 (©MOFA)

About the December Declaration of Martial Law

Ri: After all, the current political drama in South Korea was triggered by President Yoon's declaration of martial law on December 3 of last year (2024). It would be remiss of us not to address this at least briefly.

Muto: Of course. President Yoon's emergency martial law, in my view, could not have been a worse decision. I first visited South Korea in 1975 and befriended a former ambassador to Japan who the South Korean authorities had arrested during the past military regime. He was subjected to waterboarding as part of the torture. The horrors of martial law of that era continue to haunt many. 

Of course, the December 3 martial law declaration was lifted within hours. From President Yoon's perspective, he was likely feeling cornered by the opposition-dominated National Assembly, which refused to pass the budget and was impeaching cabinet ministers and government officials willy-nilly. But that said, declaring emergency martial law was the worst possible way to break the deadlock.

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Implications for South Korea's Democratic System

Muto: Ordinary Japanese might find it hard to understand why left-wing forces hold such significant power in South Korea. In Japan, events like the Asama-Sanso Incident led to widespread disillusionment with the Red Army, sparking a strong opposition to the left. In South Korea, however, the situation is quite different. 

Following the Gwangju Incident in 1980, there remains a prevailing sentiment that the leftist activists were key in advancing democracy. As a result, many Koreans in their 40s and 50s continue to identify with left-wing ideologies.

Ri: I think the December 3 martial law highlighted imperfections in South Korea's democratic system. Notably, the power of the National Assembly is too strong, and there is no effective way for the executive branch to counterbalance it. If the National Assembly can impeach the sitting president, the president should also have the right to dissolve the legislature. 

Young protesters take to the streets, demanding Yoon’s reinstatement as president (©Presidential Public Defender Team)

I can't argue that the December 3 martial law was entirely justified. How it was implemented was particularly problematic. Yet, we must understand that imposing emergency martial law is an inherent authority granted to the president by the Constitution, and President Yoon executed that right. 

Disrupting Government from the Left

Ri: Over the past two and a half years, the disruptive actions of Lee Jae-myung and his opposition party have effectively paralyzed the National Assembly. It's somewhat disappointing that President Yoon did not make more of an effort to engage with the media and explain the opposition's shortcomings. But given the media's strong leftward lean and its persistent criticism of his administration, he might have felt gridlocked. 

Muto: For President Yoon, there may have been no way out. But if he was going to take such a drastic step, it should have been executed with more clarity and strategic justification. 

Had he, for instance, built a case around the issue of North Korean infiltration and highlighted its connection to the opposition, he could have framed martial law as a necessary measure to prevent the country from falling under hostile influence. If he had presented it as a last-ditch effort to safeguard national security, the public response might have been different.

Ri: That is what's truly puzzling. The Yoon administration should have articulated its reasons for declaring martial law more clearly and cohesively. Rather than leaving the public confused, they should have focused squarely on the core issue. That is, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party are colluding with anti-state forces and actively dismantling the functions of the national government. The government could have gone as far as seeking to dissolve the party on such grounds. 

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Author: Kenji Yoshida

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